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FROM

By mail







# **Japanese Intervention**

in the

## **Russian Far East**



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By mail

# Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East

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## INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Tsarist Russia and Japan, which culminated in actual warfare, was brought about by the identity of the policies of the two countries in Korea and Manchuria, and in part in Mongolia. Both sides, although they professed to the outer world the principles of independence, were actually aiming not only to gain a foothold in those regions, but to establish themselves there both economically and politically. When Japan, having acquired rights to Liao-tung as a result of the war with China in 1894, was obliged to return this district to China, after the protests of Russia, Germany and France, this step, in which the chief part was played by Russia, could of course not gain the sympathies of the Japanese. All the more was this the case, when Russia soon after (in 1896) obtained a valuable concession in Manchuria, namely, the zone for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, two years later obtained the lease of the aforesaid Liao-tung (Port Arthur), and then, after a further two years, under cover of the Boxer uprising, occupied Manchuria. The effort of Russia in 1901 to legalize this seizure immediately encountered the opposition of Japan. The real threat involved of as successful an aggression on the part of Tsarist Russia in Korea, manifestly imposed upon Japan the ineluctable conflict with Russia unless Japan should be willing to reconcile herself to defeat.

But the events following upon the defeat of Tsarist Russia revealed the fact that Japan, emboldened by her victory, already harbored desires of another kind: she not only was not satisfied with the victory in Korea and Southern Manchuria, not only had designs on Northern Manchuria, but began to display open tendencies to fortify herself on the Far Eastern shores of Russia itself.

These tendencies at first manifested themselves in two directions: in the effort to obtain the dominating influence in the fisheries rights in the Far East and in the attempt to force a path, first, to the Chinese Sungari, then to the Amur, after

having obtained navigation rights. In 1907 a fisheries convention was concluded, in accordance with the terms of the Portsmouth treaty, but the Japanese were not satisfied with the rights granted to them to undertake fishing on the Russian shores of the Okhotsk Sea, the Japan Sea and the Behring Sea (excluding bights and rivers), on terms similar to those enjoyed by Russian citizens, but also desired to have fisheries rights in the Russian bights and rivers, where, in view of the weakness of Russian capital in the Far East, such rights would be equivalent to a complete predominance of the Japanese in Russian Far Eastern fisheries.

The Japanese did not succeed in 1907 in realizing this ambition, but the very attempt was significant and revealed the Japanese tendencies, which were soon to be heard from again, at the first favorable moment.

The attempts of the Japanese to obtain a legal right to navigate the Sungari (then navigated only by Chinese and Russians) and the Amur, were made a number of times, and the Tsarist Government, after its defeat on the fields of Manchuria, was obliged to fight stubbornly against these efforts of the victorious Japanese. Although she was fighting obstinately with Russia in China, aiming to force her out of the country, as well as out of Korea and Southern Manchuria, Japan nevertheless concluded a number of secret agreements with Russia, having as their general aim to combat the efforts of other powers to establish themselves in China. The publication of the secret treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912 and 1916 has been particularly interesting in this connection.

When Tsarist Russia was occupied on the German front and left the Far East exposed, the Japanese, under these conditions so difficult for Russia, attempted again to bring up these questions, and almost obtained a favorable solution of them, but special effort was put forth after the Revolution, and particularly after the civil war.

There was then revealed a complete program "to conquer" the Russian Far East not only economically but also politically, and the same methods that had been applied by Japan and Tsarist Russia with regard to China and Korea were also used by Japan with regard to Russian territories.

The characteristic feature of this policy in the Russian Far East has been the cautiousness with which Japan proceeded both at first and in the sequel: although she intended to fall upon the Far East and exploit this serious situation of the Russian people, she nevertheless did not decide to put through this program on her own initiative. First, from December, 1917, to August, 1918, playing upon the feelings produced in England and France by Russia's abandonment of the war, Japan aroused the Allies against the Russian Far East, and particularly against Vladivostok, by alleging that the region was one in which the lives and property of foreigners were in danger, and which would require a prolonged presence of warships and landing parties: then, when France and England had decided upon an active policy in Russia, hoping to overthrow the Soviet Government with the aid of all the anti-Bolshevik elements and thus to force Russia back into the group of belligerent nations, the Japanese assumed a modest position of watchfulness until England and France should succeed in drawing America into the affair. And then, after the question of sending troops into Russian territory had been decided upon, Japan still waited for the "invitation" of her new Far Eastern competitor, America. As time went on, the Japanese, having been given an opportunity to reveal themselves in the Russian Far East in "snow-white" garments, not only made use of all the circumstances favorable to them, but specifically and tirelessly manufactured such circumstances (which is the most characteristic feature of their conduct), in order to expand further and further the zone of their military influence, and under this pretext to establish themselves wherever their predatory program might lead them. But while they were grasping new lands, the Japanese did not lose their watchfulness: they did not cease to be on their guard in international matters, and each time that it is required by circumstances they will restrict their appetites and change their tactics. Of the lands seized by them, in the most literal sense of the word, Transbaikalia, the Amur, the Maritime Province, Sakhalin and portions of Kamchatka, the Japanese were obliged to give up first the Amur, where they began to find things a little hot for them, then Transbaikalia, then a part of the Maritime Province, and now they are established only in the southern part of the Maritime Province, on Sakhalin, and along the lower course

of the Amur, but they have not lost their hopes to return. There is no doubt that the Japanese will be obliged to leave also the southern part of the Maritime Province, but they have a strong hold on the Sakhalin region (Sakhalin and the lower Amur), where they have introduced their own administration, feel themselves at home, and may there constantly threaten the Far Eastern Republic. The artificially provoked incidents of Nikolayevsk have served as a suitable pretext to the Japanese to justify this seizure to the rest of the world, a seizure that was effected according to their "shortened" program of conquest.

The period of watchful activity in fulfillment of Japanese policy, and the possibility of a further "shortening," or on the contrary, "widening," has not yet ended: the cause has been the unstable international situation and chiefly the position of the United States, with whom Japan does not desire to have a premature collision, particularly at a moment when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty seems in doubt.

A study of the Japanese policy throughout the Far East, particularly in China, Korea and Russia, makes it impossible to overlook the identity of plans and methods, and the stubbornness with which they are applied and carried out. In Korea, China and Russia, Japan is attempting to gain a foothold on the mainland, that she may not only feel absolutely safe on her islands, but also may be assured of an opportunity for the further development of her imperialistic policy as a great power. And this policy will be continued as long as the militarists and imperialists have the upper hand in Japan.

The aggressive Japanese policy of the present day is not a remote but an immediate threat to the peace of the whole world, and it is all the more immediate a threat in that it is based, at present, particularly with regard to Russian territory, on French and in part on English support.

To return to the position of the Russian Far East, it is necessary to emphasize that the fact that the Japanese at the time of their stay in the country investigated all the former Russian fortresses and wherever possible made them unfit for use; that the fact that in their dealings with the authorities of the Maritime Province, and at present, with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, they constantly insisted that they would not

“permit” the re-erection of the old fortresses or the construction of new ones along the Russian shore, is a sufficient indication of the future plans of Japan.

They know that while they may be obliged to “limit” themselves now, to-morrow may bring the moment when they may “broaden out.”

The sad story spread by the Japanese, of their “overflowing” population and the necessity of finding space in which to spread out, is a myth as far as the Russian Far East is concerned: the number of Japanese emigrants throughout the world is insignificant, even including the conquered territories of Korea and Formosa and the exploited field of Manchuria; furthermore, the climatic conditions of the Far East are not in general suitable for the Japanese—and in the Tsarist days and even in the thriving times of the intervention, the number of Japanese citizens was very small. But those Japanese who chose the Russian Far East as their place of domicile, have succeeded in making themselves at home there, as have the other foreigners in the Far East. The point then is not to be found in this field: the above is only a subterfuge put up for external consumption.

To trace the true outlines of the Japanese policy in the Far East and to describe the painful birth of the Far Eastern Republic is the task of the present publication.

## I.

On December 30, 1917, a Japanese warship sailed into the port of Vladivostok, entirely unexpected by the Russian population of the city, and without any previous warning to the local authorities. At the same time the Japanese Consul-General issued the following declaration to the Chairman of the Maritime Province Zemstvo Board (regional self-government), and to the Mayor of Vladivostok:

The Imperial Japanese Government, in view of the fact that, under existing circumstances, the Japanese living in the city of Vladivostok and its environs are in constant fear, has decided to send a warship into the port of Vladivostok. This decision was made with no other purpose than that of defending Japanese subjects, which is a duty incumbent upon the Government. The Japanese Empire, being a country truly friendly to Russia, warmly desires the consummation of a healthy development of Russia and hopes that the interests of Japan and other Allied countries will be fully respected within the boundaries of Russia. The Imperial Government has, moreover, no intention whatsoever of meddling in the question of the political structure of Russia, which will be determined by the Russian people, and the object of the present expedition has no connection whatever with this question.

The sudden appearance of the Japanese and their unexpected declaration as to "non-interference" brought forth an immediate reply on the part of the Maritime Province Zemstvo Board, in which the latter pointed out that while considering that a final judgment as to the despatch of Japanese warships to the port of Vladivostok without the consent of, and even without a warning to the local authorities, is to be passed by the central governing authorities of the Russian Republic, the Zemstvo Board, for its part, being a representative of the population of the region, feels at the same time called upon to protest against this measure as a violation of the sovereign rights of the Russian Republic. After expressing its surprise on the subject of the contents of the declaration in general, the Zemstvo Board said:

The defense of all persons is the first duty of the authorities installed by the Russian people, and we feel obliged to state that under their protection public order in the city of Vladivostok has not once been broken, and the appearance of reports in a number of newspapers published in Japan as to the alleged occurrence of disorders in Vladivostok are in no way in accordance with the truth, as is well known to all the foreign consuls stationed in this city.

The Japanese did not react in any way to this protest, which was the answering declaration of the Zemstvo Board, but the consuls of Great Britain and the United States, after receiving copies of the protest, sent to the Regional Government the following communication dated January 16, 1918:

The claim made in this declaration, that public order has not been violated in Vladivostok up to the present, we acknowledge as correct. On the other hand, we consider the political situation at the present moment to be such as to cause feelings of uneasiness on the part of those countries having considerable material interests here, as to the direction that might soon be taken by affairs in this region, which justify the governments of these countries, including Japan, to take such preliminary measures as they may consider fitted to cope with the problem of defending their interests in case the latter should actually be threatened with danger.

The appearance of the first Japanese warship was therefore not called forth by any disorders actually threatening the lives and property of Japanese citizens living in Vladivostok, but simply by uneasiness "as to the direction that might be taken by affairs in this region."

This first illegal act of the Japanese Government, to the surprise of the Russian population, was supported by the English and American consuls. Soon there appeared in the port of Vladivostok a second Japanese vessel; a short time later came an English and an American cruiser.

It was necessary to justify in some way the presence of these vessels in foreign waters and from this moment there began a veritable bombardment of the Zemstvo Board by the consular body. Every incident, of whatever significance (criminal offenses, for instance), such as may be of constant occurrence in all countries, without calling forth the arrival of special foreign vessels of war, they brought to the attention of the Zemstvo authorities, as if they were something quite extraordinary, and indicative of the insufficiency of the government as a local au-





ing of Japanese troops was carried out exclusively with the object of protecting the Japanese, and we therefore have decided emphatically not to act against any Russian party. The Imperial Japanese Government desires merely that it shall be clear that it will always maintain the most friendly and peaceful relations with Russia.

If, therefore, the local authorities will take measures. satisfactory to us, for safeguarding the life and property of foreigners in this city, and preventing the repetition of incidents similar to those that took place recently, the Japanese Government, in view of the above-mentioned object of sending the landing party ashore, will be ready with pleasure to take up a discussion of the means of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the present question, and simultaneously the Imperial Japanese Government hopes that the Russian authorities will immediately take the steps required for a proper adjustment of the matter involving the murder and injury of Japanese.

This document necessarily received the attention of the local authorities and population, for, in addition to the outright declaration as to a Japanese landing party, indefinite and vague expressions already began to be used here: "discussion of a means of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the present question."

In his answer to the consular corps, the Chairman of the Zemstvo Board declared that the landing party as a means of moral uplift in the sense of preventing thefts and, in general, re-establishing peaceful conditions of life in the city, could not be considered as very successful, since the very fact of a landing of troops brought unrest into the population. Furthermore, the Chairman declared that the landing party should withdraw to the ships and the city itself should be left to organize the proper security forces, all the more since the question of reorganizing the militia had already been raised and was to be settled within the next few days.

The consuls declared verbally that this solution would be satisfactory to them also, but no assurances were made that the troops would be withdrawn.

That same night pedestrians in the streets were searched by Japanese sailors, which raised a veritable storm of protest on the part of the local population as well as on that of the authorities.

Notwithstanding all protests, the foreign troops were allowed

to remain in the city. Criminality was not only not prevented, but, on the contrary, began to increase visibly. It was felt by all that there were not simply criminals at work, but rather a specially organized gang.

Meanwhile American and Chinese ships were added to those of Japan and England in the harbor.

Harbin and Manchuria in general were at that time the centers for the organization of counter-revolutionary forces, grouped about General Horvath, ruler of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the Atamans\* Semenov and Kalmykov. Semenov was in control of the station of Manchuria (a city) while the detachments of Kalmykov were already active at the station of Pogranichnaya, carrying on thefts and shootings of peaceful people under the pretext of combating Bolshevism. The local population was already then fully aware of the relations existing between the Japanese and the Atamans, Semenov and Kalmykov. Semenov was also receiving some support from the French.

## II.

In June news began to arrive from Siberia of the overthrow of the Soviet power by the Czecho-Slovaks, and on June 28 the Czecho-Slovaks gained control in Vladivostok and the environs. The military power was entirely in the hands of the Czech command and only the civil power, and that not fully, was held by the Zemstvo Board.

On July 6, a proclamation addressed to the population by the Allies appeared on the advertising kiosks of the city, signed by the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic fleet of the United States, Admiral Knight; the commander of the special division of the Imperial Japanese fleet, Vice-Admiral Kato; Captain Paine of the Royal British fleet; the head of the French military mission with the Czecho-Slovak army, Col. Paris; the commander of the Chinese cruiser "Hai-Yun"; the commandant of the city, Captain Badiura, of the Czecho-Slovak army.

This declaration ran as follows:

In view of the danger threatening Vladivostok and the Allied forces

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\*Cossack chieftains,

in that city by reason of the open and secret work of Austro-German prisoners of war, the city and its environs are hereby placed under the provisional protection of the Allied powers and all measures will be taken for its defense both from external as well as internal danger.

All ordinances issued up to the present time by the Czecho-Slovak command shall remain in force.

The authority of the Zemstvo and of the City Government is recognized in local affairs, but the military force and the police shall be strengthened by such numbers of Allied troops as may be found necessary for eliminating the danger threatening from Austro-German agents and their influence, who, according to information in our possession, are active in the city. The present step is taken in a spirit of friendship and sympathy for the Russian people and not for any political faction or party, in the hope that the period of calm that will result will make it possible to unite again all factions in their work together, so that their harmonious and united strength may re-establish a firm and long-lived government, and may cast off the yoke of the tyrannical dictatorship of the Austro-German powers, which are trying to fasten this yoke for a long time on the Russian people.

All responsible citizens should unite in the general work of maintaining order and lawfulness.

The attacks of the Czechs under the tutelage of the French and the proclamation of the Allies on July 6, sanctioning these attacks, so to speak, are the signposts marking the beginning of intervention; the preparatory period is at an end. While the arrival, under very unusual circumstances of first one and then another Japanese warship at Vladivostok, and the pressure exerted by the whole consular corps, as well as the landing of Japanese and English troops, were considered as perhaps a very humiliating but nevertheless temporary episode—the Czecho-Slovak action and the proclamation of July 6 immediately caused the population to view the matter in a more serious light; it became plain that some one, individually or collectively, desired to force his will upon the Russian people.

### III.

The open acts of the Japanese now became merely a part of the general activities of the Allies. And it was clear as was shown by subsequent events, that these open acts were not the chief objective of Japanese policy. The Japanese at this time were preparing a special Russian army which was to keep

the civil war constantly aflame, to create a condition of perpetual uncertainty as to the morrow, and to undermine every Russian authority, of whatever nature it might be, Soviet, bourgeois-democratic or monarchist.

At the head of these forces there was constantly available the bandits and murderers—the Cossack Atamans Semenov and Kalmykov, established on the highways and the railroad mainline, who robbed, tortured and shot down the peaceful population when it was so unfortunate as to meet with these criminals. And both Kalmykov and Semenov were in possession of great sums of money for the hiring of bandits among the Cossacks, former Tsarist officers who did not wish to make their peace with the Revolution and had become accustomed to a dissolute life, ignorant natives of the Buriat and Mongolian tribes, as well as Chinese Khun-Khuses (bandits); they had weapons in great abundance, even machine guns.

Meanwhile conversations were going on between the Allied Governments on the subject of intervention on a large scale.

At the time when the French and English were framing great plans for the renewal of the Russian participation in the war with Germany, plans closely associated with the active struggles of the Czechs and the anti-Bolsheviks against the Soviet power, the Americans gave evidence of a more sober view of things, particularly of the value of military intervention as a means to this end, and formulated the task of the American troops as the "guarding of supplies that might later be of assistance to the Russian troops and also the giving of aid such as the Russians would be ready to accept in the organization of their own self-defense." Only with this object, the United States declared, would they collaborate at the present time with the governments of France and Great Britain in the Murmansk and Archangel region on the one hand, and "for the defense of the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks moving westward" on the other hand; but the latter was the more important consideration.

Limiting its tasks in this manner, the Government of the United States did not, at the same time, force its pessimistic view of intervention and of its function in connection with the German war upon the English and upon France, and in its dec-

laration, cited above, it states that the "decisions taken by the government of the United States on this important question do not signify that it is the thought of the United States to restrict the actions of the governments with which we are at the present time allied, or to meddle in their independent judgments."

After the action of the Czechs in June, the beginning of August saw the most definite steps taken in the history of intervention in the Russian Far East. The question as to active military intervention was settled, and the governments of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and China—the latter was also dragged in—solemnly addressed the Russian people and explained to it their true intentions and promised that "Russian territory should be inviolate at the present and in the future"; "non-intervention in internal affairs"; and abstention from actions that might violate "the political sovereignty of Russia."

In their declaration of August 5, 1918, the United States assumed officially the political responsibility for the entrance of the Japanese troops. In that declaration the following words appeared, literally: "The United States and Japan are the only powers now able to act in Siberia with sufficient forces to carry out even those modest aims that have been indicated above. The Government of the United States has therefore proposed to Japan that each of these two Governments send detachments of several thousand men to Vladivostok. These detachments should act as a sufficient force for the purpose of occupying Vladivostok and defending the Czecho-Slovaks in their western movement. The Japanese Government consented to this."

This is accompanied by assurances on the part of the United States as to the absence of any desire for conquest: "We have knowledge that the Japanese Government is giving similar assurances. The plans and intentions of the Government of the United States have been transmitted to the governments of France, Great Britain and Italy, and these governments have informed the State Department of their acceptance in principle."

As a matter of fact, the Japanese on the following day published a solemn declaration in which they made an almost iden-

tical statement: "The Allies naturally cannot remain indifferent to the unfortunate course of events (the Czecho-Slovak affair) and a certain number of Allied troops have already received orders to proceed to Vladivostok. Likewise, the Government of the United States, conscious of the seriousness of the situation, recently made to the Japanese Government the proposal to send troops immediately with the object of easing the situation of the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, desiring to meet the wishes of the American Government half-way, and likewise, to act in harmony with its Allies in this expedition, decided to proceed at once to forward the necessary troops for this purpose."

The solemn declaration goes on to say: "The Government confirms its declaration of its policy of respect for the territorial integrity of Russia and its abstention from any meddling in Russia's internal affairs and policies. In addition, it declares that immediately upon the realization of the above-mentioned aims it will evacuate all its troops from Russian territory."

The English and French gave similar guarantees, although they, particularly the French, were already definitely committed to give "assistance" to anti-Bolshevik elements in the interests of a "reconstruction of Russia" and her return to the fold of the Allies. In the declaration signed by Regnaud, it is said: "France, like her Allies, could not fail to answer the call of the sane elements of the Russian people who remain faithful to their allied obligations and who aim still to put an end to the Bolshevik disorganization, which brought about the dismemberment and the ruin of Russia betrayed to the Germans."

#### IV.

On August 11 the Twelfth Japanese division landed at Vladivostok and on August 18 the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese expeditionary forces, General Otani, with his staff, became the nominal head of all the Allied forces. In September American forces also began to arrive.

Meanwhile the Czechs were moving in an easterly direction, everywhere overthrowing the Siberian Soviet authorities, which they took by surprise, and preparing the way for the arrival of

the Allies. The Japanese troops were moving westward into Transbaikalia and beyond, taking possession of the railroad, creating a western basis for themselves in Chita, in which city the Third division arrived at the end of December. Behind the Japanese there followed closely Ataman Semenov, at that time quartered at the station of Manchuria, whither he had repaired after the defeat inflicted upon him by the Siberian Soviet troops and volunteer forces. Semenov, following upon the Japanese, got as far as Chita and settled down on the main line of the Transbaikal Railroad.

And then, coming immediately after the Czechs and Japanese, who had turned their attention to Khabarovsk in the middle of August, Ataman Kalmykov, who had "fought" at the station of Pogranichnaya (it is extremely characteristic of these "champions against Bolshevism" that every one of them took up his headquarters on the Chinese border, to which he would again withdraw when the slightest pressure was put upon him), penetrated to the Khabarovsk front, where, together with the Japanese, Czechs and English (the Japanese were in the majority), he participated in the offensive against the hastily organized forces of the Soviet of Workers and Peasants, which were defending Khabarovsk. After the exacuation of the Soviet army, the Japanese, together with Kalmykov, entered the city Khabarovsk on August 16, and established themselves there.

The Soviet troops retreated to Blagovyeshchensk, to which the Japanese directed a portion of their forces. On September 18, the Japanese entered the city and on September 24 also entered Zeya. There were no important battles, for the Soviet troops declined to give battle. The Fourteenth Japanese Division was assigned to the Amur district and soon arrived there.

## V.

A very curious feature of the Japanese policy and one that later became very expensive to the population, at once made itself apparent: wherever they came, whether it was Khabarovsk, the Amur district, Transbaikalia, or the Maritime Province, they had behind them "Russian troops" and "the Russian people," impersonated by the most desperate bandits and military criminal elements, who were in Japanese pay, were completely de-

pendent on the Japanese, and carried out all steps necessary for the realization of the secret plans of Japan. To other foreigners living in that region the picture became one of uninterrupted civil war and disorder, requiring the presence of foreign troops and permitting the Japanese forces under these circumstances to appear as the "benefactors" of the peaceful Russian population. After the first weeks of the joint occupation of Russian territory by Allied troops, differences between the Americans and the Japanese became quickly apparent. The latter quite openly declared their intention to hold the railroad in their own hands. These differences led to a Japanese-American agreement in February, 1919, which was reached after long preliminaries, and to an agreement between the Allies, of March 14, 1919, by virtue of which there was formed an Inter-Allied Railroad Commission, which took it upon itself to "guard the railroad." (The Chinese Eastern, the Usuri and the Siberian Railroads are meant.) In the declaration, point 5 stated: "The application of the present agreement shall cease with the recall of foreign troops from Siberia, and all foreign specialists on the railroad will also then be immediately recalled. We desire to emphasize the principle that the plan outlined above will be carried out without any violation whatever of the sovereign rights of the Russian people, and in co-operation with the Russian Railroad personnel." The Japanese were obliged to yield the supreme technical management of the railroads to the Americans, who had arrived in Siberia even before the fall of the Kerensky Government.

The Japanese assumed the guardianship over the Transbaikalia and Amur sections of the railroad and of a portion of the Usuri Railroad, which work was carried out jointly with detachments of Russian counter-revolutionaries organized by them. The Americans guarded a portion of the Usuri Railroad and a portion of the Transbaikalia Railroad near Verkhne-Udinsk.

## VI.

In this manner the Japanese, uninterruptedly enlarging the zone occupied by their army under various pretexts (frequently in the form of "reliefs" of regiments and divisions), were permanently settled in the Maritime Province, in the Amur region,



in Transbaikalia, and were moving into the province of Irkutsk and to the west of that province, with as yet small forces.

But this was not sufficient for them. On the basis of a military agreement with Japan, in August, 1918, China, owing to war conditions, which completely absorbed the Allies in their own affairs, was ceaselessly under Japanese pressure, and the Japanese obtained the legal right to establish themselves on the Chinese Eastern Railroad and to assume the guardianship of the road, and made use of their sojourn there (they held the Chinese Eastern Railway for about two years) to consolidate themselves firmly throughout Northern Manchuria.

The truthfulness of the Japanese assurances in their solemn declaration of August 6, 1918, became apparent after only a few days, when, sending their troops into Manchuria, they issued their famous communique of August 13, 1918, to the Chairman of the Zemstvo Board. In this declaration the Japanese exposed the fact that they had entered the territory of the Russian Far East with ulterior motives and plans of their own. While, in their declaration of August 6, the Japanese referred only to the necessity of aiding the Czecho-Slovaks, as the cause for intervention, their communique of August 13 advances an entirely new factor, namely, the menace threatening them in Northern Manchuria. This document literally declares:

The attention of the Japanese Government was recently called to the growing activity of armed German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Siberia, along the Manchurian boundary. These prisoners, actually standing at the head of the Soviet armies, are at present putting pressure upon the Chinese border in the direction of the city of Manchuria, and this impending danger has obligated a considerable number of Chinese and Japanese inhabitants to seek safety in flight. The situation threatens Chinese territory with immediate danger and in no less serious degree is a menace to Japan.

Japan is bound to China by ties of intimate friendship. Both governments discussed the policy that should be followed in the present state of affairs and agreed, as an extraordinary provisional measure, on the sending of a detachment of Japanese troops, at present stationed in Southern Manchuria, into the city of Manchuria. This transfer of troops is based upon the harmonious collaboration of China and Japan in the face of the threatening danger, and in undertaking it, the Japanese Government will faithfully observe both the sovereignty of China and the rights and interests of the local population. The Japanese Government is happy to believe that these measures will to a considerable degree aid in strengthening these relations, based on mutual confidence and good faith.

## VII.

At the time when the Japanese hirelings, Semenov and Kalmykov, under the protection of the Japanese, were continuing their task of "fighting Bolshevism," that is, were robbing, pillaging and murdering the peaceful population, the Japanese were deluging all the villages, and their excesses reached such a point that the entire peasant population began to suffer under their yoke and to turn to their still remaining Russian "authorities," to the Zemstvo Boards, for help. Simultaneously, the Japanese organized the Chinese Khun-Khuzes (bandits) and directed their assault on the Russian population, and together with them engaged in a complete terrorization of the Russian Far East, both in a military and in an economic way. Everywhere they demanded from the Volost Zemstvo Boards information as to the number of inhabitants in the Volost, the number of lands of the various categories, cattle, fowl, etc. All the numerous appeals of the Volost Zemstvo Boards to the regional Zemstvo Boards would end in the same way: "In reporting the above, the Board begs that Russian citizens be protected from violations on the part of armed Japanese detachments."

In order to describe more concretely the actions of the Japanese in 1918 and 1919 (which actions continue to the present day), it is interesting to quote extracts from some of the numerous resolutions of the village communities. The peasants, observing the powerlessness of the Russian authorities, in their simplicity often resolved to appeal to the "American" and "Chinese" Consuls in Vladivostok for aid and protection:

In view of the present condition of affairs, when Japanese troops are quartered in Ivanovka (a village of the county of Nikolsk-Usurisk, Maritime Province), and of their attitude towards the inhabitants of the village, particularly the attitude of the interpreter of the Japanese command, a Korean, we have resolved to appeal in the present document to the American and Chinese Consul in the city of Vladivostok with the request to relieve the peaceful population of the violations imposed upon it by Japanese troops, since, we repeat, it is impossible for the population even to live in peace, and it will be obliged to leave its homes and escape to wherever it can.

Here are several facts proving the above statement. The Japanese soldiers, without any cause or reason, killed ten pigs, destroyed a number of gardens, obtained by force and by threatening with weapons, produce, particularly eggs, fowl, etc., and where such was not forthcoming, beat up

the farmers. They beat a number of truckmen, when their horses, pulling a heavy load, did not succeed in keeping up with other horses which were stronger. The inhabitants of Ivanovka have been taken away from their regular occupations and are now occupied chiefly in transporting Japanese troops and their supplies; the Japanese soldiers and their Korean drivers beat up the inhabitants of the village, men and women as well as children, frequently using their weapons for the purpose. In the last few days, there were beaten up Daniel Romanchenko, 52 year of age; Titus Gerasimenko, 47 years old; the citizen of Ivanovka, Varava, 84 years old, was killed; Nikonor Troyan, 16 years old, was killed by drowning; and finally the village head, Yurchenko, 60 years old, was killed while in the performance of his duties. Signed, Oct. 7, 1919, by the true signatures of 29 citizens of the village of Ivanovka.

These are not isolated facts, but represent a system then practised and now still practised by the Japanese. We quote below a number of documents giving information that was gathered by the local authorities.

On October 13, 1919, in answer to an inquiry on the Japanese atrocities in the village of Nikolayevka, Nikolsk-Usurisk County, Maritime Province, the following appears in document 3:

On September 3, in the village of Nikolayevka, I, the Chairman of the Nikolayevsk Village Committee, Michael Loboda, made an inquiry together with the undersigned witnesses and appraisers, the citizens of the village of Nikolayevka, Timofei Korpenko and Luka Shkolin, on the burning of Barsukov's farm-house.

On July 5, 1919, O. S., early in the morning, a detachment of Japanese troops arriving, they set fire to Maxim Barsukov's shed and then also to the four remaining huts, in which Nastasya Barsukov, the wife of Vasil Barsukov, and Matrena Barsukov, the wife of Ivan Barsukov, were burned to death; they killed on the same spot Vasily Moiseyevich Barsukov and Simion Vavilovich Barsukov; Nikolai Barsukov was wounded and later died of his wounds. The damage done by the fire is estimated at 191,-154 roubles (Siberian paper money).

Document 6: The Japanese came to Ivanovka on July 22, 1919, and took possession of the Zemstvo Board building and school. After seizing the building, they threw around the benches and then broke 26 of them, also five blackboards and burned three cords of wood. Of school supplies are missing: 200 copy books, 120 pencils, 300 pens, text books and readers were destroyed, but it is impossible to estimate the number of the latter, as the catalogues also have been destroyed. The losses of the school amount to about 4,665 roubles.

In the Zemstvo Board building, they burned five cords of wood of a value of about 3,000 roubles. The Japanese staff was asked to pay 1,000 roubles monthly for their quarters for August and September, in all 2,000 roubles, but refused to do so.

From the report of the head of the Khabarovsk municipal

militia, Jan. 12, 1920, addressed to the chief of Khabarovsk County:

**Record of preliminary investigation:**

On January 8, 1920, I, Michael Chebyarov, militia man of the 2nd District of the Guard of the Amur Railroad, posted at Station Volochayevka of the aforesaid railroad, on the basis of articles 252 and 253 of the criminal law, proceeded with an inquiry concerning the killing of Joseph Melnikov by Japanese soldiers, in which inquiry it transpired that on January 8 of the current year, after the armored train No. 101 had arrived from Khabarovsk at the Station Volochayevka, there was passing at a distance of 20 sazhen (140 feet) opposite the Station Volochayevka, in a sleigh drawn by a horse, the family of Joseph Melnikov, the road surveyor of the Seventh Precinct of the Road Service, consisting of four boys, the youngest of whom was four and the oldest 15 years old; at that time, part of the Japanese soldiers left the armored train and began to shoot at the aforesaid persons passing in the sleigh, mortally wounding in the head above the left temple, the 15-year-old Joseph Melnikov, and killing instantly the horse belonging to Michael Akimov, citizen of the village of Volochayevka.

From the report of the head of the Khabarovsk Municipal Militia January 12, 1920, addressed to the Chief of the Khabarovsk District:

I report that on January 3, 1920, the Japanese officer, Heida Tonaki, fired his revolver at the militiaman of the Second Precinct, Gussev, on guard at his post. Although the shot was fired at close range, the bullet did not enter the militiaman's body. The shooter was arrested by the head of the Fourth Precinct of militia in my charge, and his Smith and Wesson revolver taken away from him. When questioned as to the reason for discharging his weapon, the Japanese officer answered: "My fun."

From a document, dated Feb. 6, 1920, in the village of Knyaze Volkonskoye drawn up by the representatives of the local authorities:

On January 8, 1920, I, Michael Chebyarov, militia man of the 2nd the settlement Knyazevolkonky, from the direction of the village of Konstantinovka, opened fire at a distance of about one verst, and thus destroyed the building of the Volost Zemstvo Board, which was struck by a number of shells.

After ceasing fire, the Japanese detachment, entering the village itself, began a machine gun fire in the first, second, and third streets and then conducted an individual search of the peaceful inhabitants, violating inoffensive women and young girls and also stealing the property of peaceful citizens. They then proceeded to burn down dwellings and several structures belonging to peaceful citizens, as well as a number of buildings of government institutions.

According to a telegram of the head of this section of the Usuri Railway Service, dated Feb. 25, 1920, the Japanese troops

shot and otherwise killed the following persons: "Near the Gedika junction, the State machine-worker, Fedor Dveryak, was killed on January 10; on January 24, the laborer Ivan Bez-krovny was shot at the station of Vyazemskaya; and on February 1, in the 608-verst guard house, the right-of-way worker, Gordey Tsibunsky, was killed with his wife and two children."

Report 102 of the Gondatin village committee, Vedensk County, Iman District, Maritime Province: Drawn up September 24, 1918:

We again ask the body of the Iman District Zemstvo Board to place the following matter before whom it may concern: Japanese soldiers guarding the bridge between the stations of Iman and Guboryevo, Usuri Railway, steal everything that has value and that pleases them, shoot at people in order that they may not interfere with their seizures of fowl, eggs, bread, sugar, tea, matches, knives, bowls, and government property, which has been brought by the Red Army men from the German front, as well as shot-guns, powder and caps. They take things not because they need them, but because they please their fancy; they ransack trunks, breaking their locks to do so, they attack women, demanding what is impossible and shameful for Russian persons, and we have been reduced to the most wretched situation, not having expected such actions from the Japanese people. We urgently beg the Japanese Consul to put an end to the violations and misdeeds perpetrated by the Japanese soldiers. (There follow the signatures of the inhabitants.)

The above specimens of complaints are not specially chosen and are not the most outrageous. Among the other records, we have documents that it is impossible to read with any peace of mind, and we can produce thousands of such complaints, all of them officially certified. To publish all these documents would be to fill thousands of volumes of human wretchedness.

All these things the Japanese themselves did and this is what they called "fighting Bolshevism."

They were ably seconded by their hirelings, the bandits Kalmykov and Semenov, who robbed, tortured and murdered thousands of people without distinction of sex or age, and that also was called "fighting Bolshevism."

### VIII.

Murderers and criminal elements who escaped the local authorities always found protection in the Japanese staff, and if they were arrested were defended by the Japanese, who declared that these were their agents. As a specimen we may introduce a copy of a telegram, number 98 of the Nikolsk authorities, dated September 8, 1920:

**Urgent.**

I arrested on this day Karl Belyayev, who in Spassk murdered Andreyev, Kustovinov, and Kalinichenko (three representatives of the Zemstvo Board authorities, who later turned out to have been burned by White Guards in the furnace of their locomotive). The local Japanese command freed the prisoner and took him under its protection, depriving me of the right to arrest him, Belyayev, as a criminal offender. This intercession of the local Japanese authorities in favor of criminal persons is not the first case. I urgently request the punishment of illegal acts of intervention on the part of the Japanese command in the business of the Russian authorities.

(Signed) SOLOGUBENKO.

**IX.**

Returning to the general Allied intervention, aside from that of the Japanese, we must distinguish between two policies: The Anglo-French policy and the American policy, or, the active and the passive policy.

France and England, in the presence of their military representatives (the English General Knox and others, for example), intended to make use of the situation to wage a cruel and bloody war against the Soviet power, and understood perfectly well that this determined struggle against the Soviet power would have to be carried on, not by democrats but only by irreconcilable monarchists and the remnants of the bourgeois-feudal Russia, who opposed to the ideas of the Revolution the old ideas (and practices) of the autocratic regime that had been born in blood and iron.

When, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, the moderate democratic elements and a portion of the Right Socialists set up their power in the provinces, and after the Ufa Conference of the members of the Constituent Assembly created the Directorate in Omsk, the center of Siberia, and when simultaneously, the monarchist elements, with foreign support, became strong enough to bring about a coup d'etat and to overthrow the Directorate, the English and the French, who had already been in sympathy with them and given them support, were doing their best to bring about the success of an extremely reactionary administration—the rule of Admiral Kolchak.

What Kalmykov was doing in Khabarovsk, and Semenov in Chita, became the rule all over Siberia as soon as this new

power, based upon foreign bayonets, was strengthened; whipping, shootings of carloads of people with machine guns; treacherous assassination of all the elements that were more or less democratically inclined, and debauchery of the reactionary soldiery in the villages which in many places were converted into cemeteries and ash-heaps, became a "normal" condition for the Siberian population.

## X.

But even then, with the fatal policy of the Allies as the background, the Japanese policy did not lose its originality.

With its own problems in view and with such an excellent opportunity to come in "by invitation," Japan could not allow any other power, not even a kindred monarchy, to fortify itself there. A strong Russian power meant a curtailment of her program; Russia, torn by internal strife, guaranteed the carrying out of her policy of a great power aiming at the creation of a Great Japan at another's cost.

For this purpose, as was already pointed out, were called into existence Semenov and Kalmykov, and were kept at different places, both to be used for the same job. At the moment they were to weaken the Central Omsk Government, to hinder its work. At the same time the Omsk Government was made use of in every possible way—its gold reserve was drained, its cotton, iron, copper, etc., were exported for next to nothing.

At last the entire population, including many anti-Bolsheviks, in despair took to arms and, hiding in outlying woods, began a guerilla warfare with the reactionary and criminal power imposed on them from outside.

## XI.

At the same time Kolchak's army, after serious clashes with the Red Army, began to thin out and retreated; the greater part, mostly peasants, went over to the Reds, the rest retreated or fled.

The Czecho-Slovaks, seeing the shameful part they had played, realizing that they were nothing but catspaws in the

hands of reaction, began to demand immediate repatriation and refused to do further fighting.

Indeed there was nothing else to be done; the victorious Red Army was everywhere met by the population with enthusiasm as the liberator from the horrible nightmare of Kolchak's rule, and grew from day to day.

Not to retreat after discontinuing to fight meant complete rout and disaster.

The Czecho-Slovaks naturally preferred the retreat and began to move eastward. The Allies, realizing the failure of military intervention, particularly after the successful end of the war with Germany did not particularly detain the Czecho-Slovaks. Sufficient use had already been made of them.

The English, French, Czecho-Slovaks, Italians began to leave Russian territory. The counter-revolutionists were in despair and called to Japan as the "only" country that could save "Russia," i.e., counter-revolution. And doing so, they cursed America. The fact that America, as represented by the Commander of the American forces, William S. Graves, did not find it possible, remaining true to the declaration of August 6, 1918, to support actively the lawless regime of the various Kolchaks, Rozanovs, Ivanov-Rinovs, etc., brought about the hatred of these monarchist remnants towards Americans. In their prostitute press, which was engaged in singing praises to "noble Japan" and to the aid already rendered to "the Russian people" (as represented by all these generals—the Semenovs, Kalmykovs), they were outdoing one another in slinging mud at the American forces in America. They all carried one motto—alliance of monarchist Japan with Siberian and Russian monarchist counter-revolution. But these "mouthings" too went for naught—they were swept away by popular indignation.

## XII.

Kolchak's rule was overthrown everywhere; first in the west and later in the east (in the Maritime and Amur Provinces). On Jan. 31 General Rosanov, Kolchak's appointee, was overthrown in Vladivostok, and in February the same happened to Kolchak's administration on the Amur.



Japan's policy remained the same as ever. On January 31 an attempt was made to repeat the experience of November 16, 1919, during the so-called Gaida insurrection in Vladivostok, where the insurgents were defeated only through the aid given to Kolchak's forces by the Japanese; as a result, several hundred men were killed by machine guns. This time, during the revolt, when almost the entire Kolchak forces went over to the side of the Democratic Zemstvo Government, which was fighting Kolchak, on the streets together with Japanese forces appeared also American, which prevented the Japanese from interfering in the events and in accordance with the declaration of their government insisted on their (the Japanese) remaining neutral.

A similar attempt to prevent the overthrow of Kolchak's rule was made by the Japanese in the Amur provinces, but was ineffective owing to the persistent and determined activity of the revolutionaries.

### XIII.

When the forces of the Zemstvo Administration of the Maritime Province, which proclaimed itself as the Provisional Government, were approaching Khabarovsk to seize or expel Ataman Kalmykov, the Japanese, which under the circumstances could not act openly, took up a position of secret military aid. In a telegram from Bulgakov, the commander of the attacking Zemstvo army, dated Feb. 21, 1920, No. 201, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Provisional Government the following was stated: In order to hamper the progress of his army, Japanese soldiers, during the night of February 12, had cut up the paving of the bridge and the stairs near the bridge on the 681st verst and laid the cut up timber on the bridge girders between the rails; on top of this they piled up straw and set fire to it. Very coolly the Japanese soldiers kept throwing pieces of wood on the bonfire. When this was brought to the attention of Gen. Yamada, in command of the Japanese forces in Khabarovsk, he did not try to evade the question, but replied that he was forced to stop the entry of revolutionary forces in Khabarovsk and therefore gave the order to burn two bridges. Still Kalmykov was chased out notwithstanding the help of the Japanese. He crossed the Chinese border, where he

shot part of his army which tried to leave him, and later was himself interned by the Chinese. (Some time later in trying to escape he was killed by Chinese soldiers.)

#### XIV.

In the Amur Province, where the Japanese soldiers were particularly suffering from the cold and where they outdid the other troops in their atrocities towards the population (in one village alone, Ivanovka, several hundred people were shot down by machine guns and burned to death), thus arousing the entire population against them—the rich and the poor, the peasants, the Cossacks, and the townspeople—the position of the Japanese became too unsafe and they decided to evacuate the territory for the time being. Evacuation began towards the end of February.

#### XV.

In the meantime in the districts close to the Japanese position (Pribaikalia), guerilla detachments in clashes with Semenov forces, routed the latter and occupied the city of Verkhne-Udinsk. The attempt to capture Chita was unsuccessful owing to the active support the Japanese gave to Semenov.

In Verkhne-Udinsk, the "Provisional Zemstvo Government of Pribaikalia" was established and announced its aim—to clear the entire province of Transbaikalia from Semenov's forces.

#### XVI.

At the end of March, 1920, the Japanese announced that they would not allow the Red troops to pass further east, and demanded that these troops be moved from the station of Gyrshe-lun to the station of Khilok on the Transbaikal Railway, declaring at the same time that they have nothing against the presence of local forces of the newly established local government in Verkhne-Udinsk, i.e., the Zemstvo Government of Pribaikalia. Thus, the Japanese attempted to establish by force a buffer zone between themselves and Soviet Russia.

#### XVII.

On March 13 an agreement was concluded between the Czechoslovak forces—which had come to an understanding with the

Red Army—and the Provisional Zemstvo Government of Pribaikalia, whereby the Government undertook to assist the Czechs in hastening their departure, to carry on no military actions in the territory of the railway line and not to destroy the tracks during the transportation of Czecho-Slovak troops along the line. The Czechs on their part undertook to hand over, after their last detachments shall have passed, all railroad bridges and constructions in complete order and to carry away none of the military property of Kolchak's army. Together with the Czechs were also leaving Roumanian Latvian and Jugoslavian troops.

### XVIII.

While the new democratic authorities were endeavoring to do everything possible to hasten the departure of the Czechs, the Japanese and their proteges, the Semenov forces, were using all possible means to hamper their movement along the Transbaikalian and Chinese Eastern Railways. On April 14, 1920, the Inter-Allied Technical Board made a vigorous protest against the actions of the Japanese and the Semenov forces, while the Inter-Allied Railway Committee was forced to send its representative, Mr. Smith, an American, to Transbaikalia to investigate why the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovaks was being held up. As a result of his report, made upon his return, all the representatives of the Inter-Allied Committee, with the exception of the Japanese, decided to send to their respective governments an identical telegram, in which they accused the Semenov forces and the Japanese of violating the decisions of the Technical Railway Board and Committee and of actually holding up the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks. Paragraph 3 of this telegram says: "The Japanese military forces, by placing Japanese detachments at such points of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which in accordance with an Inter-Allied agreement, must be guarded by Chinese troops, and also by permitting their troops to interfere in railroad matters, have caused conflicts, the consequences of which have been unnecessary victims among Russian, Chinese and Czecho-Slovak citizens, and the movement of trains has suffered." In Imianpo, a station on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese shot and killed several Russian railway men;

similar attempts were made in Khailar, where shots were exchanged between Chinese and Japanese troops."

If these were the feelings of the official representatives of the Allied powers, it is easy to imagine the state of mind of the population, which had to bear the brunt of the situation on its shoulders.

The evacuation continued normally. The Americans announced the forthcoming evacuation of their troops.

## XIX.

On March 2, 1920, the Provisional Government of the Maritime Zemstvo Board handed to Count Matsudaira, Counsellor of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission in Siberia, a note for transmission to the Japanese Imperial Government. This note pointed out that with the downfall of the Kolchak forces, order was established everywhere and civil war ended, that every assistance is being rendered in the matter of evacuating the Czecho-Slovaks, and that there was, therefore, no further reason for continuing the intervention which was so obnoxious to the population. The note further stated that, unfortunately, not all the participants in the intervention recognized the change in the situation, and that while some of the allies withdrew, and others were preparing to withdraw, the Japanese government increased its forces (the number of Japanese troops reached 70,000). The note continued: "This last circumstance defines the responsible role played by the Japanese Government in continuing and even increasing the intervention, which now assumes the character of a single-handed forcible action against the will of the people. The Zemstvo Government considers the further continuation of intervention by the Japanese Government as a violation of the sovereign rights of Russia in the Far East and declares that in carrying out their intervention the Japanese were supporting the lawless regime of Kolchak, Semenov and Kalmykov, that the Japanese were shooting Russian citizens, burning villages, etc., and that all this prevents the resumption of normal conditions of life in the Russian Far East." The note concluded with two demands: (1) to complete the announced evacuation of the Amur province and (2) to commence immediately a new and rapid

evacuation of the territory of the Russian Far East by the Japanese forces.

The Japanese did not answer, and at the same time announced to the outer world that the situation of the Czecho-Slovak forces held up their evacuation.

## XX.

On March 8, 1920, the Provisional Government addressed a request to the Diplomatic Representative of Czecho-Slovakia in Siberia in which, after pointing out that the Japanese Government had announced that the presence and even the increase of Japanese troops was necessary principally in order to guarantee safe and uninterrupted passage of the Czech troops, information was asked as to: "whether the successful evacuation of Czech troops, in spite of all the necessary measures in this direction taken by the Provisional Government, actually depended upon the presence and constant increase of Japanese troops on the territory of our Far East."

To this, on March 10, Dr. Girsu, Plenipotentiary Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, replied the following: "The difficulties in evacuating the Czecho-Slovak troops at first met with on the part of the Soviet Government in the region west of Irkutsk have been removed by mutual agreement between Czecho-Slovak and Soviet troops;" "that in the Far East there were no obstacles placed on the way, but, on the contrary, every possible assistance was rendered everywhere," for which he considered it his duty to express his thanks.

The Japanese, however, assiduously continuing their work against the interests of the population, preferred to ignore this official refutation of the statement made by the Japanese Government, as contained in the above-stated inquiry of the Provisional Government of March 8.

## XXI.

The strained relations between the Japanese and the local population were getting worse from day to day as a result of the unceasing brutality of the Japanese.

On March 27 the Provisional Government handed in a memo-

random setting forth the Japanese atrocities against the Russian people—arrests, murders, incendiarism.

As long as the Japanese were carrying out their policy along the railway line, before the eyes of all the world, they tried to mask their intentions. But in a far away corner on the Pacific Coast, in Nikolayevsk on the Amur, which was cut off from the seat of the government and from the rest of the population, the Japanese acted quite openly. There was no one for whom it was necessary to invent special pretexts for their course of action, and the Russian population could be trampled upon without any constraint.

Placing the fact of the despatch of Japanese soldiers to this far away region side by side with the official reason given for such despatch in the Japanese declarations, one unusual circumstances immediately presents itself, namely, there were no Czecho-Slovaks in Nikolayevsk on the Amur to be saved; by reason of the very geographic position of Nikolayevsk there could be no danger to Manchuria; furthermore, the Russians and the Japanese had always lived there at peace with each other. And nevertheless soldiers were sent there, several hundreds of them.

As everywhere else, the population of Nikolayevsk was fighting the Kolchak and Semenov forces, and as everywhere else, too, the Japanese supported the latter against the population. When the news of the complete rout of Kolchak reached Nikolayevsk, the local partisan detachment, which had kept up the fight with the White Guards, whom the Japanese held completely under their sway, captured the local fortress Chnyriakh and, after besieging the town for a month, had thrice asked them to surrender, proposing to the Japanese to cease their armed intervention, so as to avoid the necessity of using the long range fortress artillery and endangering the city and its population. The first peaceful offer was ignored by the Japanese. Sorokin, the truce bearer sent by the partisan forces, was killed. The second offer was carried to the Japanese in Nikolayevsk by three truce bearers, two Chinese and one Russian (Orlov); instead of giving an answer, the Japanese again killed the Russian truce bearer, after submitting him to horrible tortures. His eyes were gouged out, his nose and toes burned, and his back cut up. His body was afterwards disinterred, when the partisans en-

tered the city, and in the presence of foreign representatives an autopsy was performed in order to prove the act of atrocity committed by the Japanese and the manner in which the latter adhere to rules of truce. The third offer was made after the Japanese handed to the partisans the declaration of General Siramidsu, commander of the Japanese forces in Khabarovsk, to the effect that it was the intention of the Japanese to remain neutral in the future. The offer was accompanied by a request to make clear certain points in the declaration, and a notification that should the besieged refuse to surrender, the partisans would be forced to bombard the city. No answer came; and only after a day's bombardment the Japanese sent a truce-bearer, an old Russian peasant.

There was no written offer from the Japanese; verbally the messenger explained that they would like to commence peace negotiations. The staff of the partisan forces handed the messenger its answer agreeing to such peace negotiations with an offer immediately to cease military activities and asking the Japanese to send representatives to begin negotiations on February 24. On the basis of Gen. Siramidsu's declaration, the Japanese were asked to cease military activities and to surrender the city on the following conditions: 1. Unconditional fulfilment by the Japanese command of Gen. Siramidsu's declaration regarding non-interference in internal affairs). 2. Complete disarming of the White Guard garrison in Nikoloyevsk and delivery of all their arms and munitions, place of delivery to be indicated subsequently. 3. Until the entry into the city of the partisan forces and until all strategic points would be occupied by them, these were to be held by Japanese. 4. Upon fulfilment of above, the Japanese forces were to surrender all sentries to the partisan forces and to retreat to quarters assigned to them. The question of quarters was to be decided by the Japanese and the Russian (partisan) commands by mutual consent. The conditions were accepted, peace was signed by representatives of the Japanese command, of the White Guards, of the city administration and of the partisans. On February 29 the partisans entered the city and the White Guards gave up their arms: 300 rifles, four 3-inch guns with shells, and three projectors. Several of their leaders, fearing court-martial, committed suicide. The leading counter-revolutionists and all the

White Guard officers were arrested. Always willing to meet the Japanese half way, the partisans permitted them to have sentries within their own forces and quarters, thus relieving them from carrying out the last paragraph of the agreement. The Japanese walked freely around the city, armed. The relations were most friendly. All requests on the part of the Japanese about certain privileges or regarding delivery of foodstuffs, etc., were gladly granted. The Japanese, too, were very courteous and gave assurances of sincere friendship.

Two weeks passed from the day when the city was occupied and peace and quiet seemed to have been securely established. As before, the Japanese had sentries posted not only near their headquarters but almost near every house where the Japanese were stationed. Japanese patrols walked around the city freely.

At 3 o'clock in the night of March 12 a detachment of Japanese soldiers stationed in the city, contrary to the truce agreement concluded with the partisans, quite suddenly surrounded and besieged the headquarters of the partisan army, the artillery positions and the barracks, and simultaneously opened fire at all these points. The main attack was made on the headquarters, at which the Japanese directed a barrage fire of rifles, machine guns and incendiary bombs which set ablaze the building from all sides. In the building at the time were present Triapitsyn, commander of the partisan army; Naumov, chief of the staff, and others. Also a number of employees and their children. The commander succeeded in sending a telephone message to the Chnyrakh Fortress and to the central military telephone station. After that the wires were cut. Escape from the burning building surrounded by the Japanese, who did not stop firing for a second, was impossible, and those inside began to suffocate in the smoke. The commander and many others were wounded, two were killed. To remain in the building any longer was impossible. It was decided to leave and to make a dash for the next building. This was done. In running across almost every one was wounded, including Tryapitsyn, who was wounded for the second time; four were killed. The Secretary, Cherny, and other three employees perished in the burning building. The house to which they escaped was also under constant fire; in



spite of the suddenness of the attack, the partisans began to gather, donning their clothes on the run, forming into units and starting to repulse the attack; the 3rd company was the first to approach the headquarters in chain formation. Under their rifle fire the Japanese began to retreat. Thanks to the courage and self-sacrifice of the commanding personnel and the firm stand of the partisan soldiers, the Japanese were thrown into disorder and began to give up point after point. The battle lasted incessantly for two days (March 13 and 14) amid the most ferocious fighting. The Japanese concentrated their main forces in their consulate, in the barracks and garrison quarters. The Japanese civil population took part in the attack, arms in hand. Towards the evening of March 14 the affair was almost finished with the exception of one Japanese detachment which occupied the brick barracks. Just then an order came from Gen. Yamada, commander of the Japanese forces in Khabarovsk to the commander of the Japanese detachment, immediately to cease hostilities and to conclude a truce. The order was transmitted to the Japanese through a captured interpreter. The Japanese agreed to cease hostilities and to give up their arms. At noon of March 15 the Japanese remaining in the barracks hoisted a white flag and surrendered, 130 of them, who were taken prisoner.

Of the partisans, 50 were dead and more than 100 wounded.

These are, in short, the main features of the events of Nikolayevsk.

A population that is not at all inclined to consider itself "conquered" and that is incapable of remaining in the condition of slaves, cannot be insulted and mistreated with impunity. There is a limit to every endurance, but in Nikolayevsk there was not only human patience at stake—there life itself had to be protected against cruel and cunning "guests" who felt themselves as masters of a land which they considered already subjugated. When the partisans learned of a new movement of Japanese, "reinforcements" coming up from Alexandrovsk in Sakhalin, with the usual trail of cruelties, and knowing from past experience what awaited them upon the arrival of these reinforcements, they decided to leave the city and in their exasperation they killed the remaining Japanese in revenge for the execution of partisans then going on in Sakhalin.

The frenzied partisan leaders did not spare even the Russian population. But they were punished by the partisans themselves, after their retreat from Nikolayevsk, which was occupied by the Japanese. They were arrested for the crimes committed and sentenced to be executed. The sentence was carried out.

That the behavior of the Japanese in Nikolayevsk was not an accident is testified by similar occurrences which took place all through the Maritime Province during April.

The Japanese military party was up in arms. "The souls of the dead" of Nikolayevsk cried for vengeance and went so far as to cause the seizure of the Sakhalin territory. The Japanese Government sent a further punitive expedition to Nikolayevsk to complete the work begun.

The majority of the remaining Russian population was transferred to Vladivostok, and Nikolayevsk was occupied by the Japanese. Of particular interest is also the fact that even before any "events" took place in Nikolayevsk, the Japanese warship "Mikasa" arrived there and under the signature of the commander of the ship, Captain H. Mukai, an appeal was issued to the population of Nikolayevsk, dated as early as February 20, 1920:

In order to avoid any misunderstanding that might arise through the unexpected appearance of our vessels in these waters, as senior commander, I consider it timely to give an explanation of our present visit. In the middle of January, information reached us regarding a political change taking place here, and soon thereafter various disquieting rumors began to reach us about the dangers threatening the lives and interests of the Japanese residing in this territory. In view of the fact that all communication is cut off with this part of the country, we had no possibility of ascertaining the true state of affairs.

Disturbed by this situation and obliged to take measures for the protection of its nationals, the Imperial Japanese Government finally decided, in spite of all climatic difficulties, to despatch us here for the sole above stated purpose, without any intention whatsoever of interfering in the internal affairs of the local administration, not to speak of any designs as regards territorial seizure.

I therefore again repeat that the reason for our visit is our anxiety aroused by the various rumors of impending danger to the Japanese residents, and the purpose of our visit is to obtain all information on the spot,

and should any danger actually exist to take proper measures to protect and safeguard Japanese lives and interests.

Thus, whether we are to remain here for some time or whether we can curtail our visit depends entirely upon prevailing conditions. I trust, however, that our fears are groundless, and that we shall be able to leave shortly, with full confidence in the friendly attitude towards the Japanese nation on the part of your local population.

I take this opportunity of tendering you my best wishes.

The contents of this appeal are sufficient evidence that no danger actually threatened the Japanese from the Russian population. But there is something strange, to say the least, in the special "assurance" given to the population that there is no intention whatever "to interfere in the internal affairs of the local administration, not to speak of any designs of territorial seizure."

How far the Japanese in Nikolayevsk refrained from interfering in "the internal affairs" we have already seen above; their "designs," as far as territorial acquisitions are concerned, can be seen from what follows.

In the beginning of October, the Japanese were forced to leave the destroyed city of Nikolayevsk for the winter; on October 1, as a farewell, the following appeal was addressed to the remaining population (the appeal signed by Maj.-Gen. Tsuno):

In the spring of this year the city of Nikolayevsk was set on fire by the Bolshevik barbarians, as a result of which the population is without homes or food, its destitution reaching the highest limits. It is hard for outsiders, who are guided by the principles of humanity and justice to be mere lookers-on. Ever since coming here the Japanese troops have tried to preserve peace and order and endeavored to improve the welfare of the population. This attitude for the present as well as in the future remains unchanged. Realizing that it is impossible to leave troops for the winter in a destroyed city, we have decided to remove them from the Nikolayevsk region until the next spring. I call upon the local population by common efforts to preserve peace and order during the winter.

When the Provisional Zemstvo Government in Vladivostok tried to send boats with foodstuffs and medicines to Nikolayevsk, they had to overcome many obstacles that were put in their way by the Japanese. New demands were made every day, constant inquiries sent to Tokio; and the population of Nikolayevsk suffered from hunger and cold while precious time was wasted for these negotiations.

Finally, the Japanese "permitted" the Provisional Government to send two boats, "Erivan" and "Vzryvatel," into the latter's own territorial waters, on the following conditions:

1. The boats are to be subject to directions of respective Japanese naval authorities as to their actions upon arrival and stay in port.

2. The purpose of the commission is limited to the investigation of events and to rendering aid to the victims.

3. Upon the completion of their task, they must leave Nikolayevsk.

4. Safety in the channel or on land is not guaranteed. The Japanese military authorities, however, are willing to render all possible assistance.

5. Those arriving in port must have with them personal identifications issued by Japanese civil and military authorities in Japan as well as abroad.

6. The Japanese military authorities have no means of furnishing quarters or food supplies to those arriving.

7. The arrivals are requested not to engage in propaganda, and not to break order and peace.

In this way part of the Provisional Zemstvo Government's own territory became for them a place "abroad."

Lists of persons going on the boats were handed to the Japanese, who issued the following certificates:

#### CERTIFICATE

A medical and feeding unit is at present organized by the Russian Red Cross, and is going to Nikolayevsk on the SS. "Erivan" and "Vzryvatel," which belong to the Volunteer Fleet, at the request of the Russo-Japanese Military Commission. While we agree in principle and have nothing against the work undertaken by the Red Cross in its sending men and supplies, we are at the same time very much afraid that it may have back of it intentions of a political nature. Although we have taken proper precautionary measures, we hope the Japanese authorities will exercise due vigilance at the time of actual arrival and place of debarkation.

(Signed) GEN. TAKAYANAGI and COL. ISOME.

The boats were unable to start out before July.

#### XXII.

True to their declaration, and hoping that the Japanese, upon their official invitation, would also leave the country, the Americans withdrew and evacuated their troops.

The withdrawal of the Americans made it necessary for the Japanese to explain themselves, and on March 31 they issued the following short but significant declaration of their Government:

The expedition of our forces to Siberia was undertaken with a view to assisting the Czecho-Slovak troops. Therefore when the evacuation of the latter has been completed, our forces shall be withdrawn. This was definitely stated at the time, in our declaration. But no other country is in such proximity to Siberia as our Empire. Unfortunately, the present political situation in the Far East which not only threatens the safety and life of our citizens residing in Siberia, but is also a menace to the general peace in Korea and Manchuria, makes it impossible for us to withdraw our troops from the Russian Far East immediately. The Japanese Government, therefore, desires to corroborate its statement that the *presence of the Japanese forces in the Russian Far East does not imply any political designs against Russia* (Italics in the original) and desires to declare that as soon as the political situation in the Russian Far East has become normal to the extent that there will be no danger for Korea, and Manchuria, and life and property of our nationals protected and normal railway communication restored, that then, after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces has been completed, *our troops will be withdrawn from Siberia as early as possible.*" (Italics in the original.)

This document is curious in many respects: 1. For the first time emphasis is laid on the special interest that Japan has in the Russian Far East ("geographic proximity"). 2. Japan sets forth her own, and not the Inter-Allied policy in Siberia; America's withdrawal therefore has no importance for the Japanese. 3. Here again, as in the famous communique of August-13, 1918, the connection between Japanese intervention and the fate of Manchuria is emphasized—that part of Manchuria which is in the sphere of Russia's influence and which is crossed by the Chinese-Eastern Railway. 4. A new excuse for intervention is found in the danger to Korea's peace. 5. And even after all the conditions shall have been carried out, they do not speak of an instant or even speedy withdrawal of troops, but of "as soon as possible."

Again the Japanese remained true to themselves. This declaration was only issued by Japan in order to divert the attention of the world from her true intentions. They continued their activity, which had already led to the sad events in Nikolayevsk, and the very existence of this activity testifies to its being conducted for the sole purpose of provoking similar occurrences to

afford an unfailing excuse for carrying out the long prepared plan of seizure of the entire, or, for the time being, of part of the Russian Far East. It was necessary to prove to the world that the situation in the Far East still required the presence of Japanese troops there.

Taking an extremely provocative attitude, with the intention of arousing the ire of the population, and at the same time apparently feeling somewhat uneasy at the sight of the growing power of the Russian army, which, in the interests of the Japanese designs, had to be destroyed, the Japanese, on the night of April 4, suddenly advanced along the entire coast of the Maritime Province, carrying out a veritable massacre with the aid not only of rifles but also of cannon and machine-guns. (In Vladivostok a few shots were actually fired from a battleship.) They made no distinction between men, women and children. The building of the Provincial Zemstvo Board, the headquarters of the Maritime Government, was destroyed both from within and without and all records taken; on all government buildings Japanese flags were hoisted. Thousands of people were arrested and thrown into cellars and concentration camps, where they were subjected to torture. The number of people who were shot or who disappeared without leaving any trace was enormous. The troops and the militia were disarmed. Especially there were many killed and wounded in Khabarovsk and Nikolsk. The losses sustained by the population and the government during these raids are almost incalculable—there were destroyed, burned and pillaged many millions of gold rubles worth of private, government and military property. The post and telegraph buildings as well as gunboats were seized, and everything of value on board was stolen. It was a regular practice of the Japanese and the heads of the White Guards living at the Japanese General Staff, to free from the prisons all counter-revolutionaries, who immediately upon their liberation took to their destructive work. There is no doubt that the failure on the part of the few reactionaries to establish their, or rather the Japanese authority, was due primarily to the fact that the officials of the Provincial Zemstvo Board remained alive and self-possessed, and also to the fact that the feeling of hatred which filled the Russian population (excepting the handful of traitors who lived on the means of the Japanese Gen-

eral Staff) was quite manifest, and finally, to the active support given by the Czechs and others.

The population of the Far East cannot to this day forget the sad fate of one of the members of the Military Council, Lazo, who ordered the troops not to resist the Japanese. Lazo, together with Sibirtsev, Lutsky and others was seized by the Japanese and spirited away. Most of those arrested by the Japanese were freed, but Lazo, Sibirtsev and Lutsky never showed up. All inquiries made by the authorities and relatives of the arrested regarding their fate were answered by the Japanese with claims of ignorance. Only subsequently was it learned that those arrested had been handed over by the Japanese to the White Guards, who burned them in their locomotive engine.

The Maritime Government, which had barely found refuge under the Czech General Staff, issued a protest to all representatives of the Allied powers at Vladivostok.

At a special conference of all Allied representatives, the Japanese hastened to declare that their advance should not be interpreted as an "occupation" but only as a "self-defense"; that the Japanese flags that were flying over the government buildings were only in conformity with the military custom requiring the hoisting of flags over buildings taken in battle; that they had to take these buildings "in battle," as if the Japanese had been fired at from those buildings.

The Maritime Government, one member of which had been arrested by the Japanese and then freed, again convened in the building of the Provincial Zemstvo Board, and the Japanese flags were removed.

These events were particularly unexpected in view of the negotiations which were in progress on the afternoon of April 4, between the Japanese and the Maritime Government, concerning a series of demands submitted on behalf of the Japanese Government by General Takayanagi. These demands were submitted in the following statement:

With regard to the declaration made by our Imperial Government concerning the presence of our troops in Siberia, the commander of the Japanese forces in Siberia authorizes me to conduct negotiations with the rep-

representatives of the military authorities of the Provisional Government of the Maritime Province with a view to establishing friendly relations and avoiding conflicts which may, judging by the facts of the past and present, arise between our forces on the one hand and the Russian authorities and the local population on the other hand, regarding the presence of our troops in the Maritime Province.

In order to enter into negotiations, I on my part have the honor to state to you the terms to be submitted the Provisional Government, and to beg your reply.

These terms are as follows:

1. To take care of our troops, providing them with quarters, food, means of transportation, mail privileges, etc.

2. To obey all the regulations contained in the agreement concluded between our Government or our Command on the one hand and the Russian authorities on the other hand, on the basis of the agreement concluded between the Allied powers or the Allied commands, no matter when these regulations were instituted.

3. Not to arrest without our knowledge or restrict the liberty of persons who actively aided our military operations.

4. To cease all the activities of secret organizations and groups menacing the safety of our troops and the public peace in Korea and Manchuria.

5. Not to publish articles and provocative attacks against our troops and our Government.

6. To exert all efforts in order to insure the safety of life, property and other rights of our subjects in this region, including the Koreans.

(Signed) GENERAL TAKAYANAGI.

In spite of the fact that the character of these demands was an insult to the Russian Government, as they were practically reducing to nothing the rights of the Russian people, the Government of the Maritime Province agreed to consider these demands, and created for this purpose a Russo-Japanese Adjustment Commission, and appointed its representatives. The Chairman on the Russian side was Zeitlin, subsequently killed by Merkulov's henchmen in Vladivostok.

This Commission was to meet with the Japanese on the following day, and at night—— the Japanese launched an attack upon the entire Maritime Province. On the morning of April 5 the following proclamation, signed by the Commander of the Japanese forces in Siberia, Gen. Oi, was posted on the streets of Vladivostok:



Citizens, on the basis of the declaration made by the Japanese Government on March 31 of this year, the Japanese Command has been conducting negotiations since April 2 with the representatives of the Russian authorities regarding the peaceful solution of the question of the presence of the Japanese forces in the Province. Suddenly, on the night of April 4-5, Russian armed groups attacked our munition stores, garages, and transfer stations, and also fired, in several places, at our outposts. In view of these illegal acts, and in order to avoid the danger which is threatening from armed Russian detachments, the Japanese command is compelled to demand the disarming of these detachments. In this case, the Japanese command, not pursuing any aims of its own, cannot allow further disorders, and will therefore take measures after negotiations with the Russian authorities.

The Provisional Government sent notes of protest to the Japanese Government and to the "Inter-Allied Diplomatic Conference," categorically denying the statement made by Gen. Oi, and demanding the restoration of the normal status of the Province.

Even if we were to admit that the Russian people, or "armed groups," as the Japanese called them, attacked the Japanese in Vladivostok, then how can the simultaneous Japanese advance over the entire territory of the Maritime Province be explained?

That these raids were carefully planned and premeditated can be seen from the following copy of a document which was prepared by the Japanese previous to their advance and submitted to the Russian commanding officer of the Ugolnaya Station on the night of April 5:

Demand, (April.....).

To the Commanding Officer of the Revolutionary Troops of the Ugolny Garrison:

At the command of the Japanese Commanding Officer, I submit to you the following demands:

1. I shall not permit the presence of your armed militia within the limits of the Japanese Army's operations, since the negotiations between Japan and Russia have remained without result.

2. You should order the disarming of your soldiers, and you should turn over to us, temporarily, all weapons and military equipments.

3. Should your troops refuse our demand or attempt to flee, I will most decidedly pursue them with all the military power at my disposal. On the other hand, if your troops will obey our demand and disarm, I will not harm any one, in fact, I will even offer protection to them in our army.

Further, I beg you to reply to this letter in half an hour's time after its receipt.

(Signed) Commander of the Japanese Garrison on the Ugolnaya Station.

### **XXIII.**

The Diplomatic Representative of Japan in Siberia, Mr. Matsudaira, desiring apparently to soften somewhat the impression created by the Japanese attack, declared in an interview that the Japanese were acting in accordance with an agreement with all the Allies. The Russian press naturally was much disturbed, and as a result the American Consul made public, on May 12, the following telegram of the American Government:

In connection with the comments on the interview with Matsudaira regarding the question of the policy of Japan in Siberia, which appeared in the press a few days ago, it is desirable to give publicity to the fact that no agreement was made nor discussion thereof regarding the zone of the Chinese Far Eastern railroad, was entered into on the part of the United States since the Inter-Allied Agreement concluded in 1919, in accordance with which the Inter-Allied Railroad Commission and the Inter-Allied Technical Board were formed, and allied military aid for the protection of Russian roads was granted.

The Japanese, seeing the results of their attack as expressed in the indignation of the Russian population, which was too manifest to escape the eyes of the foreigners, and which naturally compromised them, could do nothing else but print "denials."

Particularly characteristic is the letter from the General Staff of the Japanese Gendarmerie in Vladivostok, of May 7, addressed to the Regional Inspector of the Militia of Vladivostok, and signed by Major-General Yosihara:

#### *In Reply to a Newspaper Article*

On April 5 of this year the following article appeared in "Krasnoye Znamya": 'During the attack of the Japanese army in the city of Khabarovsk, innocent citizens were massacred, among them women and children who were even thrown into the fire, etc.'

This is a lie. There are people who know the dignity of the Japanese troops, who respect honesty and justice, and do not believe this brazen lie. But among the ignorant population the statements given in this article have found believers. Therefore we cannot remain silent, as such articles only disturb the friendly relations which are being resumed be-

tween Russia and Japan. For this reason we desire that an order be issued as soon as possible for the repudiation of this article and that steps be taken to preclude the appearance of such untruthful articles in the future.

Thus, in the opinion of the Japanese militarists, it is not the cruel acts that provoke animosity on the part of the Russian population, but the "description" of these acts by the newspapers. . . .

Most characteristic for the Japanese behavior in the Far East is the following fact, which is worthy of note: While shooting was going on in the city of Nikosk, Japanese soldiers distributed and scattered proclamations, in bad Russian, of the following text:

(First)

Fellow citizens, do not be disturbed. Continue at your work; now the Japanese Army has entered into negotiations with the Revolutionary Government and its army in order to maintain peace in the Far East and to preserve the life and the property belonging to the Russian Government.

Citizens must not provoke any catastrophic disorders. Robbery, murder, and disorder are illegal acts which are absolutely forbidden by the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army is taking all possible steps to guarantee the preservation of life and property. The Commander of the Army repeats: Citizens, do not be disturbed, and meet with full confidence the Japanese Army; it is desirable that you should continue your regular work.

(Signed) Commander of the Japanese Army in the City of Nikolsk-Usurisk, Major-General Odagari.

(Second)

Having sincerely at heart the welfare of the Russian Far East, the Japanese Army declares that the measures it has taken for the disarming of the Revolutionary forces are in no way calculated to destroy your army. Upon the conclusion of peace you may again organize new powerful armies. The inhabitants of the city of Nikolsk-Usurisk may rest assured that the peace and order which they are enjoying are due to the mutual political co-operation existing between our officials.

(Signed) Commander of the Japanese Forces in the City of Nikolsk-Usurisk, Major-General Odagari.

When the first two proclamations did not help, a third one, in not less colorful language, was issued.

(Third)

Citizens of the city of Nikolsk-Usurisk, do not be disturbed, and

continue at your regular work. All stores, market places, theatres and commercial establishments must be kept going. The Japanese Army conducts war only against the dangerous elements, but with peaceful citizens it desires to live in amity. Life, property and the inviolability of person is guaranteed to all citizens; the treatment of captured prisoners will be most magnanimous, and their families may rest assured about their fate.

(Signed) Commander of the Japanese Forces of the City of Nikolsk-Usurisk, Major-General Odagari.

#### XXIV.

After long negotiations and under pressure on the part of the Japanese, while armed clashes were going on in the region, the Japanese forced the acceptance of their project of an agreement of April 4, which was accepted almost entirely. The Provisional Government succeeded in inserting insignificant corrections only. And on the basis of this agreement, referred to as the agreement of April 5, there was concluded a new agreement on April 29 of the same year, according to which, in the territory occupied by the Japanese troops, the Russians were not allowed to station their troops within a zone of 30 kilometers on either side of the railroad. The railroad of course was seized by the Japanese.

#### XXV.

In the meantime an energetic activity was going on in the whole Far Eastern territory that was separated from Russia and torn asunder internally by the impenetrable wall erected by the Japanese and Semenov in Transbaikalia; an activity the aim of which was to unite the entire territory of the Russian Far East and to overcome all Japanese efforts, intrigues and bloody repressions, the only purpose of which was to keep the Russian Far East in a state of disunion, civil war, and anarchy. On April 6, 1920, there assembled in Verkhne-Udinsk, the center of the Zemstvo Government of Pribaikalia, the conference of the working population of Pribaikalia, which proclaimed the independence of the Far East and the formation of a Democratic Republic of the Far East.

The declaration was communicated to the Government of Soviet Russia and to the Governments of all Allied countries.

The declaration of April 6 was to become the starting point in the difficult work of the real union of all the regions and of the fusion of all regional governments.

But this appeal of the conference of the toiling population, as well as the appeal of the newly elected Government to all Allied countries, was answered only by the Government of Soviet Russia. On May 14, Chicherin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, communicated that the independence of the Far Eastern Democratic Republic was recognized by the government of the Russian Soviet Republic.

## XXVI.

Almost simultaneously with the answer of Soviet Russia, or rather three days before, on May 11, apparently as an answer to the declaration of independence of the Far East, was published the declaration of General Oi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese expeditionary forces, which has since become famous in the Far East; the publication of this declaration was explained as an answer to the proposals of the representative of the Soviet Government to arrange some agreement between the partisan troops and the Red Army on one hand, and the Japanese on the other.

The declaration begins with the statement that Japan "has no designs and attempts no encroachments on Russian territorial rights" and explains further the "incident" of April 4-5 in the Maritime Province as a "necessary act of self-defense" against the "attacks on the part of partisan detachments," "for the purpose of defense," and points out that "Japan cannot shut her eyes to the fact that in a territory bordering on Japan political groups are formed which intend to trample under foot the laws of mankind and to violate the peace of the whole world." In this declaration it is said:

Now that the transport of the Czecho-Slovak troops is nearing its end, I declare frankly that the Japanese Military Command will gladly withdraw its troops as soon as the situation of the Russian possessions in the Far East is firmly established, as soon as any possibility of a menace to Korea and Manchuria is eliminated, and the safety of life and property of the Japanese population in the country is assured.

The Japanese command, taking into consideration the will of the Russian population, does not intend to complicate the political situation of the territory by giving its support to individual Russians, without regard to the will of the Russian people.

The Japanese command, together with the Russian population, heartily welcomes the formation of an autonomous territory composed of the regions of the Far East, and the institution of such a political system of government as will correspond to the will of the entire population.

Subsequently it is pointed out that "for the attainment of the situation explained above, it is first of all necessary that the Russian troops should stop military activities against the Japanese troops in Chita, and that in that region there should be arranged between the Japanese troops and the eastward-moving Bolsheviks a zone which should be exempt from the intrusion of troops of both sides, whereupon it will be possible to put into effect the union of the provinces on the basis of self-government."

The declaration ends with a peculiar Japanese "but:"

The bestialities of the Russian troops, which occurred not so long ago in Nikolayevsk on the Amur, evoke in my heart a sentiment of deep grief. The Russian troops, taking advantage of the small number of our troops, surrounded and destroyed them; moreover, they also killed the Imperial Consul and brutally exterminated many peaceful Japanese citizens. This offence, which is beyond description, made a deep impression on the Japanese people, wherefore it is self-evident that this question requires a separate settlement.

This declaration is extraordinarily interesting in many respects: 1. While welcoming, "together with the Russian population," the formation of an independent Far Eastern State (the Declaration of Independence of April 6), at the same time it makes the withdrawal of the Japanese troops conditional, as it were, upon the realization of this aim—"as soon as the situation of the Russian possessions in the Far East will be firmly established." 2. While giving their support to Semenov for the purpose of destroying the work of unity, or in case this should not succeed, in order to bring about a protectorate over the Republic, the declaration endeavors to divert the attention of the population and of foreigners by the statement that they do not wish to complicate the political situation by giving support to "individual Russians." 3. While they apparently were considering the imminent necessity of evacuating Transbaikalia where Semenov held power owing to the support of Japanese bayonets, and where the troops of the Verkhne-Udinsk Government were fighting him, they intended to help him and therefore put forth the question concerning "the cessation by the Russian troops of military activities against the Japanese troops in Chita." 4. No mention is made here of the fact that the intervention was a common undertaking of all the Allies; on the contrary, the

question of the intervention here resolves itself to one of Japanese "interests." 5. Here may already be seen a limitation of the Japanese appetites as far as territorial conquests or spheres of influence are concerned (why—will be explained later), and hence the unwillingness to clash with the Red Army. 6. And finally, the first open statement as to the necessity of a "separate settlement" of the Nikolayevsk incident.

## XXVII.

The declaration of General Oi, of May 14, was answered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Verkhne-Udinsk, whose reply contained the following statements:

By an agreement with Soviet Russia, our Government, on the very day of the occupation of Verkhne-Udinsk by our troops, arranged for a neutral zone, which is requested in the declaration. The Red Soviet Army stopped its advance west of the Selenga River. Our People's Revolutionary Army is concerned with the definite task of breaking up the last remainders of reaction which stand between our people and the long-expected peace. Our Government and our Command have taken all the necessary steps for avoiding clashes with the Japanese vanguard. Your command was informed about this in a great number of telegrams and communications. I am empowered to announce that in order to speed the satisfactory solution of this question our Government is ready to discontinue military activities against our internal enemies, on the condition, however, that the Japanese troops will exert pressure on the reactionary bands, forcing them to lay down their arms and to cease any armed attacks against the People's Revolutionary Army.

It is quite superfluous to insist upon the fact that our Government whose aim is peace and unity, warmly and gladly welcomes the proposal of the Japanese command, and is ready to meet its representatives at an arranged time and place for a final and speedy settlement of all problems.

On May 31, the Verkhne-Udinsk Government published a new address to all Allied countries in which was announced the creation of the Far Eastern Republic, and their attention was called to the necessity of a real unity of all the various regions and to the conditions the fulfillment of which is necessary for the final establishment of peace and order in the Russian Far East. These conditions were as follows:

1. That the Red Army of the All-Russian Soviet Government should cease its eastward advance at a certain established point (at that time this condition was already fulfilled).

2. That the Foreign Governments, especially the Expeditionary Forces of Japan, should not give any help or support to the remainders of the reactionary forces that are concentrated in Chita.

3. That the road to Chita should be open, so that it may be possible to unite the Province of Transbaikalia with the other Far Eastern provinces.

4. That friendly economic relations should be immediately established between our Republic and the Allied countries, for their mutual welfare, and for relieving the present difficulties and hardships.

5. That all the foreign expeditionary troops should leave the country, thus affording a possibility for commercial and industrial pursuits.

It is necessary to point out here that the activity aiming at the creation of the Far Eastern Democratic Republic was going on at the same time in the Maritime, the Amur and the Pri-baikal provinces, and that all the local governments were persistently endeavoring to obtain a possibility of entering into immediate relations with each other, for the purpose of a real fusion of the various administrations. But Semenov's "cork" in Chita, which was especially created by the Japanese and actively protected by them at the time of Kolchak's rule, with the purpose of weakening his power, was now specifically destined to prevent the possibility of relations between the local governments.

Soon after the conference of the toiling people had elected the Government of Verkhne-Udinsk, it was recognized by the Government of the Amur Province as the Central Government for the entire Far East (on May 25).

Afraid that the Maritime Government which had been recognized as the Provisional Government by Sakhalin, might also extend its recognition to the Government of Verkhne-Udinsk as a Central Government, the Japanese began to exert on it an incessant pressure, not even stopping at threats and reminding them of the events of April 4-5. At the same time the Japanese also began to coquet with the Maritime Government, declaring it to be the only truly democratic government, and that Japan



would recognize it, if it would place itself at the head of all the provincial governments.

The situation for the Russian population was clear: The Verkhne-Udinsk Government was outside of the zone of activity of the Japanese troops, and for this reason it was the most independent; but for this very same reason it was unacceptable for the Japanese; the Maritime Government was under the continuous pressure of the Japanese and under the steady menace of being overthrown by the Russian counter-revolutionists who were all the time kept in readiness in the Japanese General Staff—and for this reason it was more acceptable for the Japanese (further developments, as was to be expected, showed that even this was nothing more than a part of the Japanese game).

Thus the Japanese brought up and inflated the question of the "priority" of the governments, i.e., which Government was to be the Central Government, and every possible measure was taken to prevent the meeting of the representatives of the Maritime and the Verkhne-Udinsk Governments. And all the time the Japanese posed officially as the "advisers" and "mediators" between the governments.

In General Oi's answer of June 26 to the note of the Verkhne-Udinsk Government of May 31, this motive was even emphasized: instead of giving a direct answer to the question asked, the Japanese declared to the Verkhne-Udinsk Government that although it was recognized by the Soviet Government, nevertheless it could not be considered as a stable and legitimate government of the entire Russian Far East. The recognition of the Verkhne-Udinsk administration as the Central Government extended to it by the authorities of the Amur Province was not convincing either, because the Government of the Amur Province itself could not be considered as a stable government. The Verkhne-Udinsk Government could be considered by the Japanese only as a local government and only in this capacity were they willing to start negotiations with it for the cessation of military activities. Further on, General Oi disclosed his real intentions with regard to Ataman Semenov: "I cannot consider Semenov's Government as a brigand lair of a band of mutinous troops; I recognize it also as one of the Governments existing in

the Russian Far East." The Japanese wish to give, "under peaceful conditions, to the Russian population and to every Government that is the true representative of the population of every province, the possibility of forming, on the Russian territory of the Far East, a buffer zone that is desirable to them. Therefore, in considering the question of the buffer zone on the Russian territory of the Far East, I cannot ignore the Government of Semenov."

Thus, in addition to preventing the population from expelling Semenov, the Japanese declared his organization to be a Government with equal rights ("which is the true representative of the population" of its territory) and which would have to take part in the deliberations concerning the creation of a Central Government of the Far East.

Further on, touching upon the question of ceasing the struggle, General Oi states: "Moreover, as mentioned above, in recognizing the Government of Semenov, and with the intention of preventing disturbances in a region that has close relations with our country, I am collaborating with Semenov's troops for the purpose of upholding order in Transbaikalia. Therefore, simultaneously with the cessation of military activities between the troops of Semenov and the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, I desire also to bring about the cessation of military activities between the Japanese troops and the Verkhne-Udinsk Government."

Thus it is rather a hard thing to separate Semenov from Japan and Japan from Semenov. They are both parts of an integral whole.

## XXVIII.

While the negotiations for an armistice with the Verkhne-Udinsk Government were going on, and the Japanese were playing with the Maritime Government, not allowing it to recognize the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, their staff located in Sakhalan (on Chinese territory, opposite Blagovyeshchensk, on the other bank of the Amur River) was continuously threatening the Amur Government in order to induce it to break away from Verkhne-Udinsk and join the Maritime Administration recognizing the latter as the Central Government. In spite of all

these threats, the Amur Government persisted in its old attitude and declared, as had the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, that it considered Semenov's men not as a Government, but as bandits subject to the criminal courts of the Republic.

A similar point of view was taken by the Maritime Government, but the Japanese (this time the representatives of the diplomatic mission) declared to it that they could not abandon Semenov at one stroke, after they had supported him for such a long time; that it was necessary to give them the possibility to "save their face"; that if Semenov would not agree to the demands of the Maritime Government, if he would not listen to their advice, they would have a legitimate reason to turn their backs upon him.

The Maritime Government agreed to receive a delegation from Semenov and on its arrival proposed to it, in the interest of a peaceful solution of the question, at once to create a provisional parliament in Chita, a National Assembly after the Maritime model, and to surrender to it all civil and military power. Semenov's men did not agree to this, of course, as they knew very well that the population would not allow them to continue their rule, and thus all negotiations were discontinued, although Semenov's adherents endeavored to prolong them, trying at the same time to prepare a counter-revolutionary coup in Vladivostok.

## XXIX.

While the Japanese were conducting this complicated game, continuously diverting the attention of the Russian population and its authorities, they were at the same time preparing a new attack on the Amur Province.

In the secret correspondence between the Ministry of War in Tokio, and General Oi, as well as the Japanese General Staff in Vladivostok and the Commander of the 14th Division in Khabarovsk, which was made public in the Far East to the great horror of the Japanese, all the details of the Japanese adventure that was prepared at that time are uncovered. It is necessary to add that the Japanese denied the authenticity of this correspondence, calling it "propaganda"—but what else could the Japanese say when their plans are uncovered?

We reproduce here the full text of two interesting and highly important telegrams:

War Ministry, Tokio, 6-12-1920.

Secret Order No. S1233-11

To the Commander of the Siberian Army, Vladivostok:

After the events in Nikolayevsk on the Amur, the Japanese Imperial Government considers itself compelled to issue the following orders, which may defend the Japanese interests in the Maritime and Amur provinces.

We order you to prepare a plan of military operations which must serve our interests in case of occupation of the territory along the Amur. In preparing your plan you must use the following clauses as a basis.

We recommend that the above mentioned territory be divided into three military divisions; as the present political situation does not permit us as yet to send a large army for your disposal, we expect from your military experience and shrewdness that you will prepare the requested plan in such a manner that it will receive the approval of His Imperial Majesty. In order to aid you in your work, we will send you as soon as possible all the plans which have already been worked out in the Foreign Ministry and which provide for the necessary organization of civil institutions in case of occupation. You must immediately create a commission of officers of the general staff and commissariat, and send this commission to the above mentioned territory, so that the commission may make valuable military and economic reports to you. Our interests also demand preparation of an offensive against Blagovyeshchensk, the outlying districts of which are full of regular and irregular partisan and Bolshevik troops.

According to the reports of our agents who are in this territory, engaged in investigating this problem, the offensive is as yet premature. In any event you must have everything in readiness for an offensive, so that it could be started at a moment's notice. The general interests of the Japanese Imperial Government demand that the occupation be carried out completely in the immediate future; therefore we order you to submit a plan of occupation within the shortest possible period.

Immediately after receiving this telegram, General Oi addressed the following demand to the Commander of the 14th Division in Khabarovsk:

Vladivostok Chief Staff,

Secret Order No. S-B242, 6-17-1920.

To the Commander of the 14th Division:

I am transmitting herewith the enclosed order, and I order you to immediately create a commission which will gather the necessary information in the territory between Khabarovsk and Nikolayevsk, and which must submit the same to you within the shortest possible time.

Reply immediately by telegraph how many days would be required for the 14th Division to be ready for an offensive against Blagovyeshchensk. Do you consider the forces at your disposal sufficient for your operation? If you consider your present forces insufficient, report immediately so that I can dispose of the units which are expected from Chita.

I call your attention to the bridge across the Amur, as in case of an offensive our army may need the bridge. The preparation and repair of this bridge must begin immediately. If necessary occupy the local arsenal for this purpose.

According to your previous reports I expect that those Russians whom you mentioned will be very useful to us in case of occupation. In my opinion we will have a complete administration in the entire Maritime Province; therefore I order you to discuss your plans with reliable Russians. The names of the Russians who are ready to serve His Japanese Imperial Majesty are to be forwarded to me at once.

(Signed) Oi.

Thus after June 12, when instructions were given in Tokio regarding the preparation of an attack on the Amur Province, all Japanese activities, as far as the various negotiations were concerned, were undertaken with the sole purpose of diverting the attention of the Russian authorities from their real plans and intentions.

The evacuation of Transbaikalia was prepared only in order to mask the seizure of the Sakhalin region.

### XXX.

In order to make the subsequent events more clear it is necessary to go back a little: After the conclusion of the armistice and the signing of the agreement of April 29, it was necessary, for the fulfillment of this agreement, to put a stop to the struggle which went on, after the Japanese attack of April 4-5, between the Khabarovsk garrison and the Amur population on the one hand, and the Japanese on the other hand. For this purpose the Russian authorities sent their representatives, such as Utkin and others. The truce was concluded and the Russian troops, in accordance with the agreement of April 29, were withdrawn beyond the Amur. After that the Japanese delivered the city of Khabarovsk to the so-called Bochkarev men, a band organized after the Semenov model, and the settlements which remained without troops and militia were delivered to the tender mercies of the Khunkhuses (Chinese bandits), who were

also supported by the Japanese. The excesses of these bands lasted for a long time. The attempts of the Government to send militia to disarm them were opposed by the Japanese. The persons who were arrested at the time of the April occurrences, numbering about 150, were, in spite of the agreement, not liberated. But finally the excesses of the Bochkarev men became so scandalous that the Japanese could not, without altogether compromising themselves, prevent the Government from disbanding them.

After negotiations in Khabarovsk, the Vladivostok militia was admitted, which, after a short firing, arrested the Bochkarev men, who had taken their quarters in one of the big hotels. But even here, on the insistence of the Japanese, the militia was forced to liberate the Japanese agent Panov, who had been arrested.

The Japanese declared to Mr. Utkin, who was sent by the Vladivostok Government to Khabarovsk, that the only way to bring about peace was to sign a special agreement. This agreement contained clauses such as these:

Clause 2. Nobody has the right to conceal or to keep weapons and cartridges without the consent of the Japanese Command (excluding hunting rifles, revolvers and the cartridges needed for them.)

Clause 3. The authorities must inform the Japanese Command of the arrival and departure of steamers.

Clause 4. The administration has not the right to arrest any persons because of their previous activities, regardless of their political affiliation, and must guarantee the inviolability of their lives.

Clause 5. The administration must not allow the holding of meetings in the open without giving notice to the Japanese Command 24 hours before announcing them.

Clause 6. The Japanese Command has the right, if it considers it necessary, to ask the Russian postal and telegraph authorities, who must give their consent thereto, to submit mail and telegrams to be censored by representatives of the Japanese Command.

It is not astonishing that the Japanese did not particularly insist, when the Maritime Government—although in this era of intervention it was accustomed to a good many things—refused to confirm the agreement.

Mr. Utkin, who was traveling in the train of the Commander of the 14th Division, under the protection of Japanese sol-

diers, and, moreover, in the same car that was occupied by the Commander, was killed on his return trip to Vladivostok, at the station of Iman, by two Russian White Guards who were in the service of the Japanese (Japanese agents).

How far-sighted the Japanese were, and how much they are acting according a definite plan, may be seen from the agreement of April 29, which they forced the Maritime Government to accept. According to this agreement, the Russian troops which were leaving the region where the Japanese troops were stationed (the 30-kilometer zone), could be sent neither to the Sakhalin district, which they soon occupied, nor to Transbaikalia, which they soon evacuated, and where Semenov remained. Thus, even before giving their instructions concerning the preparation of the attack against the Amur Region, the Japanese did not allow Khabarovsk to recover its normal condition. From here news of disorders was incessantly emanating, and these disorders were to serve as a justification for the Japanese activities.

### XXXI.

On July 3, 1920, the following declaration of the Japanese Government was published:

In the period from March 12 to the month of May of the current year, in Nikolayevsk on the Amur, the local Bolsheviks in the most atrocious manner killed the Japanese defense detachment, the employees of the Consulate, as well as Japanese residents, altogether about 700 persons, of both sexes and of various ages. This occurrence exceeds anything in its atrocity and brutality. In order to safeguard the dignity of the country, the Imperial Japanese Government is compelled to take the necessary measures. At the present time, however, there is practically no government with which it could communicate on this subject, and for this reason the Japanese Imperial Government is quite unable to do anything in this matter.

In view of the aforesaid, and until a lawful Government be organized and the question favorably settled, those places in the Sakhalin district which are considered as requiring occupation will be occupied.

With regard to Transbaikalia, the Government, taking into consideration that at the present time the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from this region has already been completed, and relying on a declaration which the Imperial Government has already made repeatedly—has decided in this case to evacuate its troops from the indicated region. In Vladivostok, however, as well as in its surroundings, there exists not only a menace to Korea, and an inclination to take an unfriendly attitude, but there are also living in these districts numerous Japanese subjects.

The city of Khabarovsk is an important point on the way to the Sakhalin district. Consequently the troops must needs remain there in adequate number until the time when stable and peaceful conditions will be re-established in the above mentioned localities.

Here the question as to a "special settlement" of the events of Nikolayevsk is cleared up—by the occupation of the district of Sakhalin. This occupation is mitigated by the fact of the evacuation of Transbaikalia. But the full meaning of this evacuation already became clear from the secret telegram of June 17.

### XXXII.

Frightened by the Japanese evacuation, Ataman Semenov, on July 11, applies to the heir of the Japanese throne, as to the "stalwart defender of the ideas of humanity, the most worthy of the noble Japanese knights," "the expression of the pure ideals of the Japanese nation"—with the entreaty "to insist . . . before his mighty parent, His Imperial Majesty, on the cessation of the evacuation of the troops from Transbaikalia, at least for four months," in order to help "the much suffering Russian army, struggling to hold Chita as the political center of the Far East, the aim of which is the establishment of peace and the undisturbed development of Russian life in the Eastern Borderland which is ruled by me (i.e., Semenov), with the consent of its noble neighbor—Japan."

To this petition of Semenov an answer was sent from Tokio through the Commander of the Siberian troops, which was delivered to Semenov on August 11, at the Station Olovyanaya. The contents of the answer, as it appears in the secret Japanese documents published in the Far East, are not altogether flattering for Semenov:

Tokio, War Ministry, 1920 3/A  
To the Commander of the Siberian Forces:

#### *A Reply to Semenov*

The Japanese Imperial Government has considered your desire from every angle. The Imperial Japanese Government is grateful to you and wishes to maintain friendly relations, but the situation pressing upon us from all sides does not permit us to grant your request. The Imperial Japanese Government does not consider you sufficiently strong to carry out the great object which would assure a great future to the Japanese people.



Your influence with the Russian people is growing weaker daily, and the hatred which the people have against you does not aid us in our policies.

The Imperial Japanese Government sounded the question with the Allied Governments, but on all sides we found a negative attitude.

If you wish to direct your activities in another direction we will support them with great pleasure, but in accordance with the principles which are known to you.

Our reply to your economic questions will be transmitted within the next few days; in this matter we may reassure you.

Note: This reply was transmitted to Semenov on August 11, at Station Olovyannaya.

### XXXIII.

Although the Japanese made a declaration concerning the evacuation of Transbaikalia, they nevertheless insisted upon the signature of an agreement concerning the cessation of military activities by the Verkhne-Udinsk Government; the Japanese wanted to secure the position of Semenov after their evacuation.

In this agreement, lines were established which were not to be violated by both parties. Clause 5 especially provides that the "term of expiration of the present agreement is considered to be the termination of the work of the Conference of Representatives, who lawfully express the will of the population of the Russian Far East." By the "Conference of Representatives" is understood here the conference of the representatives of all regions of the Far East which was constantly supposed to convene for sessions, but which up to that time had not assembled owing to obstacles put in its way by the Japanese.

The agreement is provided with a special and quite interesting note: "The troops under the command of Semenov recognize the present agreement, as is guaranteed by the representatives of the Japanese Expeditionary Army on the territory of the Far East."

The agreement was signed at the Station Gongota, on July 15, by the Japanese and Russian representatives. On July 16 both parties signed a still more interesting document. It does not refer any more to the armistice, but to the future policy.\*

An interesting feature of the Japanese policy in the Far East which deserves attention is that it proclaims its adherence to

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\*See Appendix No. 16.

aspirations that are really those of the Russian population for which the latter really is struggling, and which it cannot put into effect owing to the unfriendly policy of Japan. Such ideas are in the present case:

1. The convocation of a Conference of the Representatives of all regions to bring about a real unification of the regions.
2. The creation of an independent Far Eastern Republic.

Although for years they have obstructed the unification of the Far East, the Japanese at the same time, in order to deceive the world abroad, incessantly and loudly assert that they are in favor of this unity.

It is necessary to mention right here that the first meeting in Verkhne-Udinsk of the representatives of the various regions did not take place until September.

#### XXXIV.

But let us return to the secret documents. The communication of General Oi to the Commander of the 14th Division in Khabarovsk, dated July 12, reads as follows:

Vladivostok, 7-12-1920.

To the Commander of the 14th Division, Khabarovsk:

According to information, the local government has no force whatsoever at its disposal. The Communist Party is daily growing stronger, but this does not interfere with our plans, as the forces at their disposal are not sufficiently strong. Our people, who are compelled to work together with the local government, are ready to assume authority at any moment and to maintain the administration until the occupation is completed.

Use all possible influence always to interfere with the work of the Khabarovsk administration, so that the representative of the government cannot accomplish anything in his work. Help as much as possible the City Party, but in such manner that the population may not notice it.

The negotiations with Semenov will soon end. Semenov's wishes are easily satisfied, and we are only awaiting the sanction of His Imperial Majesty and the Government.

I have been informed by the War Minister that the general European situation makes it necessary for us not to carry out any of our plans during this month. The War Minister ordered me to exercise extreme caution and I order you to act likewise. Lately I have not been receiving from you any information as to what is going on in your district. Are our agents ready in the entire province? I order you to reply to me immediately.

Oi.

Thus, playing with the Maritime Government all this time, the Japanese were simultaneously retaining "Russians" in the

service of the same Government, so as to be able at any moment to overthrow it and to occupy this province.

The instructions referring to Khabarovsk were strictly carried out.

In Khabarovsk, soon after a stop was put to the excesses of the Bochkarev men, there began, with the open support of the Japanese, the movement of a group of men headed by Likhoidov, members of the old City Council from the days of Kolchak which, defying the Vladivostok Government, did not want to arrange for new elections. The Government, which insisted upon new elections to the City Council, on the basis of universal suffrage (the law passed under Kerensky) attempted to take vigorous steps against disobedient citizens, and instructed the District Emissary Mileyev, as well as the militia, to put into effect the decisions of the Government. But here the Japanese stepped in, forbidding the militia to move freely in the city, and extending their protection to Likhoidov and his band of reactionaries, who were carrying out the plans of the Japanese. Likhoidov declared that he was not subject to the authority of the Maritime Government, and it is he whom the Japanese refer to ("City Party") in their secret telegrams.

On August 2, General Oi sent decisive secret instructions to Khabarovsk.

Vladivostok, 8-2-1920.

Secret Order S/2428

To the Commander of the 14th Division:

The offensive against the Amur province must take place not later than the end of August. Your plans for the distribution of troops are approved. The left wing, which is distributed along the Usuri River, must be reinforced by one unit of sappers. The offensive must begin either from Usuri or Sungari. You must try to have the troops attack simultaneously. According to information in our possession, the enemy's positions are strongly fortified, but the right wing, which is close to the Amur, is the weakest, so that your attack from that side could be successful and decisive.

Your desire that your operations should be supported from Sakhalyan\* cannot be carried out because the political obligations to China do not allow it. We have taken certain steps in that direction, but without results.

It is evident that negotiations with the Semenov forces will not bring any results; these troops are also beginning to be poisoned with the Bolshevik virus. By order of the War Minister, our aim must be as follows:

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\*A place in Manchuria.

irregular and Bolshevik troops must be driven out from the provinces which are to be occupied. If our attack should be made with lightning speed, we shall have the benefit of routing these troops in one month, and they will scatter in the direction of Chita. You must exert all efforts that during the offensive the Commissars and the prominent Bolsheviks may fall into our hands, so that we can finish once for all with the danger which threatens us from the Communists. Report immediately if there is anything that you need for the offensive, so that I may immediately execute  
(Signed) Oi.

Likhoidov went to Vladivostok to negotiate with the Japanese, and as a result General Oi reports to Khabarovsk:

From Vladivostok to Khabarovsk.  
S/1717.

To the Commander of the 14th Division, Khabarovsk:

From a conversation with Likhoidov I learned that the situation in Khabarovsk is developing in our favor. In my opinion these people are faithful to us. Our literary secret agents Panov and Yuriev are working in a desirable manner. No expense must be spared in attaining our aims. We can always give the requested assistance, but we cannot do so openly.  
(Signed) Oi.

But all of a sudden the whole situation changes and Tokio orders a retreat. On August 4, the War Ministry gave General Oi instructions just the contrary of the above:

Tokio, War Ministry, 8-4 -1920. ....1  
A Secret Session S/466.

To the Staff of the Siberian Expeditionary Army Vladivostok:

The Japanese Imperial Government is compelled to adopt the following decision:

The general European situation, the victories of the Soviet Government on the Polish front, the growing danger from the Soviet Government, the noticeable antipathy on the part of the United States and China, the steps undertaken by America in the question of Sakhalin, the general preparedness of the United States for war, the secret agreement between Soviet Russia and Germany—compel us not to carry out our political projects in Siberia completely.

The desire of the United States that Japanese troops should evacuate Siberian territory immediately has become a very serious problem and this problem demands extreme caution on our part.

The strong influence of Germany in China threatens us with the loss of influence.

All these problems compel us to adopt a waiting attitude. Any premature steps may ruin all our great plans. The present situation compels us to give up the plans of occupation in Siberia for some time, remaining entrenched, however, in those territories where our troops are located.

In the Japanese-Chinese question the situation compels us to make certain concessions: The greatest danger is from the Soviet Government, as the danger which is contained in the unity of all Russians may create unexpected obstacles for us. We can only rely upon ourselves, as the incidents in Nikolayevsk and in the entire Maritime Province made a very unfavorable impression among the Allies.

The time has come when most cautions, serious work must be done by us. We consider that it is best, and order that the troops which are at present in the Maritime District should spend the winter in their present quarters. The commanders must prepare everywhere fortified winter quarters. Our trusted people must influence the situation in such a manner that our general interests would be protected under any circumstances.

Our interests demand that the Japanese Imperial Diplomacy should enter into close relations with the Provisional Vladivostok Government, but without allowing that government to become strongly entrenched.

The operations against the Amur Province must cease, but the troops must be held in readiness, as the danger from that side is still very great. The growing Communist influence which we notice in every step of the present government makes a very unfavorable impression on us and on our people. We order extreme caution so that the germs of Bolshevism should remain isolated, as we do not know what the results will be of the secret conference which is to take place shortly between the Allies regarding the Siberian question.

We order the War Ministry to base all their actions in accordance with our decision of today. We order it to exercise extreme caution in military problems, as caution is essential in the affairs of the Siberian army. We order the War Ministry and its officers to be extremely careful regarding the Communist Party, which creates more obstacles than anything else to our plans. We order the War Ministry to make this decision known to the commanders of the divisions, and we believe that it will by all means advance the sacred cause of the Japanese people.

Thus Japan is prevented from completely carrying out its plans; it is compelled to change them because of the general political situation, and, mainly, because of the strength of Soviet Russia and America's attitude toward Japanese annexations in the Far East.

With regard to the secret conference of the Allies mentioned above, there exists a secret telegram (which has been published) from the War Minister in Tokio, dated August 20, which was sent by a courier to Harbin.

By courier to Harbin from Tokio.  
8-20 A/217

For the consideration of the solution of the Siberian problem, Barons Hayashi, Ishi and Magata were sent for a conference to England. They are to discuss and decide the Siberian question. For a final settlement

of the Siberian question, I order the Commanders or their lieutenants as well as the diplomatic representatives, to be in Harbin on September 12. Neither the Command nor the foreign missions must know about this secret conference. You must travel unofficially.

War Minister (Signature).

Nothing else is known of these negotiations.

### XXXV.

In the meantime, Semenov's men, who were leaving Eastern Transbaikalia immediately after the Japanese, fearing the armed population that had risen in despair and gone to the mountains and forests, forgot the agreement that had been signed by the Japanese in their behalf, and began to destroy the railroad and mercilessly to rob the population, driving away its herds, and the Verkhne-Udinsk Government was compelled, on August 7, to remind the Japanese of the agreement of July 15.

The men of Semenov and Kappel, who had been in Chita (Kappel's men, the last remainders of the destroyed Kolchak army, had arrived in Chita as far back as February, 1920), began to disintegrate completely. Some of them began going over to the struggling partisans (the armed peasants), and another part simply dispersed, as they foresaw a bad end. A mock National Assembly, which had been created by Semenov in Chita for the sake of appearances, declared itself against him—such was the indignation against him of all classes of the population, and so strong was the general conviction that he would fall very soon after the evacuation of the Japanese.

In spite of the memorandum signed by both parties on July 16, the delegation of the Verkhne-Udinsk Government which started for Chita for negotiations with the representatives of the population of Chita, was stopped by the Japanese at the station of Gongota. That was the Japanese assistance in bringing about the Conference of the Representatives!

In the month of September the delegates of Vladivostok, through the "mediation" of the Japanese, were allowed to cross the territory occupied by Semenov's men, who had encamped along the Transbaikal Railway, and to reach Verkhne-Udinsk. The results of this meeting so much displeased the Japanese

(according to their opinion the Verkhne-Udinsk Government was thereby strengthened) that the Japanese "Information Bureau" on September 11 gave vent to its wrath against the "treacherous" Verkhne-Udinsk Government. The Japanese communication ended thus: "It is unnecessary to add that Japan will always be ready to answer, either by hostile acts or by peaceful means. If the Far Eastern Government will spurn the proffered hand of friendship extended in a spirit of pure humanity, and will try to diminish the rights of Japan as proclaimed in the Government's declaration, Japan will be ready to attack injustice and to deal heavy blows to her enemies."

### XXXVI.

The Japanese were compelled to go further in their repudiation of their original extensive program until a moment arrived when nothing was left to them but to leave Likhoidov and his crowd to their own fate and to withdraw.

On September 18, a new declaration of the Japanese Government was published, reading as follows:

On the basis of the declaration made public by the Japanese Government on July 9 of this year, at the time of the evacuation of our troops from the Transbaikalian Province, and as a necessary measure, until the re-establishment of order, a certain number of troops have been retained in the district of Khabarovsk, as a strategically important point leading to the Sakhalin Province. Now, in view of the settlement of the political situation in the above mentioned district, I announce the withdrawal of our troops therefrom. At the same time I express my sincere desire that the Russian Far Eastern territory be unified as soon as possible, thus assuring the peace and prosperity of the population of the country, and securing good neighborly relations between the two peoples, the Japanese and the Russian.

Only one or two months before, the Japanese, after creating the Bochkarev band, which the Maritime Government had to expel by force, as well as the Likhoidov men, were loudly asserting that in Khabarovsk everything was not as it should be; but now, all of a sudden, all was "settled." Their plans having changed, their words changed also. . . .

### XXXVII.

The Japanese left Transbaikalia. The population, regardless of class or situation, driven to extremity by the brutalities and the debauchery of Semenov's as well as Kappel's men (who, al-

though somewhat unfriendly to Semenov's men, in general were helping them), rose against them and in the middle of October drove them out of Chita. Ataman Semenov barely escaped from Chita and had to flee in an aeroplane. The Semenov-Kappel troops encamped along the Transbaikal Railroad, leaning upon Manchuria, and, as formerly, bottled up the way between the Maritime Province and Transbaikalia. But, on the other hand, the Amur region obtained a railroad connection with Pribaikalia and a part of Transbaikalia. The Government transferred its seat immediately from Verkhne-Udinsk to Chita, which was selected as the place for the final Conference of the Representatives of all the Provinces.

One or two further efforts of the people, and the entire demoralized White Army withdrew in a panic to Manchuria. . . .

The Japanese, solicitous for the fate of the army that was so well serving their interests, offered their services as mediators, but, as was to be expected, nothing came of the offer. The Chinese, whose activities were being constantly watched by the Japanese, insisted on disarming the White Army that had withdrawn to Chinese territory, but the arms were delivered to the Japanese and the disarming became a farce.

The "cork" in the neck of Transbaikalia was removed. With the Japanese gone the "cork" was gone too—after having for such a long time bottled up the work of the unification of the Russian provinces of the Far East, and after having caused such great losses to the population.

The Verkhne-Udinsk Government had already appealed many times to the White troops, proposing that they disarm and come over to the side of the people. Amnesty was granted to all, except those who had committed grave criminal offenses. Now the Government again confirmed its amnesty to all those who would voluntarily come back. Part of the troops came back. But the major part, obviously afraid on account of the crimes committed, and egged on by the Japanese, preferred for the time being to stay in Manchuria.

### XXXVIII.

Before the Japanese now arose the question concerning the further use to be made of this army. If the general political situation required of them a curtailment of their annexionist



program, that did not at all mean that this program was to be given up altogether. Not in vain had they expended so many efforts, lives and funds.

The valuable Maritime Province, including Vladivostok, was still in the clutches of the Japanese, and now, after having suffered so much, it became the central point of the Japanese "policy."

The bandit "army" which could not fight but could kill and rob the peaceful population was gradually transferred to the Maritime Province with the usual Japanese humbugging. While declaring to the Maritime Government that they were not interfering in the question of the transfer, the Japanese were at the same time transferring the bandits with the help of Chinese officials and subordinates of Chang-Tso-lin, the military head of Manchuria.

Semenov's men were sent to Grodekovo, a Cossack center, the Kappel men to Nikolsk, Razdolnoye and other places, without paying any attention to the protests of the Maritime Government and the National Assembly. With reference to Kappel's army it will suffice to say that its representatives had previously come to Vladivostok to negotiate with the Government; and when the Government proposed to them that they should submit to its command and place themselves completely at its disposal, under absolute guarantee of the inviolability of their persons, they rejected this offer, insisting upon their complete independence.

The Japanese were fulminating against the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, which had already moved to Chita, declaring that this Government having permitted the armed expulsion of Semenov, had violated the agreement of July 15. The Japanese began to look around for a pretext to give support to the Semenov men.

The partisans, having approached the Manchurian border, did not continue the pursuit of Semenov's men, as they did not want to fight on foreign territory; but Semenov's men, as well as the Japanese, were waiting for another opportunity, and were preparing other plans as appeared from the order of General Semenov issued on November 18, at Junction 86 (on the territory of Transbaikalia, a few miles from the Station Manchuria):

**Order of the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces and the Campaign Ataman of all the Cossack Forces in the Russian Far Eastern Borderland.**

The political situation at the present moment is as follows: The Japanese Command, in the person of its representative, Colonel Isome, guarantees to the Far Eastern Army its transfer to the Maritime district, but at the present time Colonel Isome has not a sufficient number of armed forces at his disposal to cover up our retreat. The Chinese Command promises definite assistance only in the work of transporting and quartering our families and relatives. The armed forces of the Chinese in the district of Manchuria are also insufficient and unreliable, and we cannot figure on them to cover up our retreat. Therefore, in order to create a precedent of an international character and to give cause to the Japanese Command to move their troops decisively, and by removing the Chinese from the railroad line to close the frontier to the Reds, it is necessary, in case the situation at the front will compel us to do so, to penetrate as far as possible into the territory of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, avoiding and not taking into consideration the Chinese troops at the frontier.

For the purpose of accomplishing the above, I order parts of the First Abagatui Corps to move in the direction of Hailar, where it should remain until further orders. The Orenburg Cossack Brigade must follow the First Corps. Troops of the Second and Third Corps, after encircling Station Manchuria from the south, are to enter the district of Stations Sagan and Horson. Station Chzhalainor is not to be occupied. Small units of no military importance may go through Station Manchuria, where they are to surrender arms to the Japanese Mission; and it is necessary that all these movements begin simultaneously, so that the units which will come to Station Manchuria be secured from all possible excesses on the part of the Chinese by the presence of our military units in the rear of the Chinese forces.

After the execution of the above operation we shall have assured for ourselves further movement along the railroad line.

I appeal to all, from the General to the soldier, to maintain absolute presence of mind and not to lose hope in the favorable outcome of our struggle for the right and freedom of the people.

Signed, on the original, Lieutenant General Semenov.

Correct copy: Chief of Staff of the First Transbaikal Cavalry Brigade Petelin.

This plan was divulged in time and therefore could not be put into execution.

The transfer of troops to the Maritime Province was accomplished. Semenov had, apparently, to be transported somewhere else for a certain time, and thus the Japanese, their former declarations to the contrary notwithstanding, addressed to General Boldyrev, Commander of the troops of the Maritime Government, the following official announcement:

By order of General Oi, the Commander-in-Chief, I beg to inform you hereby of the following.

The detachments of Semenov's and Kappel's men have been disarmed in Manchuria by agreement between Japan and China. The transfer of some of them who would like to proceed to the territory of the Eastern Chinese Railway and to the Maritime Province should be arranged by direct communications with the Chinese Government and with the Provisional Maritime Government. In consideration of this fact, the Japanese Command is standing completely aside in this matter as not pertaining to its jurisdiction.

According to news received, there is among them Ataman Semenov, who applied for protection to the Japanese Command; the Japanese Command is standing completely aside in this matter as not within its tere the Maritime Province under lawful protection. Confirming the above mentioned arrangement, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese troops has decided that he should be forced to leave the Maritime Province.

The Chief of the Staff of the Japanese Troops,  
MAJOR-GENERAL TAKAYANAGI

Vladivostok, November 28, 1920.

This document dose not. require any further comments.

#### XXXIX.

As soon as the various regions of the Far East had obtained the possibility of free communications and exchange of opinions, the representatives of the various Provincial Governments and of the National Assemblies, then in session, gathered in Chita. This Conference, which took place on November 9, finally united all the Far Eastern provinces. The Declaration of Independence was confirmed, the day of the elections to the Constituent Assembly was fixed, and the suffrage law for these elections adopted (Kerensky's law concerning universal suffrage); a Central Government of the Far Eastern Republic was created and it was entrusted with carrying out the elections; Chita was selected as the capital of the Republic.

It was unanimously decided to ask for the cessation of the intervention. All officers and soldiers, the remainders of the armies of Kolchak and Semenov, were invited to return to peaceful work, inviolability of person being guaranteed them. In the spirit of these decisions a declaration of the Unity Conference of the Provinces of the Far East was issued, in which the Foreign Governments were invited to enter into close political and economic relations with the Central Government of the Far Eastern Republic.

## **XL.**

The Japanese—seeing the futility of all their efforts, as the people of the Russian Far East still continued to consider themselves a sovereign nation unwilling to recognize foreign rule on its territory, and determined to submit only to their own will as expressed by their elected representative organs—began to exert a pressure upon the Maritime Government and the National Assembly, menacing them with repressions, if the National Assembly should confirm the decisions of the Conference of November 9.

For a couple of days Vladivostok was filled with rumors concerning an intended overthrow; in Grodekovo, which the Japanese converted into a local "cork," after the Chita model, by populating it with Semenov's army, a belligerent spirit was induced. General Oi summoned the members of the National Assembly, who were the representatives of all political parties, kept them waiting for about an hour in a dark room, and finally came out to harangue and warn them of the evil consequences which would ensue if the National Assembly should recognize the work of the Chita Conference and the "Communist" (as the Japanese called it) Central Government that was elected there. (The majority of the members of the Government were Communists, but as a whole the Government was a Coalition Government.) General Oi handed to all of them the following declaration:

Today I invited you, the representatives of all political parties and groups of the National Assembly, in order to acquaint you with the stand taken by the Japanese Command and its attitude towards the Provisional Government. As the political situation in this territory has become serious, in connection with the Conference in Chita dealing with the unity of the country, I wish to point out to you that I have repeatedly announced that in order to prevent undesirable conflicts and to preserve peace and order in the country, a Communist administration will not be allowed in those regions in which Japanese troops are stationed. But judging from what is here going on under the influence of the Chita Unity Conference, the situation is rather serious; I am afraid that in the regions in which Japanese troops are stationed, peace and order may be disturbed. I wish to inform you that in the interest of Japanese self-defense as well as for the maintenance of order in the country, there was drawn up an agreement between the Japanese Command and the Provincial Government concerning the cessation of military activities; there was also an exchange of memorandums concerning the establishment of a buffer state,

which, independently from the work going on at the Conference in Chita, are binding upon both parties. Should therefore any third party, whosoever it may be against the will and without the knowledge of the Japanese Command, venture to violate the existing order in the zone in which the Japanese troops are stationed, and thus provoke disturbances in the country, such an activity will under no circumstances be tolerated by the Japanese Military Command. In concluding my address, I wish to express to you my profound respect for your efforts towards the regeneration of the country.

All the delegates, regardless of party affiliation, were deeply offended to be treated as if they were on enemy territory and not in their own country.

The agreements with the Maritime Government, mentioned by General Oi, are those agreements which were forced by the Japanese upon the Government after the events of April 4-5, i. e., the agreements of April 5 and 29. "The memorandums concerning the establishment of the buffer state"—are the letters, reprinted in the second part of this book, which, on the insistence of the Japanese, the Chairman of the Japanese and Russian Sections of the Russo-Japanese Adjustment Commission exchanged with each other in Vladivostok, when the sessions of the Conference were going on in Chita. These memorandums are drafted in the spirit of the memorandum of July 16, already mentioned above, which was signed by the representatives of the Verkhne-Udinsk Government at the Station Gongota.

Similar memorandums were exchanged between the Japanese and the representatives of the Amur province. In general, being themselves much addicted to declarations, they go so far as to force other people also to write them.

In order to make their presence felt, the Japanese began to hold up trains, not allowing anything to pass beyond the zone where their troops were stationed (Station Yevgenyevka); they prohibited the sending out of the city of silver money, with which the Government paid its employees, etc.

In spite of all these measures, the Maritime National Assembly, taught by its bitter experiences with the Japanese, and placing the cause of the unity of all Russian provinces above all the Japanese threats, confirmed the work of the Conference, recognizing the Government elected in Chita as the Central Government.

That the Japanese arguments as to the "Communist" compo-

tion of the Chita Government were only a pretext for the outside world is proved by the fact that the Maritime Government, with which the Japanese were having their sport, and which they wanted to tear away from Chita, thus destroying the work of unity, was of similar composition; the majority here too was "Communist;" but in their essential policy both were equally democratic.

Having failed, the Japanese did not put their threats immediately into effect, but the Maritime population felt that under the leadership of the Japanese all the White Guards who had been transferred thither were being organized for the overthrow of the Government, with the purpose of creating an independent reactionary state out of the Maritime Province, which would continuously menace the Far Eastern Republic, thus destroying the already achieved unity of the Russian Far East.

## **XLI.**

While everywhere provoking disorders, and keeping the entire population in a state of tension, the Japanese began (in January, 1921) to spread the rumor in Vladivostok that in view of the fact that the situation in the Far East was menacing the life and property of the foreigners,, the Consular body intrusted the Japanese with the defense and the protection of the interests of foreigners. The population which, after all the bitter experiences it had gone through, understood the meaning of these rumors, was prepared for new Japanese attacks.

On January 28 the papers published the following announcement from the American Consul:

The Government of the United States of America has not applied to any other Government with the request to collaborate with its representatives or the local authorities for the defense of the life and the property of American citizens in Siberia, and has not counted upon such protection. The Government of the United States is also unaware of the fact that any other Government has made such a request or counted upon such help, or would like to commit to any government whatsoever the protection of the interests of other nationalities or to accept the task of protecting the personal safety or the property of any other nationalities in Siberia.

Thus another Japanese provocation was unmasked.

## **XLII.**

In spite of the fact that in the Fisheries Convention of 1907 Japan obtained substantial rights for the exploitation of fisheries

along the Russian Pacific Coast (equal rights with Russian citizens everywhere, except the bays and the internal river waters), the Japanese were not satisfied. Already at the time of the deliberations of the various items of the Convention, the Japanese were assiduously but unsuccessfully insisting upon the right to hunt beavers and sea-bears in Russian waters, as well as upon the right to fish in bays and rivers. After 1907 Japan very extensively availed herself of her rights and developed this industry. But this was not enough for her; she wanted equal rights with the Russians in all things connected with fisheries.

This question was persistently brought to the fore in 1916, when the Tsar's Government, conducting war with Germany, was in a difficult position, and "Allied" Japan was considered the defender of the Far Eastern Russian possessions against possible attack. The downfall of the Tsar's Government changed the situation, and the Revolutions, both of March and of November, created such favorable conditions for the Japanese that they could not resist the great temptation of obtaining the realization of their old plans. Civil war and intervention completely weakened the Russian fisheries and reduced them practically to insignificance. Almost the entire fishery industry passed into Japanese hands. A long correspondence went on between the Provisional Maritime Government (Provincial Zemstvo Board) and the Japanese, concerning various privileges which the Japanese were asking in the fisheries industry. But even this did not satisfy them, because, in connection with their general scheme of conquest, they had planned not only economic preponderance, but also to secure possession of the enormous natural resources, particularly the fisheries of the Russian Far East.

On December 16, 1920, the Japanese Imperial Consul sent the following communication to the Director of Foreign Affairs of the Vladivostok Government:

With regard to the fisheries in the Sakhalin district I consider it my duty, in accordance with the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to inform you as follows: The fisheries in the lower part of the Amur river, as well as in the Amur estuary, including the islands of Langer, Ud, etc., will from now on be under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Command. As for the fisheries in the remaining parts of Northern Sakhalin and in the waters of the coast from Cape Lazarev to De-Castri, which up to the present were under the jurisdiction of the Russian authorities in Vladivostok

tok, they will henceforth also be under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Command.

This short but exceedingly interesting document immediately suggests a number of thoughts which are not complimentary to Japanese policy.

1. As far back as four months before the Nikolayevsk events, the Japanese had already seized the Russian fisheries resources of Sakhalin and the lower part of the Amur River (of the entire Sakhalin district).

2. The fisheries came under Japanese control, not as a result of competition between the business men concerned in the fishing industry, but by military conquest—"they are under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Command."

3. In seizing them the Japanese do not even consider it necessary to disguise or to assign any reasons for it.

This document, communicated from Vladivostok to Chita, brought forth an immediate protest on the part of the Government:

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic protests against the forcible seizure which is a violation of the rights of the Russian people and its territorial sovereignty. This fact is in glaring contradiction to all the declarations by the Japanese Government of its unchanging respect for the rights of the Russian Nation, its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

On January 17, 1921, the Japanese delivered to the Vladivostok Provincial Government a new note in which five demands are put forth, which are in complete violation of Russian rights in general and of the Fisheries Convention in particular. These demands were supported by statements of the losses which the Japanese concerned in the fishing industry had sustained in connection with the disorders in 1918, 1919 and 1920. The demands were as follows:

1. The Russian authorities must deposit the fees which they receive for the lease of fisheries in an especially designated credit establishment on terms to be fixed by agreement with the Japanese Government. The Russian authorities may, at their discretion, withdraw and expend a third of the money deposited for the maintenance of the personnel supervising the fisheries and for other items, and the destination of the remaining two-thirds



will be determined, according to mutual agreement of both governments, after the end of the corresponding fishing season. The Russian authorities will accurately enter the receipts and expenditures connected with the payment for the leases, and the Japanese Consul in Vladivostok will, if he deems it necessary, examine the books and watch over the correctness of the accounting.

2. In enumerating the fisheries, the Russian authorities will have to include their budgets. (Reason: The prices for the fisheries have supposedly become too high, owing to competitive offers.)

3. Shipping certificates and all certificates of any kind necessary in connection with the fishing industry, are issued not only by Russian, but also by Japanese authorities.

4. The right of coasting trade and, in addition to this, the right of domiciling Japanese subjects, even after the end of the fishing season, until the next season, for the purpose of protecting the buildings and the equipment therein.

5. The Japanese have the same right as the Russians to fish in the bights and in the rivers.

The Japanese had said almost everything and were waiting for an answer, but they did not receive any answer from the Government. On February 14, they again forwarded a note, in which they insisted upon a favorable reply.

On the following day, on February 15, an announcement of the Japanese Consul-General was published, the contents of which were as follows:

With reference to the communication of the Head of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission (i. e., Consul Kikuchi) to the local authorities, represented by B. E. Skvirsky, of December 16, 1920, concerning the taking over of all fisheries of the Sakhalin district by the Japanese Command, I applied to the proper authorities, represented by D. P. Panteleyev, in my request of January 18, of the current year, asking him to omit the following fisheries (for the catching of fish and crabs), from the list of the fisheries that are to be leased in the course of the current year:

Fishing 68-a, Agnevsky 2; fishing 68-b, Agnevsky 5; crabbing 6, Pilevinsky; crabbing 27, Aspidsky; crabbing 28, Nanaysky.

In view of the fact that no answer has been given as yet to my aforesaid communication, I have been instructed by the Government to make the following announcement: The leasing of the above-mentioned fisheries by means of auctions, which in the course of the current year were arranged by the Russian authorities, will not be recognized by the Japanese Government.

Thus, after their note of December 16, concerning the fisheries, against which the Government protested, the Japanese considered themselves full masters of the Sakhalin coastline and of the lower part of the Amur.

By the way, it is interesting to dwell on the following fact: All their notes concerning fisheries, etc., the Japanese diplomats, as well as the military authorities, persistently directed not to the Central Government in Chita, but to the Vladivostok Government; when the representatives of this Government, after the Conference of November 9, refused to accept such documents, the Japanese simply placed them on the desk and walked off. It is interesting to compare with this fact the first clause of the memorandum signed by the Japanese and the Russians at Gongota, on July 16:

The Japanese delegation declared that individual contacts of the Japanese Command with the local authorities will cease immediately after the termination of the work of the Conference, of Representatives expressing lawfully and independently the will of the Russian population of the Far East and which will legalize the final establishment of a single Government.

After the Conference of November 9, i. e., the Conference above referred to, the Japanese persistently endeavored not to mention this clause which they had signed.

After this announcement the Government of the Far Eastern Republic in the beginning of March again protested against the Japanese usurpations:

The disorders which took place in 1918, 1919 and 1920 are the direct consequence of the policies of the Japanese Command, which has completely ignored the sovereign rights of the Russian People in Russian territory. The last verbal notes which were delivered on January 17 by the Japanese Consul-General, as well as the memorandum of the Japanese Consul-General, of December 16, 1920, are considered by the Government as infringements upon the rights of the Russian people, and the Government reiterates its protest of January 19, 1921.

On March 14 the Government of the Far Eastern Republic gave a detailed answer to the five Japanese demands of January 17. In this reply the Government declares that the Japanese should re-establish the normal conditions prevailing before the seizure of the fisheries; that the Government is not opposed to satisfying the legitimate needs of the Japanese fishing industry, and that it furthermore is not opposed to the revision, by the in-

interested parties, of the entire fisheries convention. But such an answer could of course not satisfy the Japanese. They were expecting a resigned submission. On April 18 their answer to the reply of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic of March 14, was delivered. This answer has the same characteristics as the former ones: they cannot wait and therefore take matters in their own hands, and consequently will allow the Japanese fishermen to exploit the fisheries according to terms drawn up by them under the protection of the Japanese military authorities.

And on April 12, under the instructions of the Japanese Government, the Japanese Consulate-General in Vladivostok announced that the Head of the Military-Administrative Department of the Japanese Command in Sakhalin published a notice of February 19, 1921, concerning the leasing by auction of fisheries to Russians, the office of the Military-Administrative Command in Sakhalin (Alexandrovsk) being designated as the place for the auction; in this announcement it is pointed out that "persons who want to consult the above mentioned list, as well as the regulations and rules, may consult them in the Japanese language in the Consulate." Thus Russian fisheries are leased to Russians by the Japanese, who propose to the Russians that they acquaint themselves with the Japanese rules, etc., in the Japanese language!

It is a situation that requires no comment.

### XLIII.

After the declaration of July 3 (evacuation of Transbaikalia and occupation of the Sakhalin district) the Japanese did not say anything about Sakhalin, and only eight months later, on March 21, in Alexandrovsk, Lieutenant-General Kozima, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Army in the Sakhalin district, published the following order:

On the basis of the declaration published last summer, in which the Japanese Imperial Government announced that Japanese troops will occupy important points in the Sakhalin district until the time when a lawful Government will be organized in Russia and the question of the barbarous killing of the Japanese in Nikolayevsk will be settled, the Japanese Expeditionary Army will within the next days distribute its troops in the towns of De-Castri, Nikolayevsk, Mago, Sofisk, and other places, and will establish in these localities a civil administration in order to introduce there peace and order.

**I appeal to the entire local population to peacefully occupy themselves with their affairs and to submit to the authorities named by us.**

Soon complaints began to arrive from the population of Nikolayevsk, Marinsk and other places, reporting that the Japanese were interfering with the work of the Russian Government organs, that they prevented them from communicating with the Russian superior authorities and that in general they were introducing a complete Japanese administration.

On April 19, a Japanese transport arrived in De-Castri, and landed troops, a Japanese radio was erected there, the Russian telegraph was put under Japanese censorship and communication with the Russian higher authorities without the permission of the Japanese was prohibited.

On May 29, the Head of the Military Mission who came to Marinsk with the Japanese detachment, made the following announcement to the Chairman of the District Board:

We herewith communicate to you the order which we received from Lieutenant-General Kozima, Commander of the Army of the Sakhalin District: The Chita Government and the People of the Far Eastern Republic ought to know the contents of an announcement concerning important matters referring to the former Sakhalin District. On the basis of this announcement the activities of any other administration and of its representatives in the occupied territory is not allowed. On the basis of this order, we invite you, the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic, a Government which we have not recognized as yet, to cease your activity.

On July 14, 1920, the Japanese Command made the following announcement:

In the near future Japan will inaugurate a military administration in the Russian part of Sakhalin.

For this reason:

1. All institutions must hand over their affairs to the Japanese Command beginning with July 25.

*Note:*—The majority of the officials and employees will remain in their former positions.

2. Those who live in the buildings belonging to the State or to the community, must leave them on the above date.

3. It is strictly prohibited to carry away from the above-mentioned buildings papers, instruments, supplies, etc.

The inhabitants were immediately told that if in the course of seven days they would not submit proofs that all their rights or

privileges had been acquired from the Russian Government, these rights and privileges would not be recognized.

Not less interesting was the announcement that was sent to the Russian authorities, on August 24, by General Kozima and Head of the Military Administrative Board, Tsuno:

(a) Beginning with the 1st of July the rights of the Russian Government are not recognized.

(b) The Russian administration is considered to be abolished and consequently also all its decrees concerning the exploitation of natural resources.

(c) Property rights shall be determined upon investigation.

(d) For the settlement of administrative and other important matters an investigator shall be appointed, who shall examine the material and give the necessary explanations.

(e) The Japanese authorities will take care of the trustworthy personnel of the Russian administration.

(f) All material of an administrative character will remain in the hands of the persons who were in charge before.

(g) Should the above mentioned points not be adhered to, the necessary measures will be taken.

The Japanese law concerning capital punishment was introduced (with the application of execution) and the whole conduct of life was taken in hand by the Japanese, who issued a great number of regulations. In the "Rules concerning the supervision of Resident Foreigners," the Russians were converted into foreigners, and apparently foreigners of the second class.

The first clause of these rules reads as follows:

Foreigners who intend to come from abroad, into the region which is ruled by the Japanese civilian administration, must have with them a passport or a certificate of nationality, issued by their Government.

The aforesaid passport or certificate, on which a photograph is pasted, must be vised by the Japanese ambassadors, envoys or consuls.

All foreigners coming from Japan, not excluding Russians and Chinese, must be provided with a certificate issued by the Japanese authorities.

On the above mentioned certificate must be pasted a photograph, especially in the case of Russians and Chinese, and this cannot be replaced by the description of the person's appearance.

The Order "Concerning the Supervision of the Mining Industry," issued on August 30, stipulates that:

1. Applications concerning the acquisition of rights in the mining industry shall not be received for the time being.

2. The granting of rights concerning the mining industry is discontinued for the time being.

4. The exercise of rights concerning the mining industry is prohibited for the time being, except in cases where the mining rights have been already enforced and the exploitation is actually in progress.

5. The Head of the Military-Administrative Board is entitled, if he deems it necessary, to limit the rights concerning the mining industry or forbid their exercise altogether, and so on.

This order brought forth the protest of even that adherent of the Japanese interventionist policy, Mr. Krupensky, the Tsar's Ambassador in Tokio. On November 25, 1920 (No. 635), protesting against the clauses 2, 4 and 5, Krupensky declared: "The above-mentioned points are nothing else but an abolishment of Russian laws on Russian territory by Japanese authorities, which appropriated for themselves the rights of territorial supremacy, and the order as a whole is in contradiction with the meaning and the spirit of the declaration of the Japanese Imperial Government of July 3, of the current year, as well as with the oral assurances given to me in this respect by your Excellency (the Minister of Foreign Affairs). I consider it my duty to call the attention of the Japanese Government to this matter, and to protest against this order which violates Russian interests."

The Japanese continued and still continue in their work, and have finally gone to such lengths that they have even renamed the streets with Japanese names. The Japanese know the value of the Sakhalin district very highly—Sakhalin coal, Sakhalin oil, its inexhaustible fishing wealth, is for them a sufficient attraction not to heed the Russian protests or the protests of the Government of the United States. Moreover, the occupied territory is strategically very valuable; the Far Eastern Republic can from this vantage ground be incessantly threatened, and thus forced to grant anything that the Japanese imperialists may want.

#### XLIV.

As appears from the above, the Japanese were doing and were ready to do anything that would lead to the realization of their designs on the Russian Far East. Knowing the difficulties in which France found herself after Wrangel's army was destroyed in the Crimea and evacuated from Russian territory; knowing the desire of France to continue the struggle against Soviet Russia at any price, the Japanese began, in January, 1921, to negotiate with the French Government for sending this entire army to the

Russian Far East, and duly exploiting it as a fighting force. But first of all, Japan presented a great number of demands, the meaning of which was a silent but nevertheless a real and undivided protectorate over the territory of the Far East which was occupied by the Far Eastern Republic.

The French willingly granted Japan freedom of action in the Russian Far East on the condition that the Wrangel troops should be transferred and used by the Japanese and that the Japanese, after satisfying their appetites, should give preference to the French over other foreigners in the matter of concessions. Japan had to furnish the shipping tonnage, but the French Government did not refuse to defray the expenses connected with the transfer of the troops. The central figure in the organization of this affair was subsequently to be Tirbakh, a former adjutant of Kolchak, who came from Paris to Shanghai especially for this purpose. The Japanese intended to put Semenov at the head of the troops, should the transfer succeed. In this spirit, negotiations were conducted with him in Port Arthur, where he was residing. It was taken for granted that the person who would be at the head of the army, and the "government" which would take the place of the present Government of the Far Eastern Republic, would irrevocably agree to full Japanese control in military as well as in civil affairs. The natural resources were also to come under the complete disposal of Japan.

Thus Japan was not losing heart. All her failures only stimulated her to further devices.

But here too Japan made an error in her calculation. The United States crossed her path and Japan was again forced temporarily to slow down.

#### XLV.

In the meantime, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, elected at the Conference of February 9, went its own way, and, basing itself on the provincial authorities, was executing the decisions taken by this Conference. Under the supervision of a commission that was elected on a coalition basis, the elections to the Constituent Assembly were going on. But the Semenov and Kappel "democrats," although warring against each other, tried wherever possible to break up these elections, killing members of the electing commissions, etc. Fortunately they had

gathered only on a small part of the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, viz., the Southern part of the Maritime Province, not occupying even this portion completely, and thus could not do any harm. The elections were a brilliant success, and gave an overwhelming preponderance to the representatives of the peasants.

The Constituent Assembly was to be the last stage in the struggle for the Democratic Republic in the Far East, and all those who had at heart the success of that Republic were naturally bound at that moment to help the Government.

From what the Japanese were doing all the time, it could not be observed that they had any sympathy for the success of the Russian population, which, in spite of the many great obstacles, had succeeded in uniting all the provinces and was beginning its labors in the arts of peace. The heroic population was starving in order to give the Government an opportunity to conduct its difficult work in the atmosphere of assassination with which it was surrounded. The Japanese, as was already shown before, converted Grodekovo into a new "cork," such as Chita had been before. There Semenov's men committed their excesses, taking passengers off the trains (those who were abducted disappeared nobody knows where), robbing and assaulting the population. According to the agreement of April 29, 1920, the Japanese were not to admit armed Russian groups to the zone where Japanese troops were stationed, but the Japanese, who were so often referring to this agreement, forgot about it whenever they themselves were helping to arm and organize these groups.

What Semenov's men were doing at that time under the protection of the Japanese appears from the depositions of a General of the Kappel forces (Molchanov) which the latter made in the beginning of March before the Commission of the National Assembly that was investigating the murders that had taken place in Razdolnoye (district of Nikolsk-Usurisk, Maritime Province). According to the statement of this general, the murders which took place in Razdolnoye, where his soldiers were stationed, forced him to entrust his intelligence department with the investigation of this matter. As a result, it was established that all the murders were committed according to a previously elaborated plan and had the purpose of provoking an open conflict



between the Kappel army and the population. According to this plan, more than one hundred persons were to be killed, including all the educated elements of the village. The group that was organized for the execution of this plan included also officers. The circumstances of the murders were arranged in such a way that they should suggest a purely criminal origin, having nothing in common with politics. The names of the three persons who were at the head of this organization also became known.

General Molchanov applied to the representatives of the Japanese Command, asking them to take the necessary steps for the arrest of the criminals; the interpreter of these representatives replied that they, too, were very indignant over these murders and that they were ready to collaborate in the struggle against crime. Filled with hope by this answer, General Molchanov asked the interpreter: "Will the criminals be arrested if I indicate their names?" The answer was: "Surely, the Japanese Command will certainly arrest them."

Then General Molchanov repeated the names of the main participants in these murders; they were all agents of the Japanese General Staff. The Japanese, terribly taken aback, refused to have them arrested. Thereupon General Molchanov proposed that they should be guaranteed safety by the organization of a common guard, consisting of two Japanese and two members of his army; this guard would despatch the murderers to the Vladivostok prison.

The Japanese did not agree to this, but the murders ceased, after this conversation, and their organizers disappeared from Razdolnoye, fleeing to Grodekovo, which had been their steady haunt. In the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Government, of March 7, 1921, attention is called to these facts:

Incessant murders of absolutely innocent persons, committed by armed bandits, calling themselves Semenov's men, etc., have been irritating and disturbing, and are still irritating and disturbing the population. A short while ago these criminals again shed blood, several scores of people were killed in the settlements Razdolnoye, Khotol, and Zharikovo; the population in Fadeyevka, was disarmed and left at the mercy of the Khun-Khuses, and several citizens were abducted to an unknown destination.

In spite of the glaring crimes of Semenov's men, who have gathered in Grodekovo and are now gathering in other places too, in spite of the pro-

tests of the Russian authorities against the unlawful gathering of armed forces in Grodekovo, in spite of the numerous attempts of these authorities to send militia for the disarming of these bands and for establishing order, the Japanese Command systematically refuses to settle this question, pretending to ignore the fact that armed forces are living at Grodekovo, a fact which is only too well known to all persons residing in the Maritime Province, and especially to those who have had the misfortune to pass through or to arrive at Grodekovo. Matters have gone so far that on February 8, of the current year, the former Colonel Dombel, who, on the basis of a mandate from Semenov, calls himself the Head of the Military Communications of the Army of Grodekovo, without any ceremonies openly declared that all the ranks and institutions of what was formerly Kappel's army are abolished, if the persons occupying them will not declare that they submit to General Savelyev, Commander of the Army of Grodekovo.

We are informed by the local authorities that when General Ochi, the Aide-de-Camp of the Japanese Emperor, passed Grodekovo, the commanding staff of this army, at the head of which was the above mentioned General Savelyev, was introduced to him, and the armed forces were reviewed.

It is evident that all the protests and appeals of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to the Japanese Government were a voice in the wilderness. The reactionary bands were organized for action.

In the night of March 30-31 an attempt was made to overthrow the Government in Vladivostok, and the Japanese, "true" to the agreement that they had imposed upon the local authorities on April 29, disarmed—not the White Guard bands which had attacked the Government—but the lawful militia, whose duty it was to defend peace and order.

This revolt failed, but the Japanese did not lose heart. The counter-revolutionary activities were not interrupted.

On May 20, owing to the persistent efforts of the Vladivostok authorities, there was found a "shelter" and a store-house for arms of the White Guards in a house over which the Japanese flag was flying. The search was interrupted by the intervention of Japanese soldiers and gendarmes, because, as they said, "the search offended the honor and the dignity of the Japanese flag."

As a "punishment" for this search the Japanese disarmed for several hours the militia and the escort of the Commander of the Russian troops.

On May 26, the White Guards again made an attack and this

time, after the Japanese had disarmed the Government militia, they succeeded in seizing the power. The same thing happened in Nikolsk.

Thus was created the so-called Merkulov Government, that is based upon the Kappel and Semenov troops, which are—as was shown above—warring against each other, but which in reality do not differ much from each other.

The Japanese had gotten what they wanted: The Maritime Province was severed from Chita; the unity of the Far Eastern Republic was violated, and it was possible to put still more obstacles in the way of the work of the Government.

But, curiously enough, schooled by long experience in the entire Far East, the Japanese are themselves never certain of their final success, and therefore are developing a many-faced activity, proceeding simultaneously in different directions, which at the first glance may seem to exclude each other. After having overthrown the Vladivostok Government, they at the same time are concealing its members in their General Staff, to protect them against the counter-revolutionists. The Japanese, who so eagerly wanted to exterminate all “Communists,” all of a sudden are hiding three representatives of the Government who just happen all to be Communists. Two days after the overthrow, the Japanese handed to these three persons the following announcement:

Declaration of the Japanese Command, delivered on May 28, 1921, by Colonel Yamatoto to Messrs. Antonov, Zeitlin and Maslennikov, the representatives of the lawful authority of the Maritime Province, after the overthrow of May 26:

1. You are free to depart wherever you please. If you intend to go to Khabarovsk, the cars that are necessary for this purpose will be granted to you by the Japanese Command, and the cars will be protected.
2. However, the Command does not consider the Vladivostok Government as completely overthrown, and at the same time it does not recognize the creation of the new government, and for this reason the Command does not think that your immediate departure from Vladivostok is desirable.
3. If you remain here, help will be extended to you for your communications with Chita and Khabarovsk, the same as to our military missions.
4. The Command does not want you to conduct under its protection any perceptible political activity, but it has no objections against your meeting certain persons, and therefore in this case collaboration will be extended to you.

A truly "Oriental" document—but the ingeniousness of this Japanese game will be visible only below—overthrowing the Provincial Government and at the same time dallying with it; starting also a game with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, they were preparing at the same time a new big attack against the Far Eastern Republic. For the execution of their new plan it was necessary for the Japanese that Semenov, their permanent chief hireling in such work, should come—as the Japanese, in spite of all their efforts, could not find another man who would be such a willing tool. But Semenov had to be brought from Port Arthur, where he was "resting" after his flight from Chita, and passed through Vladivostok under Japanese protection.

In connection with the execution of their plan, the Japanese gave special, and, of course, secret, instructions to the Japanese Gendarmerie Command, represented by Okimoto, the Chief of the Gendarmerie detachment, and Colonel Yama (June 22, 1921).

These instructions were as follows:

1. On the basis of a secret agreement that was concluded in Port Arthur, the Japanese Command should help Ataman Semenov in his landing in Vladivostok.
2. Should there occur a clash, after the landing of Ataman Semenov, between the Kappel and the Semenov men, the Japanese Command must disarm both sides.
3. Semenov intends to stay in Vladivostok for a long time. He intends to proclaim himself Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Far East and to declare a mobilization. The Japanese Command should watch the frame of mind of the population.

As soon as Semenov landed, there immediately followed a conflict between him and the Kappel men. Semenov submitted to the Merkulov Government a great number of demands, but Merkulov's Government treated these demands as if they were tendered by Ataman Semenov in his capacity as a private individual.

The Japanese, dissatisfied with this turn of affairs, gave new instructions:

1. In order to prevent clashes between the Kappel and the Semenov men, Colonel Gomi is instructed to negotiate with Ataman Semenov and to suggest that he go to Grodekovo.
2. The Japanese Command should secretly extend help to Ataman Semenov after he reaches Grodekovo.
3. If the Merkulov Government arrests Ataman Semenov, the Japanese Command should protest and ask for his liberation.

4. During the absence of Ataman Semenov a clash might occur in Vladivostok between the Kappel and the Semenov men. The Japanese Command should disarm both sides.

The bitter hostility between the Kappel and Semenov men, which had already begun in Chita, was one of the unexpected obstacles. The plan of the new attack against the Far Eastern Republic was conceived in the following manner: From Mongolia the attack was to be made by Baron Ungern, Semenov's assistant, a Japanese agent, who, as soon as there was a serious menace from Verkhne-Udinsk, was sent by the Japanese—with a detachment—to Mongolia, to seize the power there, to organize an army and to wait for orders for an attack. Ungern was to advance to Troitskosavsk, take Verkhne-Udinsk and Chita; from the Amur an attack was to be made by General Sychev, whose detachments were stationed on the Chinese bank of the Amur river; Sychev was to cross over to Russian territory and take Blagovyschensk; from Grodekovo towards Iman and Khabarovsk the attack was to be led by "Ataman Semenov himself."

Thus, in the case of success, the entire territory of the Far Eastern Republic was to be occupied by "Russian" troops and the Japanese would have obtained their aim—a Far Eastern "Republic" under Japanese protectorate.

The secret agreement between the Semenov Generals and the Japanese, which is printed below, exposes the whole deal.

#### TREATY

*Absolutely Confidential.*

June 8, 1921, the Fortress Vladivostok. We, the undersigned, on one side: Acting Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces and the Campaign Ataman of all the Cossack Troops of the Russian Eastern Borderland, Commander of the Grodekovo Group of Forces, Lieutenant-General Saveliev, and Chief of Staff of the Grodekovo Group of Forces, Major General of the General Staff, Sobolev, and on the other side, the representatives of the Diplomatic Mission with the Staff of the Eleventh Division of the Japanese Imperial Forces: Captain Arimoto and Lieutenant Higuchi, on the strength of authority given to us by the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces and of the Campaign Ataman of all the Cossack Forces of the Russian Eastern Borderland, and the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, conclude this treaty regarding the following:

1. The forces entrusted to me are to make an offensive against the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic.

The offensive is carried out in accordance with the following plan:

(a) The First Grodekovo Military Unit moves in the direction of the Lake Hanka Anuchino, where it joins with the units of the Second Northern (Khabarovsk) Military Unit.

(b) The Second Northern (Khabarovsk) Military Unit starts out simultaneously with the First Unit in the direction of Anuchino-Iman, where it joins the units of the first group.

(c) The individual units of the third Vladivostok group are transferred by sea to the bays St. Olga Tetiukha and march in the direction of Anuchino, where they join the units of the first and second groups.

(d) Small partisan detachments of the Ussuri Cossacks are reorganized and are used for clearing the rear of the army from the Reds as it advances.

(e) The date of the active offensive is appointed by agreement with the Japanese Command, not later than July 1, 1921.

(f) In accordance with the degree of success of the offensive and as the military units in the district of Anuchino-Iman, the offensive movement against Khabarovsk is to be started.

(g) Partisan units of Major General Sychev, by order of the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, must cross the Chinese frontier and enter the district of Blagoveshchensk, coinciding with the time of the occupation of Iman.

(h) The units of Lieutenant General Baron Ungern-Sternberg are to be utilized for disorganizing the rear of the Reds and acting in small partisan units in accordance with the previously arranged plan within the districts: Misovaya-Selenga-Petrovsky Zavod.

2. As the Russian forces advance and occupy Iman-Khabarovsk, units of Japanese Expeditionary Forces, without taking an active part in the struggle with the Bolsheviks, temporarily occupy the regions freed from the Reds, giving aid to the expeditionary detachments in their struggle with the Bolshevik partisan movement.

3. Upon the liberation of the Maritime district, the Japanese forces immediately evacuate from the places temporarily occupied by them to the cities of Nikolsk-Usurisk and Vladivostok, and do not advance beyond the 30 verst line (as foreseen in the Russo-Japanese Treaty of April 29, 1920).

4. At the time of the beginning of the offensive of the Russian forces the Japanese Command gives them material aid amounting to five hundred thousand (500,000) yen and gives for use by the Russian Command the following arms and munitions: 3,200 rifles of various types, 350,000 cartridges to match the rifles, 24 machine guns of various types, 24 cases of cartridges to match them, 6 field and 2 mountain 8-inch cannon and 75 cases of shells for them. The number of arms and munitions may be increased in case of necessity.

5. The Japanese Command temporarily undertakes to supply the Russian forces with all necessary food and fodder and adopts measures to transport equipment and clothing from Tsindao and the railroad zone of the Chinese Eastern Railroad at Grodekovo.

6. After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Japanese Command enters a plea with the Japanese Imperial Government that the contraband be removed from the moneys deposited by Lieutenant General Ataman Semenov in the Yokahoma Specie Bank and that these moneys be transferred to the Russian Command.

7. The Japanese Command aids in transporting Russian troops by sea to the northern coast and arms Russian ships which are guarding the coast, as fully as possible.

8. The Japanese Command at the time of the occupation of Iman, at its own discretion, will land troops for the protection of the Japanese fishing schooners in the bays of St. Vladimir, Tetiukha, Terneye and the Imperatorsky port.

9. Until permanent order is established in the Far East, the Japanese Command takes upon itself the guarding of the port and of the Fortress of Vladivostok and maintains a control of the lines of the Ussuri and the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

10. After the occupation of Khabarovsk and the clearing of the country from the Communist Government of the Far Eastern Republic, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces and the Campaign Ataman of all the Cossack Forces of the Russian Eastern Borderland, Lieutenant General Ataman Semenov, temporarily, until the convocation of the territorial People's Assembly, assumes the full power of civil authority on the territory of the Far East.

11. After the clearing of the Maritime, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Amur and Transbaikhal provinces, and the overthrow of the rule of the Far Eastern Republic, elections take place immediately for the territorial People's Assembly, with the purpose of establishing a democratic rule in the Far East.

12. When a stable governmental authority is established in the Far East, Japanese subjects shall receive preferential rights for obtaining hunting, fishing and forestry concessions in the Maritime, Sakhalin and Kamchatka provinces, and for the development of the mining resources and gold mines in the Maritime and Amur provinces.

13. Paragraph 12 of this treaty, in case of necessity, may be reconsidered and supplemented.

14. The above treaty goes into effect from the day of its signing by both sides.

Acting Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces and  
Acting Campaign Ataman of all the Cossack Forces of the  
Russian Eastern Borderland, Commander of the Grodekovo  
Military Unit (Signed) LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAVELIEV.

Chief of Staff of the Grodekovo Military Unit, Major General of the General Staff (Signed) SOBOLEV.

Seal of the Staff of the Grodekovo Military Unit.

Then follow the signatures and seals of the Japanese parties to the treaty in Japanese.

This is a true copy of the original.

But here again the Japanese encountered the heroism and the stubbornness of the Russian population of the Far East. The bands of Ungern, after they entered the territory of the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia, were dispersed by the troops of these two countries, and Ungern himself was executed; the bands of Sychev were unsuccessful, and finally, under the pressure of the Far Eastern Republic, were disarmed by the Chinese and dispersed; Semenov, having encountered opposition even among his own men, was forced to go abroad and the plan failed. The troops of the Far Eastern Republic, on the territory cleared by the Japanese, were all the time guarding the people's interests and the liberties which had been conquered at such a high cost and were ready to fight to the very end against Semenov's "democrats".

That the Japanese, in their policy in the Far Eastern Republic, did not stop at anything, is shown by the document inserted below, which, like the above mentioned Japanese-Semenov treaty, is in the hands of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic. (Offer of a Chinese Khun-Khus to the Japanese):

We have at our disposal detachments in Nikolsk, at the 89th junction and at the junction Dubinskoye. If you send to my address 4000 yen, and 500 poods\* flour, 100 poods choomiza, 1200 pair of shoes, my detachments may be at your disposal on July 25, 1921.

General Kuankuasim.

On the document is written:

"Agreed," Signed by Colonel Higuchi and Hira,

Staff of the 11th Division. July 15, 1921.

The Japanese failure gave to the population of the Far East an opportunity to continue its work of strengthening the young state. On February 12 the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic was opened and it immediately set about the task of the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic. This important work was finished on April 27, 1921. The Constituent Assembly, after finishing the work of building up the Republic, appealed to all those on whom depends the future peace not only on the Russian Far East but also of the entire Far East; to all former and present participants of the intervention, pointing out the collective responsibility of all of them for all the horrors suf-

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\*1 pood = 36 lbs.



fered by the population during the Japanese intervention, which is still in operation. It could not help pointing out that the population which had beheld in the solemn declaration of the United States of America an assurance that the Japanese had come with their armies on the invitation of that Government, cannot help considering the American Government as primarily responsible for the misfortunes of the Russian Far East.

The Constituent Assembly appealed separately to the Japanese Government, proposing that it withdraw its troops and finally enter into normal political and economic relations, on the basis of equal rights of both parties. But Japan remained silent and continued its adventure in the Maritime Province.

#### XLVI.

All appeals of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic remained unanswered, and only after President Harding had addressed the powers with reference to the Washington Conference, at which inevitably the Far Eastern policy of Japan (in China and Siberia) would be discussed, did the Japanese inform the Government of the Far Eastern Republic of their consent and willingness to start negotiations with it. Thus the Dairen Conference was started, on August 26. The Delegation of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic was immediately placed in a difficult position, as it was deprived of the possibility of safely communicating with its Government; its couriers were held up in Manchuria, and its telegrams arrived in a mutilated condition. Great efforts had to be made to obtain even a modicum of opportunity to communicate.

The Japanese were not in a hurry and were protracting the negotiations, as they were unwilling to discuss the question of the evacuation of their troops. They completely refused to discuss the question of Sakhalin and the lower course of the Amur river, declaring that they could not discuss this matter with the Far Eastern Republic. They would discuss it with the recognized All-Russian Government. At the same time they insisted upon the revision, jointly with the Far Eastern Republic, of the Fisheries Convention of 1907, which was concluded between Japan and the Tsar's Government. Thus, in one case, when it was not convenient for the Japanese, the Far Eastern Republic was declared not competent to discuss questions referring to its terri-

tory, while in other cases, when this was necessary to the Japanese, it was recognized as qualified to do so. The causes of this inconsistency are too clear to require pointing out. The Conference remained without results and soon it became known what the Japanese were after. In its official declarations, the Japanese Government emphasized that it wanted only guarantees for the life and the property of its citizens, and the "equalizing" of the Japanese with the Russians, as to their rights in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic. But in practice, these demands meant something quite different. While the Russian peasants, according to the Constitution (this was also the case at the time of the Tsar) could only lease their land for a long or a short term, the Japanese wanted the right of owning the land as property. This privilege is what the Japanese call "equal" rights with the Russian population. But in one case the Japanese really demanded "equal rights", namely, with regard to the navigation rights under the Japanese flag on the Amur river and as to fishing in the bights and interior rivers—to which rights they are not entitled according to the agreements concluded, first, between Tsarist Russia and China, and second, between Tsarist Russia and Japan. Having received this "equalization," the Japanese would de facto be not the equals but the masters in the Russian Far East.

Very ominous was and still is the desire of the Japanese to destroy the long abandoned fortress of Vladivostok, with whose condition of Japanes are sufficiently familiar as well as their insistence that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic should not fortify the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Of a similar nature also was the attempt to obtain the consent of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to a "temporary" establishment of Japanese troops on the territory of the Far Eastern Republic—whenever the Japanese Government should deem this necessary.

All this is a clear indication of the future intentions of Japan with reference to the Russian Far East. As to the economic aspects of the matter, the Japanese Government declared not so long ago that it only wants equality of opportunity for itself and other foreigners, to take part in the commercial and industrial life of the Far Eastern Republic, and that in this sense it insists that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic should recog-

nize all the rights which were acquired by Japanese citizens from former Russian Governments. But this demand, which, at the first glance, seems quite innocent, means for the Japanese something quite different, which they do not care to speak out loudly: by Russian Governments they understand the "governments" of Semenov and Merkulov, created by the Japanese, and imposed upon the Russian population with the help of Japanese bayonets. With them the Japanese concluded and are concluding secret treaties (one of them has already been quoted above) concerning concessions and various exclusive privileges and rights. The population of the Far Eastern Republic considers these "governments" as common criminals, who are pillaging and selling out the property of the people and ought to be indicted before the courts of the Republic. The indignation which such a request on the part of Japan arouses among the Russian population is therefore quite natural.

No wonder the Japanese and Russian delegates have been deliberating for four months in Dairen without obtaining any results.

The Dairen Conference was necessary for the Japanese in order that they might be able to say in Washington that all the questions connected with the "evacuation" of the Japanese troops from Siberia are being solved by them jointly with the Russians, thus diverting the attention of the participants in the Conference. After the Conference they hope to have a free hand. Simultaneously with the negotiations in Dairen, the Japanese are giving instructions to their troops in Vladivostok to support and to defend with Japanese bayonets the so-called "Provisional" Government of Merkulov. Of this, the following secret Japanese telegram is sufficient evidence:

Tokio, September 26,  
Radio General Staff, Vladivostok.

In case of disorders the strictest neutrality is to be observed. The Provisional Government is to be defended, if necessary, by force. All overtures on the part of the Far Eastern Republic referring to the occupation of Nikolsk-Usuriisk and Vladivostok are to be declined diplomatically, and if this will not help, also by force. An official communication with the Russian Government in this respect is not necessary.

*Minister of War*

In order to exert pressure upon the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, and in order to broaden the sphere of their

influence, the Japanese, in December, 1921, again resorted to their old and tried method: They organized the last remainders of the army of Semenov, Kolchak (the so-called Kappel men), and some parts of the army of Denikin and Wrangel who had come to Vladivostok, directing them through the neutral zone, towards Khabarovsk, thus attempting to cut off an enormous territory—the entire shore of the Pacific Ocean—from the Far Eastern Republic. In organizing this attack, in arming troops and providing them with money, the Japanese are again violating the agreements which they themselves imposed upon the Vladivostok Zemstvo Government, according to which: 1. No Russian troops could stay within the zone where the Japanese troops are stationed; 2. Neither the Russian troops, from the direction of Iman, nor the Japanese troops, from the direction of Station Yevgenyevka (the farthest point to the north where Japanese troops were stationed), could enter the neutral zone.

The Japanese always remain true to themselves and to their “frank” policy.

This attitude of the Japanese compelled the National Assembly in Chita to make a vigorous protest on December 9, 1921.

## XLVII

By the “agreement” with China, of August, 1918, the Japanese received the legal right to fix themselves for a long time on the Chinese Eastern Railway, to establish themselves there so that in the future it would be easier for them to swallow also this piece of Chinese territory, on which Tsarist Russia had gained so firm a hold. All the further Japanese intrigues of the last few years—as is apparent from Semenov’s order, by the way—were exclusively directed toward the creation of a proper situation, to “justify” them in seizing a new opportunity for a prolonged protection of this railroad. The complicity of the Japanese in the attacks of the Khun-Khuses on the Eastern Chinese Railroad is no secret for any one in the Far East. The Japanese need proofs that the Chinese are unable to protect the railroad and that such protection must therefore be effected by the Japanese, or at least by the “Russian” Semenov men who are in their service. France, which claims her own interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway through the Russian-Asiatic Bank, is not disinclined to help the Japanese, whenever that is possible, in this intrigue, by support-

ing the Japanese point of view. The Japanese have taken pains to create for themselves a favorable situation in Southern Manchuria, and now they have been greatly strengthened in Northern Manchuria too. With the help of the Chinese reactionaries in Manchuria, the influence of the Japanese grows; this is also the center of the intrigues of the Russian counter-revolutionists who are paid in Japanese coin for their services. Harbin and Manchuria were the centers of the activities of Horvath, Semenov, Kalmykov, and many others. Hailar subsequently became the base for Baron Ungern, who was operating in Mongolia, and Hailar became a refuge for them when they had to flee before the troops of the Far Eastern Republic and Soviet Russia. Through the Chinese Eastern Railway, Semenov's men, against the will of the Maritime Government, entered the Maritime Province.

Thus the Chinese Eastern Railway, which so long was the object of Japanese aspirations, has finally come into their hands. The secret Japanese telegrams quoted below, the first of September 12, from Tokio, and the second, the reply thereto, of September 27, from Harbin, are a very good illustration of the Japanese intentions:

*Tokio, September 12, Radio*

To the General Staff Vladivostok

k/t Confidential:

Your army should be ready for the occupation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The plan of occupation will be delivered to you (in writing). The occupation will have a temporary and demonstrative character. We are waiting for particulars from Dairen.

*Ministry of War*

Harbin, September 27,

General Tachibana, Vladivostok,

Delivered by courier:

After considering the situation concerning the demonstrative occupation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, I beg to inform you as follows:

A demonstrative occupation would be a mistake on our part, because we would not have a sufficient cause for it. A full agreement with the important Russian groups in Harbin has not been reached; the influential personalities have rejected our proposal. They consider it inopportune to address their request directly to the Japanese Government; they are still pretending to be good patriots. For my part, I consider the occupation as premature, aside from the fact that I do not expect any results from the Dairen Conference. The occupation might have an undesirable effect upon the Far Eastern Republic and give away our future plans. For the

time being we must not cast off our role as benevolent friends of the Russians.

Concerning this question I have sent my written report by courier to Tokio.

Takayama.

### WHAT NOW?

The whole history of Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East from the first day up to the present, has undoubtedly proved that there is a determined plan of Japan to bring about, with the consent and the approval of France, a masked annexation of the entire Far East, or at least of portions of it. This history also establishes the fact that the Japanese, under the influence of the international situation, have frequently changed their plans—now reducing the territory of the intended annexation, now increasing it, now suddenly preparing “Russian” forces, which they send forth at the necessary moment. At present there is in the hands of the Japanese the southern part of the Maritime Province, which they are trying to enlarge through the so-called “governments” which they are imposing there; they are in complete possession of Sakhalin and the lower course of the Amur, which is invaluable in economic as well as in strategic respects; they are the masters of the whole Pacific coast.

In a peaceful way Japan will return the seized territories only under the pressure of those who so often have forced them to change their plans and to alter their course. But will they force Japan to stop this dangerous game? On the answer to this question very much depends, especially the future peace of the Far East. The fact that, under the influence of the Washington Conference, the Japanese have started negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic in Dairen, is a confirmation of the conclusion at which we have arrived: the pressure on Japan must be brought to bear from without. This is also confirmed by the fact that the Japanese, uncertain as to the results of the Washington Conference, are so greatly protracting the negotiations in the Far East, and are unwilling to give a definite reply as to the central question—that of the unconditional evacuation of their troops.

The Washington Conference, and, in general, its participants outside of the conference, all those who have taken part in the

intervention in the Far East ought, in their own interest, i. e., in the interest of the peace in the Far East, which means also the peace of the whole world, to liberate the Russian population of the Far East finally from this terrible and unequal struggle, which it has been conducting for three years in the defence of its rights and its dignity.

The Russian people are waiting for the answer to the question:  
What now?

On this answer depends the future peace in the Russian Far East.





# **APPENDIX**

*Documents referring to the History of the  
Japanese Intervention*



## A DECLARATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, has always entertained the most sanguine hopes for the speedy re-establishment of order in Russia, and a healthy and untrammelled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenceless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian Far Eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Russia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, the Germans and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume commanding position.

The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race, and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern. In the presence of the threatening danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the course of events, and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for an early despatch of troops to relieve the pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak troops.

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the

desire of the American Government, and also to act in harmony with their Allies in this expedition, has decided to proceed at once to the disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remains unshaken in its constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and it reaffirms its avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. It further declares that upon the realization of the objects mentioned, it will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory./

Tokio, August 3, 1918.

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## DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

### CABLE

Washington, D. C.,

Flag Brooklyn, Vladivostok, Siberia, August 5, 1918.

The following is an official statement to the press on the American-Japanese action in Siberia: "In the judgment of the Government of the United States, a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation, military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the East, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people if they profited by it at all could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own, or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose of winning on the Western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces. As the Government

of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissable in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces in the organization of their own self-defense. With such object in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has therefore proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding so far as it may the country to the rear of the westward moving Czecho-Slovaks; and the Japanese Government has consented. In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs not even in the local affairs, of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy, and no impairment of Russian territorial integrity, either now or hereafter; but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance. These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the

United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the War. It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association, accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some sympathetic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will wherever necessary or possible lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

Acting Secretary of Department of State.

#### APPEAL OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

Your allies have not forgotten you. We remember all the services your heroic army rendered us in the early years of the war. We are coming as friends to help you save yourselves from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany, which is trying to enslave your people and use the great resources of your country to its own ends.

We wish to solemnly assure you that while our troops are entering Russia to assist you in your struggle against Germany we shall not retain one foot of your territory. We deplore the civil war that divides you and the internal dissensions that facilitate Germany's plans of conquest, but we have no intention to impose any political system upon Russia.

The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian peoples. It is for them and for them alone to decide their form of government and to find a solution for their social problems.

Peoples of Russia, your very existence as an independent nation is at stake. The liberties you have won in the revolution are threatened with extinction by the iron hand of Germany. Rally around the banner of freedom and independence that we, who are still your allies, are raising in your midst, and secure the triumph of those two great principles without which there can be no lasting peace or real liberty for the world. Peoples of Russia, we want not only to stop the German aggression, but intend also to bring economic relief to your devastated and suffering country. We have already forwarded supplies to you, and will do likewise in the future.

We wish to aid in the development of the industrial and natural resources of your country, not with a view to exploiting them for our own benefit. We desire, too, to restore the exchange of commodities, to stimulate agriculture and to enable you to take your rightful place among the free nations of the world.

Peoples of Russia, join us in the defense of your liberties. Our one desire is to see Russia strong and free, and then retire to watch the Russian people work out their own destinies.  
August, 1918.

BALFOUR.

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#### NOTE OF THE MARITIME PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

A note handed by the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo to the Counsellor of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission in Siberia, Mr. Matsudaira, for transmission to the Japanese Imperial Government:

March 2, 1920.

On January 31st, 1920, at the time of the complete downfall of the government of Admiral Kolchak, under the stress of civil war and at a time when Russia's allies in the war with Germany (1914-18) were exercising a guardianship over Russia that was humiliating to the Russian national feelings, and were intervening in Russia's internal affairs—the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo, which is the people's government recognized by all classes of the population without exception, assumed the power

and is now the only government in the territory of the Maritime Province. It is entirely responsible for the preservation of peace and order, as well as for the defense of the national honor and the sovereign rights of an undivided and free Russia. The Provisional Government, aiming to fulfill its great obligations to defend the sovereign rights of the Russians in the Far East, is seeking peaceful ways for ending the insulting intervention of foreigners in the internal affairs of Russia in the Far East, so that peace and order may be established in place of the prevailing anarchy and civil war.

With the ending of the military operations of the Allies against Germany, a fundamental change occurred in the aims and purposes of the intervention, and the only formal pretext put forth for the continuation of such intervention at the present time is the necessity of guarding the railroads necessary for the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak detachments. Now when the normal process of internal governmental construction has begun, the Provisional Government has all the means to secure the immediate and orderly evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and when it is evident to all that the process of national unification is taking place—the immediate cessation of foreign intervention in Russia's affairs is demanded, both by the expressed will of the people and by changed conditions.

The Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo declares with deep regret that not all the participants in the coalition of powers concerned in the intervention, realize sufficiently that conditions have changed so that there can no longer be any justification for permitting their armies to remain in Eastern Siberia and in the provinces of the Far East.

Thus, at the time when the troops of some of the participants in the intervention are being withdrawn, or, according to declarations made, are getting ready for evacuation, the Japanese Government is increasing the number of its troops of occupation in the Russian Far East. The fact above mentioned establishes the responsibility of the Japanese Government for the continuation and even for the increase of intervention, which has now assumed the character of a one-power attempt to influence by force the will of the people and the internal policy of Russia in the Far East.



The Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo publicly and firmly declares:

1. That it considers any further intervention by the Japanese Government a violation of the sovereign rights of Russia in the Far East.

2. That the official reasons given for the retention of Japanese troops in the Far East, and especially for increasing them by the arrival of fresh troops in Vladivostok, are contradictory to the principles of higher justice.

3. That the intervention of the Japanese Government has thus far been used for lending active support to the reactionary and irresponsible government of Kolchak, and that until the present time this intervention has been lending voluntary or involuntary support to the lawless acts and the innumerable atrocities committed by Semenov in Chita, and by Kalmykov in Khabarovsk, the latter having recently been defeated by the revolutionary troops.

4. The interference of the Commanders of the Japanese Military Forces in the activity of Russian authorities has reached such a state that criminals are granted an asylum by the Japanese, and that the Japanese refuse to surrender them to the authorities; for example, the case of General Rozanov.

5. That the Japanese troops, because of the abnormal conditions of intervention, are shooting Russian citizens, burning down villages, etc.

6. That all the above stated facts prevent the accomplishment of the great work of national unification of the Russian people, and the formation of a government in accordance with the desires of the Russian people at the present time.

In view of the facts stated above, the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo, expressing the unanimous wishes of the people and firmly believing that, with the exception of a small group of irresponsible individuals who are guided by selfish motives, the entire population of free Russia is opposed to intervention, and that it is the sincere desire of the Japanese people that their sons return home,

RESOLVES to request you to transmit to the Imperial Japanese Government the intimation that in order to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people, it is necessary: 1. to complete the evacuation of the Amur Province which has begun

and which is welcomed by the population, and 2. to immediately proceed with a complete and steady withdrawal of Japanese troops from the territory of the Russian Far East.

Sincerely aiming to maintain friendly relations with the Japanese people, the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo expresses the hope that you will, without any delay, bring this solution to the knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Government, and give all possible aid to the favorable solution of this problem. On its part the Provisional Government will use all efforts to have the population of the Maritime Province maintain the necessary order and abstain from all irresponsible actions while the Japanese troops are being withdrawn from Russian territory.

The above note is being transmitted to the Diplomatic Representatives of foreign powers in the Far East, for the information of their governments.

The Provisional Government of the Maritime  
Provincial Zemstvo.

Original is signed by:

A. MEDVEDIEV, Chairman; A. RUSANOV, A. MENSCHIKOV, S.  
AFANASIEV, P. POPOV, Members; S. BELKIN, Secretary.

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#### NOTE OF THE MARITIME PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

March 8, 1920.

Up to the present time the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo has taken all necessary measures for the security and unobstructed movement of the Czecho-Slovak forces. No complaints have been received by the Provisional Government which would indicate any exceptional difficulties thrown in the way of the departing troops or any necessity for outside aid.

At the same time, however, the Japanese Government has issued a declaration that the presence and even the increase in the number of Japanese troops is due principally to the necessity of assuring the safety and the unobstructed movement of the Czecho-Slovak detachments.

The Provisional Government, representing the unanimous will of the entire population, and enjoying its full support, expresses its readiness to give all possible help, with all the means at its disposal—technical as well as military—in accomplishing the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces; and requests you please to inform it whether the successful accomplishment of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops really depends on the presence and the constant increase of the Japanese troops on the territory of the Far Eastern Borderland, in spite of all the necessary measures taken by the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo,

President of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. MEDVEDIEV.

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, B. SKVIRSKY.

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#### REPLY OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPRESENTATIVE.

On March 8, 1920, the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo (in Vladivostok) addressed an official inquiry to the diplomatic Representative of the Czecho-Slovak Republic in Siberia, asking: "Is it true that the successful carrying out of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces, in spite of all the necessary measures adopted by the Provisional Government, depends on the presence and the constant increase of the Japanese forces on the territory of the Far Eastern Borderland?"

The following reply was received on March 10, 1920, to this inquiry:

The first obstacles which were created in the process of evacuation of our forces by the Soviet authority in the district west of Irkutsk were removed by an agreement between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Soviet forces and from that moment on the evacuation of our forces has not met with any difficulties on the part of the Soviet authorities.

On the Transbaikal Railroad the protection of the roadway was entrusted to the Japanese forces, and during the entire time there was no destruction of the railroad line, in spite of the orders issued by Ataman Semenov to destroy bridges and tunnels in order to interfere with our evacuation. This section

of the railroad was in the sphere of influence of Ataman Semenov.

As to the Far East, I must certify with a feeling of deep gratitude and sincere friendship that on the part of the Provisional Government and all its institutions, the evacuation of our forces not only did not meet with any obstacles, but, on the contrary, it was always given every possible assistance, for which I consider it my duty to express to the Provisional Government and its institutions my deepest gratitude.

(Signed) Plenipotentiary Minister of the  
Czecho-Slovak Republic, DR. GIRSA.

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#### MEMORANDUM OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE INTER-ALLIED DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE.

On the night of the 5th of April, without any provocation on the part of the Russian military or civil authorities, and without any previous communication with the Russian authorities, the Japanese troops in Vladivostok forcibly disarmed and relieved the Russian guard in the Government institutions of the city of Vladivostok, replacing it with their own guard, have hoisted the Japanese flag over the buildings, have fired at some of these structures, including the building occupied by the Provisional Government, which was seriously damaged and the records and property largely destroyed, have forcibly disarmed some of the Russian detachments of the Vladivostok garrison, and have arrested Mr. A. A. Menshikov, a member of the Provisional Government and several military and civil government officials.

This sudden attack of the Japanese troops which has been accompanied in some cases by destruction of human lives, comes as a surprise to the Provisional Government, the more since it occurred just at the time when negotiations were going on between the Japanese and Russian military authorities, these negotiations having been started at the request of the Japanese authorities, for the establishment of friendly mutual relations, and when the Russian military authorities, in accordance with the instructions of the Provisional Government, have expressed their readiness to settle peacefully all matters which may come up in connection with the presence of the Japanese troops in Russian territory.

In the declaration to the population, made by the Chief of the Japanese forces in Siberia, General Oi, and in the statement issued by Captain Nakasova, the Japanese Command explaining its activities, which have been contrary to the declarations of the Japanese Government addressed to the Russian people, and in conflict with the Inter-Allied agreement, alleges that the Russian military detachments have fired at the Japanese guard at different places.

The Provisional Government categorically denies this statement. The Russian detachments have been instructed fully to respect all the Allied military forces in Vladivostok. The discipline of the Russian troops and the fact of their realizing the responsibility they have before the country are well known to the Allied Command. Nevertheless, the Provisional Government, though aware of the justice of its assurances, is willing to put the incident before an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry.

Strongly protesting against the activity of the Japanese Command, the Provisional Government addresses this protest to all the Allies, as the so-called "intervention" has been undertaken by all the Allies conjointly and the responsibility for the recent affairs lies with all the Allies.

With a view to preventing the further development of events of this nature, with all the possible consequences thereof, the Provisional Government requests of the Inter-Allied Diplomatic Conference to propose to the Japanese Command:

1. To release immediately the members of the Provisional Government, the civil and military officials and other Russian citizens who were arrested by the Japanese Command in connection with the recent events.

2. To evacuate immediately all the Government buildings occupied by the Japanese troops and to hand them over to the Russian authorities in good order.

3. To give a satisfactory explanation and apologize to the Provisional Government because of the activities of the Japanese forces.

4. To make no searches and to permit no other persons under its protection to make searches or arrests without the permission of the Provisional Government.

5. To return the arms immediately to the three Russian military detachments from whom they were forcibly seized and also

to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission, with the participation of Japanese and Russians, for a detailed and impartial investigation of the causes and circumstances under which these events occurred.

The Provisional Government considers it its duty to declare that respect for the sovereign rights of the Russian State and of the authority of the Provisional Government of the Far East is an indispensable condition for disposing of this incident, and that only the adoption of all the necessary measures will enable the Provisional Government to pacify the irritated population of the Province and to take measures for a peaceful settlement of the affair.

The Provisional Government at the same time begs the representatives of the Allied countries to inform their Governments of the aforesaid.

(Signed) President: A. MEDVEDIEV.

Members of the Government: A. AFANASIEV, P. POPOV.

Vladivostok, April 5, 1920.

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#### NOTE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN

Having the support and confidence of all classes of the population, as seen from the numerous resolutions passed by the trade unions, by the conferences of the employees in the government and public institutions in the province, by the political parties, etc., and especially, being in very successful co-operation with the Government—the Provisional Government of the Russian Far East—the Maritime Province Zemstvo Board, has been directing its domestic policy to the establishment of justice, freedom, order and equality, and in its foreign relations has endeavored to maintain the Russian sovereignty in the Russian Far East and to develop peaceful and friendly relations with other nations in accordance with the principles of international relations. Therefore, the Provisional Government—the Maritime Province Zemstvo Board—has with regard to all attacks and activities been guided by the principles of justice, in spite of many outside unfavorable circumstances, and now declares before the whole world that it has not provoked by its activities the attack on Vladivostok by the Japanese Command on the historic night of April 5.

The sudden and illegal attack of the Japanese troops came as a sad surprise to the Provisional Government at the very moment when, with a view to strengthening the mutual friendly relations, it had expressed its readiness to discuss peacefully the maximum of concessions to the Japanese Command, on condition that the sovereign rights of the peoples and all the obligations the Government had undertaken with the Allies, Russia, and the world, would be respected.

For the protection of the sovereign rights, the freedom and the national property of the people, and the authority vested in the Government by the people, the Government, guided by its rights to independence and self-protection, must have sufficient strength and power. This force must come from out of the people and must be selected by the Government, which is acting on behalf of the people. Only a Russian army can constitute such a force, not an army of aggression, but for the protection of the country from any attempts at a forcible coup from whatever side it may be initiated.

The Provisional Government is able and determined to maintain its authority over the said territory by adopting every measure. The absence of the people's army as a force upon which the Government could rely would create anarchy and disorder, from which not only the Russians citizens will suffer, but also the foreigners in the Far East who in one way or another have common interests with Russia. Japan as a civilized nation cannot desire such anarchy, and on the other hand cannot prevent it, if it aims at entrusting the protection of the Russian State interests to foreign, not to Russian forces, or to reactionary forces hostile to the people. Only the enemies of Russia, who want to see Russia crushed can aim at that; but Japan is not Russia's enemy, and the Russians on their part look for help and friendly support from the Japanese people. The Government, therefore, is even now ready to put as a foundation for coming negotiations with Japan the principle of friendly mutual support on economic and political lines.

In order to realize these aims and to prevent the repetition of such sad events, which we believe are not in agreement with the general policy of Japan in her dealings with Russia, and in order to re-establish relations in accordance with the principles

of justice and international custom, the Government considers it its duty and feels justified in proposing the following conditions:

1. In order to prove that the recent events have not been directed against the Government recognized by the people, the Japanese Command must correct its error and release all military and civil officials and others who have been wilfully arrested by the Japanese Command. Having interfered with the functions of the Russian territorial authorities, the Japanese Command must consider it its duty to comply with this lawful request.

2. The Government institutions occupied by the Japanese troops must be evacuated and restored in good order to the proper Russian authorities, together with all the documents and property therein.

3. The Government and the people, indignant at the recent events, expect that after satisfactory explanations have been given, the Japanese Command will apologize to the Government and will assure it that such sad occurrences will not be repeated.

4. The Provisional Government cannot agree that the temporary disarming of all the Russian military detachments and the militia should become a permanent fact. Japan has not been authorized by the Allies to act in such a manner, nor has the disarming been undertaken at the request of the Japanese Imperial Government. It has been an independent and illegal act on the part of the Japanese Command. The arms which were taken away from the Russian military detachments must be returned to them, as a proof of the sincerity of the Japanese declarations of their non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Russian Far East, of their desire to evacuate their troops, leaving Russia to the Russians.

5. The Japanese authorities shall not effect searches, or allow searches to be effected, under their protection, by irresponsible persons, having the full assurance of the Government that the Russian authorities, relying upon their disciplined detachments, are in a position to maintain order and protect the lives of all citizens without exception.

The Provisional Government of the Russian Far East undertakes this step, recognizing its duties and responsibilities to the people, and especially because all the classes of the pop-



ulation, indignant at the recent events, have the right to demand from the Government the adoption of every measure necessary to reach the aforementioned results.

The events of April 4-5, which have not been provoked by anyone, will shock the public opinion of the entire civilized world, and the Japanese Government no doubt will not consider as legal the action of the local command, and will do everything possible to amend these fatal blunders.

The Provisional Government, not assuming any responsibility for the further development of events, hopes that the Japanese Government will reach a wise decision in the matter.

The Provisional Government of the Russian Far East.  
The Maritime Zemstvo Board.

President, A. MEDVEDIEV.

Members, A. MENSCHIKOV, S. AFANASIEV, P. POPOV.

Vladivostok, April 5, 1920.

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#### DECLARATION OF GENERAL OI REGARDING THE EVENTS OF APRIL 4-5, 1920.

Citizens:

On the basis of the declaration made public by the Japanese Command on March 31, 1920, the Japanese Command, beginning with April 2, has been carrying on negotiations with the representatives of the Russian authorities regarding a peaceful settlement of the question of the stay of Japanese troops in the district.

Suddenly, on the night of April 4, armed Russian troops attacked our warehouses, garages, and military prisons, and also fired at our patrols in various parts of the city.

In view of the above illegal actions and in order to prevent a threatening danger from the armed Russian military units, the Japanese Command is compelled to demand that the Russian Military Units be disarmed.

Without having any personal aims in this matter, the Japanese Command cannot allow any further development of disorder and will take the necessary measures after negotiations with the Russian authorities.

The Commander of the Japanese Forces in Siberia,  
GENERAL OI.

Vladivostok, April 5, 1920.

## **RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 5, 1920.**

**(Copy from a Copy.)**

The terms presented by the Commander of the Japanese Forces to the Provisional Government of the Maritime Provincial Zemstvo Board in regard to the declaration made by the Japanese Imperial Government regarding the stay of Japanese troops in the Far East for the purpose of maintaining friendly relations and avoiding conflicts which may arise, judging by the past and present events, between the Japanese troops on the one hand and the Russian authorities and the local population on the other hand.

The representatives of the Russian Military Forces, after negotiations with the representatives of the Japanese Military Forces, have expressed their consent to the following terms:

1. To secure the stay of the Japanese troops in the sense of giving them all necessities for such a stay, i.e., quarters, provisions, means of transportation and correspondence, etc.
2. To consider as effective all those decisions concerning military affairs exclusively, which were entered into by the Japanese Government or the Japanese Command on the one hand and the Russian authorities on the other hand, on the basis of the agreement between the Allied powers or the Allied Command. If these decisions should be found to be not in accordance with the interests of Russia or the Russian Army, the Russian Military Authorities will make a proposal to reconsider such.
3. Not to arrest and not to interfere with the liberty of individuals who are employed by the Japanese Command, without bringing this to the knowledge of the Command.
4. To liquidate within the limits of the territory of the Provisional Government all actions and outbreaks, regardless of their source, which threaten the safety of the Japanese troops and also the peace and order of Korea and Manchuria.
5. To restrain all printed articles and individual provocative actions directly intended to compromise the Japanese troops and the Japanese State.

6. To use all efforts to secure absolutely the life, property and other rights of Japanese subjects living in the territory.

(Signatures of Russian and Japanese Officials.)

Dated at Vladivostok, April 5, 1920.

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**TEXT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND  
JAPANESE COMMANDS OF APRIL 29, 1920.**

1. The Russian Military Command on the one hand and the Japanese Military Command on the other hand, mutually agree by the issue of simultaneous, corresponding orders to immediately end the military operations between the detachments of Russian and Japanese troops in various districts, and the military operations must cease on both sides from the moment the order is received and is mutually exchanged by the Commanding Officers.

2. The Russian Military Forces, regardless of the political parties or groups they belong to, must not be located simultaneously with the Japanese troops within the limits of the following districts:

a. Within the limits marked by the line passing within 30 kilometers from the final point occupied by the Japanese troops along the Ussuri Railroad on the one hand and the line of the Russo-Chino-Korean frontier from the west and south on the other hand:

b. Within the line along the Suchan Railroad along the Suchan River from its end, 30 kilometers on each side.

3. The Russian Military Forces that are at the present time in the above mentioned districts, within three days after the receipt of this order, are to end military operations, and must be removed from these districts in the above mentioned three-day period, but this limit may be prolonged by agreement with the local Japanese Command.

4. The Russian Armed forces which are being withdrawn behind the line of demarcation keep their arms, munitions and sup-

plies, the quantity being in accordance with the number of the troops on the day the orders are exchanged by the local command, regarding the cessation of military actions, and in accordance with the existing wartime regulations.

The Japanese command will not place any obstacles to the normal supply by the Russian authorities of provisions, supplies, fodder, clothing and other objects necessary for the existence of Russian troops who have been removed to new quarters.

5. In case of necessity, the troops or portions of them may be removed from the places where they were originally sent and transported by order of the Russian Command to other districts outside the limits of the demarcation line, but without the right to transport them to the provinces of Transbaikalia and Sakhalin. In case such a removal of Russian forces takes place, they may be moved within the limits of the established 30 kilometer zone, and they may use the Ussuri Railroad on conditions stated in paragraph 4, but only by agreement with the Japanese Command regarding the method of transportation.

6. In order to maintain general order and peace and for the performance of militia duty in the districts mentioned in paragraph 2 and along the railroad line, Russian military militia units are permitted, and the personnel, arms and number of these in each individual district are determined by the Russian authorities with the knowledge of the Japanese Command, and must be limited to actual necessary requirements.

The terms regarding the necessary military units for guard duty and military institutions and prison duty in the city of Vladivostok are defined by agreement between the two commands.

7. The guarding of railroads is carried on on the basis of decisions arrived at by the Allied Military Committee in accordance with the decisions of the Allied Railroad Committee regarding the control of railroads.

8. Arms, munitions and other material necessary for military operations, factories manufacturing such and warehouses where such are kept, in the districts mentioned in paragraph 2, are subject to seizure by the Japanese Command. The future

fate of the above-mentioned supplies is subject to special decisions. The following are the exceptions:

a. Arms, munitions and supplies necessary for militia and prison duty and also necessary for instruction in military schools and manoeuvres in the city of Vladivostok in accordance with paragraph 6, are returned from the supplies seized by the Japanese command.

b. The Far Eastern Mechanical and Shipbuilding Works in Vladivostok remain at the disposal of the Russian authorities on condition that no munitions are produced in them and that the Japanese Command has the right to supervise the execution of this condition.

c. All objects of military use not mentioned in paragraph 8, which have no direct relation to military operations, and also warehouses containing such, are not subject to seizure.

d. Military supplies used as means of transportation, which have been seized and which are not the absolute property of the Russian authorities, are subject to special registration.

9. The right to dispose of barracks which are at the present time occupied and which may be occupied in the future by the Japanese troops, belongs to the Japanese Command until the evacuation. In case of necessity the Japanese Command shall furnish to the institutions and military units mentioned in paragraph 6, barracks which are at their disposal within the possible limits.

10. The Russian authorities shall take all measures to protect railroads and telegraph lines in the districts enumerated in paragraph 2, and must use all efforts to reestablish normal communication, and the Japanese Command shall give assistance in case of necessity.

11. Both contracting parties must take measures for the speedy realization of this agreement. For this purpose, in case of necessity, and also for the working out of details regarding the execution of this agreement, a special Russo-Japanese Commission is established.

12. All the conditions established by the Command are of temporary character, and are to be reconsidered at the request of either side, and may be changed by agreement.

Vladivostok, April 29, 1920.

## DECLARATION OF GENERAL OI OF MAY 11, 1920.

Whereas a proposal was recently made to our Military Command in the name of Mr. Smirnov, Representative of the Soviet Government at Irkutsk, and Mr. Yanson, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the same Government, for making, altogether aside from all consideration of a peace treaty, such arrangements between the partisan forces in Siberia and the Bolshevik troops, on their eastward advance, and the Japanese Army, as to make it possible to keep each of the aforesaid military forces within their present sphere of operations, and whereas the authorities of the Revolutionary Government at Verkhne-Udinsk have acquainted the Commander of the Japanese forces at Chita, on more than one occasion, with their proposal of a similar character and with other proposals regarding the establishment of an independent political institution for Far Eastern Russia, I feel it incumbent upon me to make herewith the following declaration:

The Japanese Military Command, which has no territorial ambitions whatever in Siberia, feels the deepest sympathy with the Russian population in Far Eastern Russia, and earnestly hopes that a stabilization of political affairs and restoration of order in the daily life of the people in that region will soon deliver them from the hardships and difficulty under which they are suffering at present.

The recent military events in Vladivostok were due to the course the insubordinate partisans were suffered to pursue in their disorganized activity, which the Japanese army had had to feel as an increasing pressure brought to bear upon it, and as a growing menace to the integrity of its position.

Under such circumstances the Japanese Army had only one course to follow in its self-defence.

Japan wishes to make it likewise most clear, that it can in no wise tolerate the existence, in any country in close geographical relations with its own territory, of any political organization that defies humanity and attempts to disturb the peace of the world.

In view of the rapid progress of the repatriation of the Czech troops towards its final accomplishment, the Japanese Military

Command wishes hereby to express its readiness to effect the military evacuation of Siberia, when conditions in Far Eastern Russia have been readjusted on a stable and assuring basis, when all menace to Korea and Manchuria has been removed, and when the safety of life and property of our civil population has been guaranteed.

The Japanese Command is not only earnest in its hope that the conditions in Far Eastern Russia will soon attain such a consummation, but also is no less eager in manifesting its regard for the opinion of the Russian people, and the Japanese Command does not mean to defy their sentiment by according support to any particular section of the Russian population thereby aggravating political conditions in the country.

It will be a matter of no less solicitude to our Command than to the Russian population, if Far Eastern Russia can be established on a basis of such form of self-government as to meet with the approval of the people.

It is to be hoped, too, that economic relations be resumed, that the population in these parts of Russia may be relieved from their present hardships and privations.

In order to expedite matters for such satisfactory arrangements as described above, it is necessary that the Russian Army be caused to cease acts of hostility against the Japanese Forces at Chita, and provide an inviolable zone of neutrality between the two armies in these parts.

This accomplished, the unification and autonomy of Far Eastern Russia may be expected, based on such an arrangement.

It is hardly necessary to say that the Japanese Command will refrain from all interference, and when the state of political affairs has been brought to such a stage as to make it possible adequately to guarantee the making of such political arrangements, and when, consequently peace has come in sight, the Japanese Command will welcome the final arrival of the time for such military evacuation of Siberia.

Such are the hopes of the Japanese military command, and in these, to be sure, our Government as well as our people are agreed.

This solicitude we feel for the future, we trust, is shared by the Russian population.

However, we feel that it will not be altogether impertinent to say in this connection, that the action taken by the Russian Force at Nikolayevsk was a very deplorable affair.

Our military force, being small in number, was driven back and annihilated, our Consul was killed, and a great number of the Japanese population there was massacred or subjected to all sorts of unspeakable humiliation.

The incidents in question have profoundly impressed the Japanese nation.

It appears quite logical that this affair be considered as a separate issue and estimated on its own account, for proper settlement.

(Signed) GENERAL MARIMOTO OI.

Commander of Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Siberia.  
May 11. 1920.

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#### **RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE MILITIA IN THE MARITIME PROVINCE.**

In accordance with paragraph 6 of the Russo-Japanese Agreement of April 29, the number and arms of the militia units are established by the Russian authorities, with the knowledge of the Japanese Command.

In order to execute the above, the following project is proposed:

1. The number of militia within the district outlined in paragraph 2 of the Russo-Japanese Agreement of April 29, 1920, is to be 4,250.
2. The entire militia is divided as follows:
  - a. Administrative.
  - b. Railroad.
  - c. Special militia reserves for combating criminal gangs.
  - d. Vladivostok Fortress militia.
3. The numbers of the above mentioned divisions of militia are to be as follows:



- a. Administrative militia (city and county), 2,300 men.
- b. Railroad militia, 300 men.
- c. Special militia reserves, 1,350 men.
- d. Vladivostok Fortress militia, 800 men.

4. The 4,250 men established by the Commission are divided within the districts of the province as follows:

- a. Vladivostok District
  - City militia, 1,100 men.
  - Reserves, 600 men.
  - Fortress militia, 300 men.
- b. Khabarovsk District
  - City militia, 250 men.
  - County militia, 100 men.
  - Reserves, 250 men.
- c. Nikolsk-Usurisk District
  - City militia, 250 men.
  - County militia, 200 men.
  - (Including Posiet, Barabsh and Grodekovo.)
  - Reserves, 300 men.
- d. Iman District
  - County militia, 200 men.
  - Reserves, 200 men.
- e. Olginsk District
  - (Including Suchan and Skhotovo), 200 men.
- f. Militia for Ussuri Railroad
  - 300 men.

5. The entire militia of the provinces with the exception of the Fortress militia, i. e., railroad, administrative and special militia reserve, are under orders and at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior, through the Government Inspector of Militia.

The Fortress militia is under orders of the Commandant of the Fortress.

6 The functions of the various groups of militia are defined by the existing government regulations or by regulations which may be issued by the government.

7. The militia is to be armed as follows: Two-thirds of the city, county, railroad and fortress militia is to be equipped with sabers and revolvers and one-third of the above with rifles.

8. The arms are issued by the Japanese Command from the supplies of Russian arms which are under Japanese guard.

Chairman of the Russian Commission, SPOLATBOG.

Member, Government Inspector of Militia, KOLESNICHENKO.

Vladivostok, June 15, 1920.

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## ARMISTICE TREATY BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND THE VERKHNE-UDINSK GOVERNMENT

We the undersigned, representatives of the Japanese Expeditionary Army on the territory of the Far East and of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, who have gathered for the purpose of ending military operations, which have taken place against the wish of either side, are negotiating regarding their cessation.

1. On the Amur front (on the left and right shores of the River Shilka), which are concluded by our local military commanders.

2. Regarding the cessation of military operations on the Transbaikal front, in the district of the Yablonovi mountain ridge, while concluding this treaty regarding the cessation of military operations on all fronts, we have arrived at the following understanding:

I, the representative of the Far Eastern Republic and of the Chief Command of the People's Revolutionary Army, in their name, assume all obligations arrived at in this treaty, which is concluded between the local commands of both sides and which is signed for the Japanese Expeditionary Forces by Colonel Katosadziro and for the Amur units of the People's Revolutionary Army by Citizen Victor Londo, regarding the cessation of military operations on the left as well as the right shores of the River Shilka. This agreement is to go into effect in the district of the left shore of the River Shilka on July 2, and in the district of the right shore of this river on July 10, 1920.

I, the representative of the Japanese Expeditionary Army on the territory of the Far East, have the sincere desire to end

the military operations on all fronts of the territory of the Russian Far East.

In view of the fact that the Verkhne-Udinsk Government is not the only government in the territory of the Russian Far East and in view of the fact that this government is not regarded by the Japanese command as the principal government on the territory of the Russian Far East, the Japanese Command cannot conclude an agreement with the Verkhne-Udinsk Government to end military operations on all fronts of the Russian Far East.

There is a difference of opinion between the two parties on this subject. Thus, if no agreement can be reached, it will remain impossible to conclude a treaty regarding the cessation of military operations on all fronts of the territory of the Russian Far East.

The principal problem is outside of the jurisdiction of the representatives of the Japanese Command and therefore a settlement of this problem is left to further negotiations.

It is the desire of both sides that peace be re-established as soon as possible on the territory of the Far East, therefore this treaty is being concluded so that hostilities may cease on the Transbaikal front and in the district of the Yablonovi mountain ridge.

The treaty provides as follows:

1. The troops of both sides must not go beyond the established lines of demarcation and must not carry on any military operations, including aerial military operations.

2. On the Transbaikal front, in the district of the Yablonovi mountain ridge, the line of the Japanese forces begins from the junction point of the roads Podvolochnaya-Telemba and River Usmukan. From this point the line follows meridian  $113^{\circ} 30'$ ; to the south, the line follows through the junction of the road Shaksha-Telemba with the road Telemba-Verkhne-Chitinsky, further through the point northwest of Beklemishev ten versts on the old Moscow road, which is also known as the Old-Chitinsky. Further, the railroad bridge across the River Zuzugan, which is 10 versts east of Station Gongota, until Kodakhta, from here the line goes to the south parallel with the meridian  $112^{\circ} 30'$ .

The line of the People's Revolutionary Army begins at Telemba and then runs north, parallel with meridian  $118^{\circ} 30'$ ; to the south: elevation Kondinskaya, Station Gongota; then the line of the People's Revolutionary Army follows through Uletuyskoye and further south along the meridian  $112^{\circ} 30'$ .

All the above mentioned points within a radius of one verst are the spheres of influence of the sides which occupy them at the present time.

NOTE: The regulation of civic affairs in the neutral zone between the line of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces and the line of the People's Revolutionary Army, is left to the authorities of the Far Eastern Republic, with the understanding that the population will not be utilized for military operations.

3. Station Gongota is the last point on the railroad for trains coming from the west and Station Sohondo is the last point for trains coming from the east.

NOTE: Between Stations Gongota and Sohondo telephone connections are established so that negotiations can be carried on in case urgent action is necessary in order that diplomats or other individuals may pass from Station Gongota or Sohondo.

4. Noon of July 18, 1920, is the time for the cessation of military operations. Before that time the Commands of both sides must inform their units regarding the cessation of military operations and must in the various districts exchange the orders regarding the cessation of military operations. Until that time neither side is to undertake any military operations against the other.

NOTE: Truce-bearers on both sides in exchanging documents are to use the following roads:

- a. Telemba—Upper Chita.
- b. Old Chita (also known as old Moscow).
- c. The railroad line.
- d. Kodakhta-Ulyantuy.

5. This treaty is to expire upon the conclusion of the work of the representatives who truly express the will of the people of the Russian Far East.

6. In case any misunderstandings arise and this state of peace is broken and hostilities are to begin, both sides are to give ten days' notice.

**NOTE TO THE TREATY:** Troops under the command of Semenov recognize this treaty which is guaranteed by the representatives of the Japanese Expeditionary Army on the territory of the Far East.

The basis of this agreement is the note from the Chief of the Japanese Delegation, Major General Takayanagi, to the Chairman of the Peace Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, W. S. Shatov under No. 4, dated July 12, 1920.

Chief of the Japanese Delegation, GENERAL TAKAYANAGI.

Members of the Japanese Delegation, COLONEL KUROSYAVA and CAPTAIN SOYEDA.

Chairman of the Peace Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, SHATOV.

Chairman of the Peace Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, PAVLOV.

Station Gongota, July 15, 1920.

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#### **MEMORANDUM CONCERNING EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN SHATOV AND TAKAYANAGI.**

The Commander of the 5th Japanese Division, who has received instructions from the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in Vladivostok, and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, which sent its representatives to the Station of Gongota, have concluded an agreement concerning the discontinuance of military activities, and, availing themselves of this opportunity, both delegations, within the limits of the authority conferred upon them, have discussed also other questions connected with military matters, and exchanged the notes transmitted as the result of the deliberations.

The Representative of the Far Eastern Republic,  
W. SHATOV.

The Representative of the Japanese Army,  
MAJOR-GENERAL TAKAYANAGI.

Station Gongota, July 17, 1920.

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#### **NOTE REFERRED TO IN THE MEMORANDUM OF JULY 17, 1920.**

Anxious to bring about, as soon as possible, peace in the territory of the Russian Far East, the Japanese and Russian dele-

gations are convinced that the best means for the attainment of this purpose, and for the establishment of peace and order, is the creation of a buffer state with a single government, in the affairs of which the armed forces of other governments should not interfere.

In its international and economic relations this buffer state cannot remain in a state of isolation from the civilized countries possessing a highly developed industry. There exists the closest community of interests between the territory of the Russian Far East and Japan, and for this reason the buffer state must necessarily entertain relations of the closest friendship and intercourse with Japan.

In pursuance of the above mentioned principles, both delegations fully agree in the conviction that the buffer state will not accept communism as the basis of its social system, and that it will have a popular character along broad democratic lines. For this reason the present situation makes necessary the convocation of a conference of representatives who will legally and independently express the will of the population of the territory of the Russian Far East.

In accordance with this understanding of the tasks set before them, both delegations make the following mutual statement:

1. The Japanese Delegation declares that the individual relations of the Japanese Military Command with the local authorities will be discontinued with the conclusion of the work of the Conference of Representatives, who will legitimately and independently express the will of the population of the Russian Far East, and will finally give approval to the creation of a single government.

2. The Japanese Delegation declares that the Japanese Command will not interfere with the manner in which the above mentioned conference will be called nor with its deliberations, and promises to offer every possible assistance should obstacles be placed in the way of the delegates who are going to that conference, regardless of their political opinions.

3. Concerning the question of the continued stay of Japanese troops on the territory of the Russian Far East, the Jap-

anese Delegation takes the position stated in the declaration of the Japanese Government of July 3.

With reference to the region of Transbaikalia the Japanese Military Command in accordance with the declaration made by the Japanese Imperial Government, has decided this time to withdraw its troops from the above mentioned region, in consideration of the fact that at the present time the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from this region has already been completed. The Japanese Command hopes that in case its relations with the Far Eastern Republic remain satisfactory the evacuation of the Japanese troops will be completed in a short time.

4. The Russian Delegation declares that the armies of European Soviet Russia will not be admitted to the territory of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, and that they will not be allowed to stay, to encroach upon, or to pass through that territory.

5. The Russian Delegation declares that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic promises, on the basis of a mutuality concession, that within the sphere of its influence it will guarantee the inviolability of person of Japanese citizens and that it will respect their rights.

6. In the hope of bringing about an early pacification of the territory of the Eastern Republic, the Japanese and Russian Delegations declare that the Japanese Command and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic bind themselves to undertake all necessary measures to settle peacefully all conflicts, but, in case of necessity, they promise to take the most energetic steps.

7. The Japanese and Russian delegations declare that after a preliminary mutual agreement each government may send its military missions to the other, since these missions will be very useful in the matter of a successful solution of the questions which may arise in the future.

The Representative of the Japanese Army (Signature),  
GENERAL TAKAYANAGI.

The Representative of the Far Eastern Republic (Signature),  
SHATOV.

Station Gongota, July 16, 1920.

## **PROTEST AGAINST THE NON-ADMISSION OF THE VERKHNE-UDINSK DELEGATION TO CHITA**

**To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, to the High Commissioner for Japanese Affairs, Matsudaira and to General Takayanagi:**

On September 4, we, the representatives of civic organizations and political parties of the independent Far East, accompanied by Colonel Isome, the head of the Japanese Mission in the City of Verkhne-Udinsk, started on our way to Chita. The aim of our delegation, in which all political elements were amply represented, was to gather all the democratic elements of the Far East and to consolidate them in one single endeavor, for the purpose of bringing about the rule of law and order through the medium of the free expression of the will of the population of the Russian Far East. After our arrival at the station of Gongota, we were held up by the Japanese Mission in Chita, owing to the fact that Ataman Semenov was staying there, who was again trying to impose his rule by means of violence and through the suppression of the democratic elements of Chita.

We suppose that on the basis of the armistice agreement and on the basis of the statements of the Japanese Military Command and the Japanese Mission we have the right to move freely on the entire territory of the Far East.

All the persons who are placing obstacles in the way of our work are directly or indirectly contributing to the strengthening of anarchy in our country. In the name of the people of the Far Eastern Republic, which elected us we protest also against the activities enabling Ataman Semenov to disrupt the Far East and to suppress the free will of the population with the help of armed forces which again have been introduced to Chita.

At the time when the entire population of the city of Chita expressed itself in favor of a reunion with the Far Eastern Republic, the new attempt of Semenov to impose his rule cannot be endured by anybody.

We declare that the free people of Central Transbaikalia will be unable to remain indifferent while such an act of violence is being committed against their free will, and that the flames of civil war are likely to flare up again.

Protesting against such acts of hostility, which are directed against the free democratic institutions, we hope that the



higher authorities of the Japanese Government and of the Military Command will take urgent steps to enable our delegation to pass immediately to Chita.

Signatures.

September 6, 1920.

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### RUSSO-JAPANESE ADJUSTMENT COMMISSION.

Letter of the Chairman of the Japanese Section of the Russo-Japanese Adjustment Commission to Mr. Zeitlin, Chairman of the Russian Section of the Commission:

The Commander of the Japanese troops in Siberia in his statements more than once expressed the wish for an early adjustment of the political situation in the Far East, together with the re-establishment of good and neighborly relations between the Japanese and the Russian peoples.

The Russian authorities considered the question of the fusion of the administrations of the various regions of the Far East, as a necessary condition for the erection of a buffer state in the Far East.

The question has been considered from all points of view and is nearing its solution. We are convinced that in this question your Government has already taken a definite position. In view of the fact that this question is closely connected with the question of the continued presence of Japanese troops in the Far East, the Japanese Section of the Commission, according to instructions from the Commander of the Japanese forces, would like to learn from the Russian Section of the Commission, the opinion of your Government as to the following questions:

1. May we be assured of the fact that the program of your Government, as announced on August 19 of the current year, and ratified by the National Assembly at Vladivostok, is final and will not be changed?

2. Does the memorandum exchanged between the Representatives of the National Assembly in Vladivostok and the Verkhne-Udinsk Government, which has been recognized by the former, change in any way the principles of your Government as indicated under (1) above?

3. Concerning the structure of the new government, is it to be understood as:

a) A moderate, democratic, republican form of government, to the exclusion of monarchist, as well as of communist principles?

b) Having constitutional-parliamentary institutions, the members of which are to be elected from among all classes, nationalities and political parties?

4. Is it to be understood in such a way that the new state in the Far East, while entertaining relations with Soviet Russia, excludes communist principles in its political and economic relations and recognizes and puts into effect the principles of a bourgeois-capitalist system?

5. Is it to be understood that the new, united state formed in the Far East is fully independent in its foreign policy and that its relations with Soviet Russia are based purely on treaties?

6. Is it to be expected that in the new united state of the Far East life, property, the right of domicile and removal will be guaranteed to foreigners, as well as the free investment of capital on the principles of the open door and of equal rights?

7. If in consequence of negotiations with other powers there should occur any changes in the above mentioned fundamental points recognized by your Government, may we expect you to notify us of such changes?

8. Is it to be hoped that the fundamental principles which were unanimously adopted by all the regional administrations will not undergo any changes at the hands of the Constituent Assembly and will be embodied in the laws and in the decrees?

December 2, 1920.

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### RUSSO-JAPANESE ADJUSTMENT COMMISSION

The Answer of Mr. Zeitlin, Chairman of the Russian Section of the Russo-Japanese Adjustment Commission, to the Chairman of the Japanese Section of the Commission.

In reply to the communication which was transmitted by you, as to the wish of the Commander of the Japanese troops in Siberia to learn the opinion of our Government concerning a number of questions, I beg to inform you as follows in the name of the Government:

1. The program of the Government, announced on August 19, of the current year, and approved by the National Assembly, being a logical expression of the principles of the fundamental declaration of the Government, of July 21 of the current year, is final for the Government and is not subject to any changes.

2. The memorandum signed by the delegation of the National Assembly in Verkhne-Udinsk does not affect the program of our Government as indicated under 1.

3. The political and social system of the future Far Eastern State is to take the following form in accordance with the aims of our Government:

(a) Democratic-republican, absolutely excluding the restoration of monarchy as well as the establishment of Communism.

(b) Constitutional and parliamentary, founded on the basis of universal suffrage, without excluding any classes, nationalities or political parties.

4. The new state created in the Far East is conceived by our Government as entertaining treaty relations with Soviet Russia, excluding, however, the putting into effect of Communism in political and economic matters, and presupposing that the policy conducted will be along the lines of a bourgeois-capitalist system.

5. The above-mentioned state organization, which is entertaining treaty relations with Soviet Russia, is conceived by our Government as a State that is completely self-governing and independent in matters of foreign policy.

6. According to the fundamental ideas of the Government, life and property of foreigners, as well as their right to residence and removal, must be fully guaranteed in the new state organization; likewise, for the development of commerce and industry, foreign capital will be invited, on the principles of the open door and equal rights.

7. The Government does not permit of the possibility of changing the fundamental principles of its program; at the same time our Government is always ready, on a reciprocal basis, to inform the representatives of the Japanese Government of all steps undertaken for putting into effect the Government's pro-

gram, insofar as such information might interest the representatives of the neighboring nation and facilitate the bringing about of mutual understanding and confidence.

8. The fundamental principles adopted by all provincial administrations, being based on a sound understanding of the international situation and the internal alignment of forces, shall, at the discretion of the Government, be put into effect in the form of laws and decrees, after they have received the approval of the Constituent Assembly.

December 2, 1920.

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### THE JAPANESE ON THE EMBARGO ON VALUABLES FROM THE MARITIME PROVINCE.

The Chairman of the Russian Delegation of the Russo-Japanese Adjustment Commission received from the chief command of the Gendarmerie Division of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces a communication the contents of which were as follows:

According to the agreement between the Japanese and the Russians, concluded at the time when the Japanese Command returned to the Russian authorities the gold and silver that had been taken away, and according to the declaration made by the representative of the Japanese diplomatic mission, to your Government at the end of November last, it is inadmissible to export from the Maritime Province gold, silver and valuables belonging to the Vladivostok Government.

Although the Government is convinced that the corresponding organs of your Government are watching over the fulfillment of this clause, nevertheless the Japanese Command is obliged to watch over this matter. It has been ascertained that efforts have been made to export gold and silver without the knowledge of the Japanese Command, and for this reason very often goods in transit have to be held up in order to ascertain their contents.

We believe that it will be convenient for the parties and that it would aid in expediting matters, if silver would be exported only after the receipt of a certificate from the local Chief of Gendarmerie, and where there is no such office, from the local Chief of the Japanese Military Command, after informing the latter, in advance, of the forwarding of the objects in ques-

tion. In order to put these instructions into effect the Gendarmerie Command especially wants you to inform to this effect all the Russian authorities concerned in this matter. These instructions must be observed also in case the articles in question are transferred between various Government institutions in the same city.

January 14, 1921.

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### NOTE TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

While ordering its army to occupy Russian Far Eastern territory, the Imperial Japanese Government, by its proclamation of August 2, 1918, clearly stated to the Russian people and to the world that this extraordinary measure was being taken solely "for the sake of rendering assistance to the Czecho-Slovak army," and that, "maintaining its established policy of unqualified friendship toward Russia and the Russian people" and recognizing "the territorial integrity of Russia" and "forbearing from interference in the internal affairs of the Government," "upon the fulfillment of the mission above stated, that is, upon the completion of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak army, the Japanese army will unconditionally leave the Russian territory."

The evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak army was successfully completed in August, 1920.

However, long before the completion of this evacuation by its declaration of March 31, 1919, the Imperial Government of Japan proclaimed that "as no other country is geographically so closely connected with Siberia as our Empire and whereas the political condition of the Far East is such as to threaten not only the life and property of our citizens living in Siberia, but also the peace in Korea and Manchuria, we regret to state that we consider it impossible to evacuate our troops from the Far Eastern territory. And the Government of Japan reiterates that the presence of its army upon the territory of the Far East does not mean any political aggression against Russia," and again in this act the Government of Japan "sincerely states that as soon as peace will be established within the territory, the Japanese army will immediately leave."

The same statement was reiterated by the Commander of the expeditionary army, General Oi, in his notes to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, of May 11 and September 18, always expressing his sincerest desire for the speediest unification of the separate territories of the Far East, regarding it not only as beneficial for the Russian population, but as a condition preceding the establishment of economic relations between the nations. In his declaration of May 11, General Oi states literally as follows: "The Japanese command will with pleasure lead its troops out of Russian territory as soon as stable conditions are established on Russian domains in the Far East" and that "the Japanese Command, considering the will of the Russian population, does not wish to complicate the political situation of the region by rendering assistance to individual Russians who might tend to disregard the will of the whole Russian population. The Japanese command, together with the Russian population, heartily welcomes the establishment within the territories of the Far Eastern region of such a form of government as will conform to the will of the people." It was also plainly declared "that the above is not only the wish of the Japanese Military Command, but also that of our Government and people."

The Russian people, having lost faith in its various self-styled saviors, decided, upon its own volition, and not at all because of demands made by foreigners, to establish such order as will make it possible once and for all for the will of the people to freely express itself over the whole area of the Russian Far East.

The authorized representatives of the whole people have gathered in Chita on October 29, 1920, and have most solemnly proclaimed the union of all the territories of the Far East in one independent self-governing Far Eastern Republic beginning with the day of the declaration of independence, namely, April 6, 1920. The same declaration laid down the first basic principles upon which the government must be built in order to bring about law and order and peaceful development of all social forces. At the same conference a law was passed for the convening of the Constituent Assembly and a Government was formed to bring into effect the will of the people. All these solemn declara-

tions were published in due time and made known to the whole world.

Two months have passed since the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic is steadfastly following the road that is pointed out by the declaration of October 29, 1920. The election of the Constituent Assembly has already taken place. Within ten days the representatives of the people will be gathering in the capital of the Far Eastern Republic in order to draw up a constitution for the country and decide upon the important, vital problems of the government. The internal war which was still flickering in some parts of the country, prior to the unification, has died of itself. All classes of the population are steadfastly striving for a peaceful life and labor with a view to rebuilding all that was destroyed. The Vladivostok People's Assembly, laboring under extraordinarily hard circumstances, due to intervention, and in spite of various memoranda and veiled threats by the High Command of the Japanese forces, the Chief of Staff and the Head of the Diplomatic Mission, has by an overwhelming majority recognized the Government of the Far Eastern Republic. These are the heroic results of the aspirations of our people for unity, its burning desire to overcome the intervention.

On the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, freed from intervention, law and order reign supreme; the life, free labor and the property of all citizens are absolutely safe. Numerous foreigners residing in the Republic enjoy the same rights as the native citizens, and their lives and property are as safe as in any other civilized country.

Concluding on the basis of the above named facts that the further arrival and sojourn of Japanese troops on the Russian territory is not only unjustifiable, but absolutely harmful, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kojevnikov, by order of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, most explicitly brought to the attention of the Japanese Imperial Government, through the Chief of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission in Vladivostok, the urgent necessity to most speedily evacuate the Japanese forces from the Far East, and he further made known the readiness of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic to commence negotiations with the Imperial Government of

Japan with the view of concluding a treaty of everlasting friendship and of establishing economic relations for mutual benefit, firmly believing that there is no problem between the Government of the Far Eastern Republic and the Imperial Government of Japan which could not be solved peacefully by negotiation.

However, the Japanese army continues forcibly to occupy part of the territory of our Republic, thereby making life unbearable to the population of that part of the territory of the Republic on which these forces are situated.

Taking advantage of the presence of Japanese troops and their actual suppression of any and all attempts to establish order on the part of the population and their governmental organs, which suppression is contrary to all declarations, the criminal elements are doing their contemptible work. Russian cities and villages in the zone of intervention are enveloped in a poisonous cloud, as it were, of robbery, murder and all kinds of unspeakable crimes.

Some lawless persons at the station of Grodekovo on the Ussuri railroad are stopping trains, searching and robbing passengers and taking many of them off, beating them and very often leading them away, nobody knows where. These same criminals ride in the trains without paying their fare, force railroad agents to give them special locomotives, and, not receiving them, detach engines from trains (case of November 28, at the station of Grodekovo). They also take away from Russian as well as from foreign passengers silver and other belongings, which is much like open highway robbery. The local authorities find it impossible to establish order, thanks to the opposition of the Japanese Military Command to the lawful authorities and its sympathy with the enemies of law and order. The Japanese Command by force of arms is restraining the authorities of the law from combating the criminals and establishing order—which means an absolute violation of the right of self-determination of the people.

The sympathies of the Japanese Military Command for the enemies of the people were most vividly expressed when it conducted under its protection Semenov, that criminal and enemy of



the people, through Russian territory, defying the whole Russian and foreign population, and, officially announcing this fact to the former Maritime Government, as if challenging its impotence, took him to Port Arthur with a guard of honor of the army of the Imperial Government of Japan, thereby openly scorning the feelings of the free people. This criminal is now issuing orders in which he promises to start a new adventure in the spring, and while he is openly proclaiming that Japan is and will be rendering him assistance, he is thereby arousing against Japan the population and awakening an old hatred, thus hindering the establishment of good neighborly relations.

The Japanese Command is not allowing the attachment of paymasters' cars to trains which are on their way to pay salaries to the railroad employees, and is obstructing the movement of almost all freight, thereby completely and without cover interfering with the inner life of the Far Eastern Republic. It has also held up the car of the Secretary of the Military-Diplomatic Mission of the former Verkhne-Udinsk Government, which has since become a part of the Far Eastern Republic, attempting to search him and his car, thus violating the most elementary laws with regard to diplomatic representatives established by the practice of international law, and giving the population the impression that all official Japanese declarations are mere words.

Needless to say, all these actions on the part of the Japanese are awakening within the minds of the Russian people doubts as to the genuineness of the solemn declarations of the Japanese Government, and forcing them to be on the alert.

True to the mandates of our people, and directed by the same desire as are the people, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic thinks it necessary with a view to establishing peaceful mutual relations between both countries and peoples: 1. that the High Command of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Vladivostok, in the actions carried out by its subordinates, should adhere to the principle of absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of the Far Eastern Republic and desist from rendering assistance to separate groups of the population in their domestic struggles, as was the case with the assistance given to the Grodekovo band; 2. that in view of the fact that the region is quiet and that a strong Government has been estab-

lished, the time is appropriate for a definite date to be set for the evacuation of the Japanese troops from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic by the Imperial Government.

Considering the fact that upon the territory of the Far Eastern Republic there is at present a Japanese Diplomatic Mission, the Government asks kindly to be informed whether the Japanese Imperial Government will agree to receive our mission in Tokio upon the just principle of reciprocity, with the aim of speedily establishing political and economic relations based on such treaties as will be for the mutual benefit and friendship of both the Japanese and Russian peoples. We trust that this will speed the long-hoped-for day of mutual understanding and peaceful neighborly relations between the two peoples.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic,  
A. KRASNOSHCHÉKOV.

Chita, January 19, 1921.

#### PROTEST AGAINST VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRAL ZONE BY THE JAPANESE

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Imperial  
Government:

According to information received from local authorities, the Japanese troops have advanced beyond the limits of the 30-kilometer zone agreed upon, and on February 23 of the current year occupied the following settlements: Yakovlevka, 60 versts east of the station of Yevgenyevka; Pokrovka, 5 versts east of Yakovlevka; Sysoyevka, between Anuchyn and Yakovlevka.

By thus transferring its troops into a region from which the Japanese troops had been withdrawn, the Japanese Military Command only complicates the situation without any plausible reasons. As far back as May 11, 1920, General Oi, the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces, had announced in his declaration: "Now that the evacuation of the Czechoslovak troops is nearing its end, I declare openly that the Japanese Command will gladly evacuate its troops, as soon as the situation of the Russian possessions in the Far East will be firmly established." In the same declaration it was emphasized that: "The Japanese Command, jointly with the Russian population,

welcomes with all its heart the formation on the territory of the Far East of a state based on the principles of self-government and on the introduction of such political forms as will correspond to the will of the entire population." And further on, in the same document: "The Japanese Command will welcome the moment when, the establishment of the above mentioned state organization and the pacification of the country being assured, it will be possible to evacuate the troops. I have not the slightest doubt that this is not only the wish of the Japanese Command, but also of our Government and of our people."

From the point of view of the Japanese Government this moment was reached long ago, because in its declaration of July 3, 1920, it announced the evacuation of Transbaikalia, and General Oi, the Commander of the Expeditionary Forces, referring to the declaration of September 18, declared solemnly: "In consideration of the fact that the political situation in the aforesaid region (Khabarovsk) is again becoming normal, I hereby announce that our troops will be evacuated from there. At the same time I express my sincere wish that the Russian territory in the Far East may be united as soon as possible, so as to secure peace and welfare to the country and to strengthen the good neighborly relations between the Russian and the Japanese peoples."

At a solemn moment, when the Constituent Assembly, composed of the authorized representatives of the entire Russian population of the Far East, is earnestly working at the task of finally creating and forming the Far Eastern Republic, when the work of the final unification of the Russian Far East is nearing its completion, when in all places evacuated by the Japanese troops peace and order reigns, the re-occupation by the Japanese troops of localities which were already once evacuated under the most solemn declarations, is an absolutely unjustifiable act, and is in outright contradiction to numerous official assurances of the Government and of the Japanese Military Command.

These activities of the Japanese Military Command assume a more alarming character in view of the fact that simultaneously strange and suspicious individuals purposely disseminate malicious rumors purporting that the partisans are again preparing their attacks within the limits of the Maritime Province, and

**that the armed forces of the Far Eastern Republic are preparing aggressive activities.**

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic has time and again declared, and again solemnly declares, that it has absolutely no aggressive intentions or plans with reference to the Japanese troops. The Government was doing and is doing its best for a peaceful cessation of intervention and for the creation of the most friendly relations between the population of the Russian Far East and the Japanese Nation.

But to its great regret, the Government is compelled to state that all its efforts to efface from the memory of the population all the unfortunate impressions connected with the hostile activities of the Japanese troops on Russian territory may prove vain, if the Japanese Command will continue its policy of advancing its troops into places which it had already once left, thus disturbing and irritating the population over and over again.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic considers it its duty to protest against such activities of the Japanese Military Command, which lead, not to the unity of the Far East and to the strengthening of its democratic state organization, but, on the contrary, to its dismemberment.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. KRASNOSHCHKOV.  
Chita, March 3, 1921.

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#### **NOTE TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.**

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic, not only in its declarations, but also in its practical everyday activity, has spared no pains to maintain the population in a condition of complete tranquility and self-control, its patience having repeatedly been put to severe trials.

Incessant murders of absolutely innocent persons by armed bandits calling themselves "Semenov's men," etc., have been irritating and inflaming, and are still inflaming, the population, up to the present day.

A short time ago these criminals again stained themselves with blood; several scores of people were killed in the settlements of Razdolnoye, Khorol and Zharikov, the population of Fadyevka was disarmed and left at the mercy of the Khunkhuses (Chinese bandits), and a number of citizens were abducted to an unknown destination. Persons of suspicious character are launching and spreading rumors that the bands of Semenov are, as previously, supported, inspired and armed by the Japanese Military Command, and that in a not distant future these bands will again start their attacks, with the full support of the Japanese Military Command. For reasons which are only known to themselves, these individuals are endeavoring to instill in the Russian population the poison of a distrust in all the open and secret activities of the Japanese Command, thus spreading hostility between the Japanese and the Russian peoples.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic is disinclined to believe these maliciously disseminated rumors, but it is unfortunately compelled to state that the attitude of the Japanese Command toward the Russian authorities, which are endeavoring to protect the innocently suffering population, is not always clear, and that this is quite likely to strengthen the conviction among the population that the disseminated rumors are based on truth.

In spite of the revolting crimes of Semenov's men, who have gathered in Grodekovo and who are still gathering in other places also, in spite of the protest of the Russian authorities against the unlawful gathering of armed forces in Grodekovo, in spite of the repeated attempts of these authorities to dispatch militia to disarm these bandits and restore order, the Japanese Command systematically declines to settle this matter by pretending ignorance of the fact that armed forces are staying in Grodekovo, a fact which is too well known to all those who live in the Maritime Province, and especially to all those who have the misfortune of passing through, or of accidentally arriving at Grodekovo. Matters went so far that on February 8 of the current year the former Colonel Dompel, who, citing a mandate issued by Semenov, calls himself the Chief of the Military Communications of the Army of Grodekovo, declared without any ceremony that all ranks and institutions of the former army of Kappel are abolished, unless the persons who had occupied them

declared their recognition of the authority of General Savelyev, Commander of the Grodekovo Army.

We are informed by local authorities, that when General Ochi, the Aide-de-camp of the Japanese Emperor, passed through the station of Grodekovo, the commanding staff of this army, headed by the aforesaid General Savelyev, was introduced to him, and that the armed forces were reviewed.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic is endeavoring to bring about sincere and friendly relations between the Japanese and Russian peoples and for this purpose it considers it essential that the activities of those who are trying to spread distrust between the Russian population and the Japanese Command be stopped. These activities would be doubtless stopped and the malicious rumors would immediately be silenced if the Japanese Command would affirm:

1. That in reality it neither inspires, supports, nor arms the so-called Semenovists and the other counter-revolutionists.

2. That it really does not conduct any negotiations with them as to any aggressions against the Russian Government and that—as far as it itself is concerned—it is not opposing the Government of the Far Eastern Republic.

Such a confirmation would tell the population that the Japanese Command is standing by all the solemn declarations of the Japanese Government as to non-interference in our internal affairs. It is self-evident that if the Japanese Government would declare that its troops are only temporarily stationed on Russian territory, and that, owing to the accomplished unity of the Far East and the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, their evacuation is imminent—such a statement would be received by the population with great satisfaction.

A clear, vigorous, and frank expression on the part of the representatives of the Japanese Command would help the Government of the Far Eastern Republic in its endeavor to efface from the memory of the population all the wrongs it has been forced to bear, and in good faith to establish friendly mutual relations.

Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
(Signature) A. KRASNOSHCHIEKOV.

Chita, March 7, 1921.

## NOTE TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. On March 21, 1921, Lieutenant-General Kosina, the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in the Sakhalin District, referring to the declaration of the Japanese Government of July 3, 1920, announced to the population of that district the forthcoming occupation of Nikolayevsk, De-Castri, Mago, Sofisk and other places, and the installation in these points of a civil government "for the re-establishment of peace and order."

II. After the night of March 30-31, when armed criminal bands of counter-revolutionaries in Vladivostok attacked the lawful authorities and the Constituent Assembly, the Japanese Command, which, during the whole night had not interfered with the excesses of the criminals, disarmed the militia, which was carrying out its duties in the defense of the life and property of Russian and foreign citizens.

III. On April 12, by order of the Japanese Government, the Japanese Consulate-General in Vladivostok announced that the Chief of the Military-Administrative Department of the Japanese Command in Sakhalin had made public an announcement of February 19, 1921, concerning the auction of leases for Russian fisheries, the office of the Military-Administrative Command in Sakhalin (Alexandrovsk) being designated as the premises in which the auction was to take place; and in this announcement it was stated that "persons who wished to inspect the aforesaid list, the regulations and rules, might consult them in the Japanese language in the Consulate."

IV. In the course of the last few days fresh Japanese troops have begun to arrive in Vladivostok.

V. On April 19, a Japanese transport arrived in De Castri and landed troops; a Japanese radio station was installed; Japanese censorship was established over the Russian telegraph station and it was prohibited to communicate with the higher Russian authorities without the permission of the Japanese.

The introduction of troops and of a Japanese civil administration more than nine months after the declaration of July 3, 1920,

during which time peace and order had not once been disturbed in these places, and when not the slightest danger threatened the numerous Japanese residents or their interests; the disarming of the Government militia and the support given to the counter-revolutionary criminals, the arbitrary institution of auctions of Russian fishery rights, with the permission given to the (presumably Russian) competitors to ascertain the Japanese rules in the "Japanese language in the Consulate," and the landing of fresh troops in Vladivostok—all these facts occurring at the time when the Constituent Assembly is terminating its work for the final shaping of the young Far Eastern Democratic Republic, cannot help strengthening, in the minds of the population, the conviction as to the openly annexionist tendencies of the Japanese Government, which at this time is no longer making use of such pretexts as the "danger menacing the Czechoslovaks, Korea, Manchuria," etc.

If the Japanese Government was sincere in its declaration of July 3, 1920, and in reality considered the measures taken by it as temporary, "until the organization of a lawful government," this moment for the restitution of their rights to the Russian people and for the return to normal conditions, has certainly arrived, now that the Russian Far East is ruled by a body that is invested with all the power of a lawful popular government.

Protesting energetically against all the above mentioned violations of the sovereign rights of the Russian people, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic is again compelled to point out that a persistent continuation of such a policy, which is in contradiction to all the solemn declarations and assurances of the Japanese Government, cannot contribute to the strengthening of the friendly relations between the Russian and Japanese peoples.

Not by encroaching upon the sovereign rights of the Russian people, but by sincere and friendly negotiations on mutual needs and interests, will it be possible to create that stable and normal situation which is needed not only by the Russian and Japanese populations, but also the whole world and which, according to its repeated assurances, is also the aim of the Japanese Government.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,

B. SKVIRSKY.

Chita, April 21, 1921.



## APPEAL OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

To the Imperial Japanese Government:

In the early part of August, 1918, the Japanese Imperial Government issued a declaration to the Russian people, in which it was said: "The Government of the United States, recognizing the seriousness of the situation has lately addressed the Japanese Government, asking it for a prompt despatch of troops in order to relieve the position of the Czecho-Slovak forces. In order to meet the wishes of the American Government, and to cooperate with the Allies in this expedition, the Japanese Government has decided to make immediate preparations for the despatch of the necessary troops. A number of troops will be immediately sent to Vladivostok. Although choosing this course of action, the Japanese Government, nevertheless, remains firm in its desire to maintain its friendly relations with Russia and her people, and confirms its declaration of the policy to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to refrain from interfering in the Russian domestic policy. Furthermore, the Japanese Government declares that after having accomplished the above task, it will immediately withdraw its troops from Russian territory." It would appear from this declaration that with the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks the Japanese forces should also have gone. However, in the declaration of the Japanese Government made on August 13, 1918, only a few days after the solemn declaration of Japan, referred to above, was issued, additional reasons were given to justify the despatch of Japanese troops; the Soviet troops, at the head of which, in accordance with the information which reached Japan, were Austrians and Germans, were a menace to Japan and China. In the declaration of March 31, 1920, at the time when the Czecho-Slovak evacuation had been completed, the new reasons given in the declaration of August 13, 1918, appeared with much greater emphasis. The Czecho-Slovak question became a matter of secondary importance, and the considerations with regard to the alleged menace to Korea and Manchuria, and the fact of Siberia's being close to Japan was brought to the foreground. In this declaration nothing was said definitely about the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, after the evacuation of the

Czecho-Slovaks. It was stated only that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Siberia and Transbaikalia as soon as possible after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces had been completed. At the same time the occupation of the Russian part of Sakhalin was announced on the ground that there were no legally constituted Russian authorities with whom it was possible to negotiate a settlement of the Nikolayevsk affair. The evacuation of the Japanese troops from the Khabarovsk district was announced on September 18, 1920. In the declaration signed by General Oi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in Siberia, it was said: "I want to express my sincere wish for an early union of the Russian Far East, which will secure peace and prosperity to the people, and will strengthen the friendly, neighborly relations between the Russian and Japanese peoples." The same wish has been repeated in all the statements and declarations of the Imperial Japanese Government and Japanese Command made since August, 1918. The Constituent Assembly wants to sum up the present situation in the following words:

Russian Sakhalin has been occupied. The Maritime Province, occupied by Japanese troops, no longer resembles Russian territory, for the Japanese Command is conducting itself as if the Japanese and not the Russians were the masters of that territory. The Maritime Province, under the control of the Japanese, is the only district in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic where the remnants of the criminal counter-revolutionary bands of Semenov are murdering and robbing the peaceful population. In the Maritime Province the Government of the Far Eastern Republic and the district authorities cannot control the affairs of the Russian people; they cannot ship food, goods or cars outside of the area occupied by the Japanese troops. The population of other parts of the Far Eastern Republic is therefore suffering from lack of food and clothing. Trains are searched and even cars in which representatives of the Russian authorities are riding are detained, if the Japanese Command thinks fit.

The latest notes sent by the Japanese Consul-General to the authorities of the Maritime Province, with regard to fisheries, provoke a sad comparison between the actual facts of life and the Japanese declarations. With great pains does the Constituent

Assembly think of the events of April 4 and 5, 1920, and the numerous innocent victims who fell as the result of the Japanese intervention. The Constituent Assembly is constrained to state that the presence of the Japanese troops in Siberia, which aggravated the Russian people, was responsible for those events. The representatives of the people of the Russian Far East solemnly declare that any aggressive designs with regard to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria are foreign to the minds of the Russian people. The people of the Russian Far East wish to establish and strengthen peaceful relations and look forward to the resumption of trade relations to the mutual advantage of the two countries. The Constituent Assembly states with great regret that even the people of those parts of the Russian Far East which have been freed from foreign intervention cannot go on with their peaceful labor and cannot establish permanent order, because the presence of the Japanese troops in Russian territory rouses their suspicion and makes them uncertain of the future. Notwithstanding all the difficulties and obstacles, the Russian Far East has been united in the Far Eastern Republic. The latter has been declared a democratic State, the foundation of which are the principles of civil right, the direct equal and secret ballot, and the inviolability of private property, both of Russian and foreign citizens residing within its territory. The sovereignty in the Republic belongs to the people, who are firmly convinced that the only solid basis for freedom and independence is peaceful neighborly relationship with other countries.

If we recall that the Czecho-Slovak forces have long since evacuated Siberia, then according to the statements made by the Japanese Government there is no reason why Japanese troops should remain longer in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic. The time has come for the Japanese Government to prove that, when sending troops to Russia in 1918, it did not intend, by taking advantage of the temporary weak position of the Russian people due to the war, the disorder which followed it, and the revolution, to seize Russian territory. A great historical moment has come for the Japanese Government to determine for many years or even hundreds of years to come the mutual relations between the two great peoples of Russia and Japan. Expressing the will of the whole of the people of the

**Russian Far East** to free the country from foreign intervention, the Constituent Assembly emphatically insists upon the evacuation of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces from the entire territory of the Far Eastern Republic. The Constituent Assembly believes that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops will be an important factor in re-establishing relations between the Japanese and Russian peoples. The proximity of the two countries, the importance of the Russian Far East to Japanese industry, the immense natural resources which await foreign capital for their development, all are a pledge of the future close and peaceful relations, which, when the past sad memories are gone and the people return to their ordinary occupations, shall exist between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic.

The Constituent Assembly expresses the hope that in the near future the Japanese Government, having desisted from intervention in Russian affairs, will accord recognition to the Far Eastern Republic and enter into formal relations with it.

For the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic.

(Signed) President, SHILOV.

(Signed) Secretary, SUCHOVY.

April 24, 1921.

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## MEMORANDUM OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

To the Government of the United States of America:

In the official declaration of the American Government, which was received at Vladivostok on August 5, 1918, it was stated that the United States and Japan were the only countries at the time which were in a position to act in Siberia with sufficient forces even to achieve such a modest task as the one the Government of the United States had put before itself. The Government of the United States proposed, therefore, to the Government of Japan, that both countries should send a military force of several thousand men to Vladivostok to co-operate in the occupation of the city with the view of guarding the rear of

the Czecho-Slovak troops, who were advancing eastward. The Japanese Government agreed to that proposal. The Government of the United States declared to the Russian people in a most frank and solemn manner that it did not aim at infringement upon the political sovereignty of Russia, that it did not want to interfere in her domestic affairs, even within those limited areas which the American troops might be forced to occupy, and that it had no intention to encroach upon the integrity of Russian territory at that time or in the future; that the American Government aimed exclusively at helping the Russian people in the manner most acceptable to them in their efforts to regain control of their own affairs, their territory and their destiny. It was understood that the Japanese Government would issue a similar statement.

The declaration of the American Government established the following facts: That the American troops were landed at Vladivostok to assist the Czecho-Slovaks; that the American Government proposed to the Japanese Government to send its troops into Russian territory and that the former is, therefore, responsible for the further stay of the Japanese troops in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic; that the American Government has solemnly guaranteed its non-interference in the Russian affairs and the inviolability of Russian territory.

Under these conditions America invited Japan to co-operate in the matter of assisting the Czecho-Slovaks. At about the same time (in August), the Japanese Government in its official declaration repeated the above statements. Not going into details of the sad history of the intervention, it is enough to say that at the end of 1919 and at the beginning of 1920, the Allies have one after another withdrawn their troops from Siberia. The last transport of American troops left Vladivostok in March, 1920, and soon after that the remainder of the Czecho-Slovak forces left our country. The Japanese troops have not been withdrawn; Japan has brought out pretext after pretext to justify their stay: Japanese interests in Eastern Siberia, the possible menace to Korea and Manchuria and the unsafe conditions menacing the life and property of her citizens. Instead of the evacuation of the Japanese troops we witnessed the events of April 4 and 5, 1920, with all the subsequent results, and in July last, Japan occupied the Sakhalin District. The Japanese troops were

withdrawn from Transbaikalia and the district around Khabarovsk, while the Maritime Province is still occupied by them. The Maritime Province is now the only place where the criminal counter-revolutionary bands of Semenov are murdering and terrorizing the population. There, as in Sakhalin, the people do not feel themselves any longer the masters of their own land. The Japanese activity in the Maritime Province, specially their interference with the railway affairs, forced the members of the Inter-Allied Technical Board to adopt a resolution, asking their respective Governments whether it would be expedient to continue their work in view of the interference of the Japanese Command.

The American Government made no statement to the Russian people of the Far East at the time of the departure of the American troops. It is therefore not quite clear to the people of the Russian Far East whether the American Government has achieved the purposes for which it sent troops to Siberia. Does the American Government consider that the Allied intervention has come to an end? In the declaration of March 14, 1919, with regard to the establishment of the Inter-Allied Technical Board, it was stated that this arrangement for the Board would become invalid as soon as the Allied troops should be recalled from Siberia. The fact of the Inter-Allied Technical Board's remaining in Siberia would indicate that the intervention continues with American participation. The representatives of the Russian people in the Far East are compelled by the present circumstances to request of the American Government an explanation of the following:

- 1) Does the United States Government adhere to its declaration of August 5, 1918?
- 2) If it does, how does the United States Government explain the continuance of the intervention after the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak troops?
- 3) If it does not adhere to that declaration, when will the United States Government declare with the same solemnity that the intervention has ended?
- 4) When will the United States Government, which invited the Japanese Government to a military co-operation in the Rus-

sian Far East, require a definite end to be put to the intervention which began in 1918 by that invitation?

In spite of the numerous obstacles which have been put and are being put before the people of the Russian Far East in their efforts to unite, they have found strength enough to achieve their aim. By the will of the entire people of the Russian Far East, without distinction of class or nationality, the Constituent Assembly has now been convoked on the principles of universal suffrage. The Constituent Assembly has confirmed the independence of the Russian Far East and the formation of a democratic Far Eastern Republic.

The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic has recognized the independence of the democratic Far Eastern Republic, and now the Constituent Assembly, which represents the people and expresses their will, expects the United States of America to accord recognition to the Far Eastern Republic.

For the Constituent Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic.

(Signed) President, SHILOV.

(Signed) Secretary, SUCHOVY.

April, 1921.

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#### NOTE TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

On May 20, 1921, the local Russian authorities in Vladivostok received the order to proceed with a search in one of the houses over which the Japanese flag was flying, and which, according to information received, was the headquarters and arsenal of the White Guards. When the agents of the Government and a detachment of militia approached the house, a Japanese officer came out and declared that he would not give his permission for a search, that he had Russian lodgers, but that there were no weapons there. When the agents of the Government approached the door, the door turned out to be barricaded; the door was broken open, and in the first few rooms there were discovered twenty-five people, White Guards, who were hiding there. Here were also found twenty-five grenades and pyroxilin. The further rooms were closed and the Japanese categorically refused to ad-

mit to them the agents of the Russian administration. By orders of the Russian authorities the public prosecutor was called to the premises where the search was being made, and an official report was drawn up in his presence. At the same time there arrived on the scene a Japanese interpreter whose conduct was extremely rude and who committed an assault upon the agent of the Political State Police. A Colonel of the Japanese Gendarmerie also arrived at the place under search, and he also categorically opposed any search in the closed rooms. The negotiations with the Japanese Command lasted from 5 P. M. until late at night, but they did not bring about any results. The Japanese Command refused to give the representatives of the Russian Administration permission to proceed with the search; it also rejected the proposal to place seals on the closed doors and to place Russian guards in front of them. At 10.30 P. M., the negotiations having as yet led to no results, the Russian authorities informed the Japanese that they would take away the exterior guard, leaving all the responsibility with the Japanese Command. On the morning of the following day the Command of the Japanese Gendarmerie invited the agents of the Russian Administration to take part in the search to be made in the house in which such action had not been permitted on the previous day. The Russian authorities answered with a refusal, declaring that they themselves were undertaking searches and arrests of persons who were suspected of criminal doings. In the evening the Japanese Command informed the Russian authorities that in the house in which the day before they had discovered the White Guards, as well as twenty grenades and pyroxilin, and where after the intervention of the Japanese Gendarmerie the search had been abandoned, the Japanese, in a search effected the following day in the morning, found in the room of a Japanese citizen, who was the owner of the apartment, two machine guns, twenty rifles and a certain number of cartridges.

On May 21, at 10.40, the Detachment of National Defense, the Escort of the Commander of the Troops and his General Staff, were surrounded by Japanese troops, who demanded that the detachments should be drawn up so that the number of men and weapons might be checked up. The entire Staff of the Military Commander as well as the Division of the People's Defense



and the Escort of the Commander were arrested and freed only after several hours.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has repeatedly addressed the Japanese Government, and called its attention to the connection between the Japanese Command and the Russian criminal elements, a connection which was compromising the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. The Japanese authorities denied the statements of the Russian authorities, attributing these statements to the insincerity of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic. The occurrence which we refer to at present not only cannot be denied in any way but has been even confirmed by the Japanese Command. The house over which the Japanese flag was flying was used as a hiding place for criminal elements, who had there organized a conspiracy against the People's Government, and who had there a depot for their weapons. The Japanese Military Command, by its actions, has made it clear to the population of the Far East that it aids and abets these criminals. Such conduct on the part of the Japanese Military Command, which has presumed, on foreign territory, not only to support criminal elements by concealing them behind the Japanese flag, but even to arrest the Staff of the Military Commander and to disarm Russian forces struggling against the criminal elements in the name of order and safety of person and property, will hardly aid in strengthening the friendly relations between the Japanese and Russian peoples.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic, as well as the population of the Far Eastern Republic, do not consider the Japanese people responsible for the activities of their Command, but they are compelled to declare, as they had already declared many times, that such activities of the Japanese Command should be stopped.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic hereby vigorously protests against such interference of the Japanese Command with internal Russian affairs, against the indignities to which Russian authorities have been subjected, and the obvious support and assistance extended to the White Guard criminals.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic hopes that this time the Japanese Government will immediately take all the

necessary steps to bring about the cessation of such a policy of the Japanese Command on the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,

B. SKVIRSKY.

Chita, May 23, 1921.

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**PROTEST TO THE JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSION  
AGAINST THE INTERRUPTION OF TELEGRAPH  
COMMUNICATION**

For three days, May 25, 26 and 27, according to the reports of local authorities, telegraphic communications between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok have been interrupted for the representatives of the Russian authorities, while Japanese telegrams, in code as well as otherwise, addressed to the Japanese Mission in Khabarovsk, are regularly arriving from Vladivostok.

This latter fact definitely confirms the opinion that the telegraph is in the hands of the Japanese Command, which is thus responsible for the fact that the agents of the Government of the Far Eastern Republic are unable to communicate with each other.

Taking into consideration the circumstance that the Government of the Far Eastern Republic never prevented the Japanese Command from using the telegraph lines of the Republic for its needs, and that, consequently, the exclusive use of these lines by the Japanese Command, which is temporarily stationed on the territory of a foreign Government, cannot be explained otherwise than as a conscious attempt to break the elementary requirements of international law, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic expresses its vigorous protest against this procedure, and categorically insists upon the immediate re-establishment of normal conditions on the telegraph lines, which means that they must to be primarily at the full and unconditional disposal of the lawful authorities of the Far Eastern Republic.

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,

B. SKVIRSKY.

Chita, May 27, 1921.

## NOTE TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

On May 21, 1921, the officers of the Russian Militia at Vladivostok discovered a band of criminals who had arms stored in the house of a Japanese citizen. The militia officers were unable to arrest that band in view of the forcible and wilful interference of the Japanese Gendarmerie. The Russian militia had at that time been reliably informed of an anti-government uprising being organized at Vladivostok. The Japanese Command, which was aware of these preparations, not only did not prevent the illegal arming of the criminal elements implicated in the preparations, but, on the contrary, on May 26 the day of the uprising, surrounded the militia and the People's Defence Guard and required them to surrender their arms, while no measures have been taken against the outlaw bands. Nor did the Japanese Command prevent the occupation of the Government establishments by the agents of Semenov, who were set free by the Japanese Command. In short, the conduct of the Japanese Command at this time has not been different from its conduct on March 30, 1921, when an attempt at a coup in Vladivostok was made.

Elected by a Constituent Assembly, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, fulfilling the will of the people, has tried to restore order over the entire territory of the Russian Far East, and to establish friendly relations with all other nations. The Government has adopted every measure to liquidate as early as possible the results of the disorder inherited by it from the bandits of Semenov, who have been condemned by the entire civilized world. Rising against the atrocities of the bands of the Atamans, the population of Transbaikalia, which has experienced all the horrors of Semenov's brutality, armed themselves with home-made spears and scythes and expelled Semenov and his bandits.

The difficult financial and economic position which the people of the Far Eastern Republic are now facing, demands first of all peace both among themselves and with their neighbors, and incessant work of all classes of the population. Acting in accord with the will of the people, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic has first of all tried to bring to an end the civil war,

The Constituent Assembly at Chita, elected on the principles of universal, equal, direct and secret ballot, has by its energetic work established the fundamental laws of the young Republic, in which the principles of the broadest democracy are expressed, and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic would have been peacefully guided in the matter of democratic reconstruction if it had not been for the constant interference of the Japanese Command, which enabled the fleeing bands to take refuge in Chinese territory. The Japanese Command has also taken under its protection the bands of Semenov at Grodekovo, and has taken no steps to prevent the flogging of peaceful citizens by the bands or the committing of other forms of violence against the population. At the same time the Japanese Command has hindered the work of the People's Assembly of the Maritime Province in the matter of dispersing the above band. It is unnecessary to explain and to prove how unfriendly and harmful is such behavior on the part of the Japanese Command to the people of the Russian Far East. It is now well known to everybody, as I have been informed by one of the members of the American Mission now in Chita, that disorder in the Far Eastern Republic is evident only where there are Japanese troops, and where there are no Japanese troops one feels as safe as in America.

How much the Japanese Command is trying to maintain order in the Maritime Province can be judged from the fact that, acting in the above manner, the Japanese Command has itself violated the agreement of April 29, 1920 (which it forced upon the former Vladivostok Government), in spite of the repeated statements that it is strictly observing this agreement. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic wishes to know by what clause of the agreement of April 29, 1920, the Japanese Command has the right to disarm the Russian Militia of the Maritime Province.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic can only explain this by an utter confusion on the part of the Japanese Command at the moment when the bands which are under its protection tried to commit violence upon the peaceful population and plunder the national property of the Far Eastern Republic. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic explains this by the

confusion of the Japanese Command, for it cannot here admit an evil design, as such would be a crime and would stigmatize the Japanese Government.

Is the Japanese Government unable authoritatively to put an end to such conduct of the Japanese Command in the Maritime Province?

Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to tolerate a further complicity of its Command with the criminal elements?

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic will be forced to hold the Japanese Government responsible for the conduct of the Japanese Command, for it does not believe that the orders of the Imperial Government are ignored by the Japanese Command, nor can it admit that the latter is a power independent of the Government.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic sincerely wishes to establish its relations with the Japanese people, not on the basis of the old wrongs committed by the Japanese troops against the Russian people, during the intervention, but on the reciprocal readiness of the two countries to establish friendly neighborly relations, based on perfect equality and mutual respect for the rights of each country. Let the Japanese Government make an honest and frank statement before the whole world, of its claims in the Russian Far East, as honest and frank as the statement of the people of the Far Eastern Republic, of their desire for peace at home and with their neighbors, and for the cessation of military intervention.

The Government and the people of the Far Eastern Republic are not only not attempting to evade those questions, but on the contrary, are trying to bring about an early settlement of them, and they are not to be blamed if the Japanese Government and the Japanese Command will not choose the open road. And if uprisings recur and blood is shed, let the whole world know that the Japanese Command is instigating them by every possible means, and that the Japanese Government is not preventing such activities on the part of the Command.

On behalf of the people of the Russian Far East we demand that Japan cease interference with our affairs. The Govern-

ment of the Far Eastern Republic, on behalf of the entire people of the Russian Far East who elected it, requests from the Japanese people and the Imperial Government of Japan a straightforward and definite answer to each of the following questions:

1. Do the Japanese Government and the Japanese people consider just the constant interference of the Japanese Command in Russian affairs against the will of the Russian people of the Far East?

2. Will the Japanese Government continue to help the criminals and the brigands of the bands of Semenov, Ungern, etc., and put obstacles in the way of the authorities of the Far Eastern Republic in their struggle against these bandits?

3. Does the Japanese Government consider it necessary to establish friendly neighborly relations with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic?

4. Does the Japanese Government consider it necessary to protect the interests of the Japanese merchants in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic in the only possible way, namely, to enter into a commercial treaty with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic?

5. Does the Japanese Government intend to withdraw from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic its army of occupation, the presence of which in Russian territory, as has been sufficiently proved during the last three years, has in no way helped to establish friendly relations nor to secure any privileges for Japanese residents, but on the contrary has been the source of a growing hatred toward Japan?

We hope for the sake of a better understanding between the two peoples that the Japanese Government will not delay to give straightforward and definite answers to all these questions.

We believe that the Japanese Government will choose a more righteous course in its relations with the Russian people. We firmly believe that a definite end will be put to the shameful policy of usurpation and violence, and that the Japanese Government will enter into just, sincere and friendly relations with the Russian people. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic is convinced that such a settlement of the matter will be to the

benefit of the Japanese people. While welcoming the friendly settlement of all outstanding matters, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic demands:

1. A definite statement of the Japanese Government and the Japanese Command that it will refrain from supporting the self-styled Government of Merkulov at Vladivostok. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic is convinced that this adventure is doomed to failure.

2. The Japanese Command shall immediately return all arms to the People's Defense Guard.

3. The Japanese Command shall not prevent the Government officials from making arrests and taking other necessary measures to restore order.

4. The Japanese Command shall not put any obstacles in the way of the local authorities of the Far Eastern Republic nor of the district emissary of the Government, Mr. Kozhevnikov, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok, in restoring order and protecting the lives of the foreign citizens residing in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic solemnly declares that if the Japanese Command does not interfere with the domestic affairs of the Republic, foreigners in the Maritime Province will enjoy absolute safety and the same hospitality as has been accorded them in the territory which has already been freed from the yoke of the intervention.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic, which has been elected by the Constituent Assembly on behalf of the entire population of the Russian Far East, solemnly declares that no adventures similar to that which occurred at Vladivostok will force the Government to forego its efforts to carry into effect the will of the people as expressed in the fundamental laws of the Republic enacted by the Constituent Assembly.

The Government will suppress all bandits from whatever quarter they may come and will defend the sovereign rights of the Russian people in the Far East, hoping to have the support of the entire civilized world.

And if the Japanese Government fails to give a straightforward and definite answer to the questions proposed by the people of the Russian Far East and if it refuses to comply with the lawful demands of the Russian people, the people of the Far East and their Government will not share the responsibility for continuation of the civil war and for the lack of order in the Maritime Province, placing the responsibility upon the Japanese Command because of its constant interference with the domestic affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, and the Government and the people of Japan will be held accountable before the entire civilized world.

We are firmly convinced that the Japanese Government will immediately discuss the abnormal conditions with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic and will in co-operating with it arrive at a decision satisfactory to both.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic,  
IGNATIUS L. YURIN.

Chita, June 2, 1921.

#### A NOTE OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC TO JAPAN

On November 17, the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic in Dairen submitted the following note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic to be delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan with regard to the events in the Maritime Province:

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic, notwithstanding the presence of Japanese occupational troops on the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, decided to start negotiations with the Japanese Government in order to establish friendly relations between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan, and to create the possibility of a peaceful industrial and commercial intercourse between the populations of the two countries. By so doing, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic assumed that the development of the agricultural life of the population of the Far Eastern Republic will have a favorable effect upon the interests of Japanese trade and industry.

In beginning negotiations in Dairen with the representatives



of the Japanese Government, the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic were well aware of the fact that the fundamental obstacle to the attainment of a peaceful intercourse between both countries is the presence of Japanese troops in the Maritime Province and in other parts of the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, as well as the presence, in these regions, of Russian organizations and armed detachments, which are hostile to the Far Eastern Republic, and which are constantly receiving support on the part of the Japanese Command. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic was convinced that simultaneously with the opening of negotiations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic in Dairen, the Japanese Government will begin the evacuation of its troops from the confines of the Far Eastern Republic and that it will take the necessary steps to prevent the organizations and detachments that are hostile to the Far Eastern Republic from being supported by Japanese troops and their Command.

The representatives of the Japanese Government, in the course of the negotiations, declared to the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic that no support would be given in the future by the Japanese military detachments and by the Japanese authorities to the aforesaid insurgent organizations and detachments; but, nevertheless, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic is compelled to state with the greatest regret that this announcement of the representatives of the Japanese Government was not actually put into effect. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic has received quite a number of reports pointing out that at the time when the deliberations on friendly relations and peaceful trade were going on between the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic and Japan, the insurgent organizations in the region where the Japanese troops were stationed continued to avail themselves in their struggle against the Far Eastern Republic of the indirect support of Japanese detachments and of the Japanese authorities.

Already in the middle of September, the military authorities delivered weapons to the insurgent White Guard detachments, and in every one of these detachments, during their attacks against the Far Eastern Republic, or their punitive expeditions against the local population, there was invariably a number,

larger or smaller, of Japanese soldiers taking part, the Japanese sometimes exceeding the number of the Russian White Guards.

Thus, for instance, the attack against the military post of the Army of the Far Eastern Republic in the village of Vassianovka, on November 15, was accomplished by 35 soldiers, of whom 33 were Japanese and two were Russians, dressed in Japanese uniforms. On November 16, in the region of Vladimiro-Alexandrovsk and Suchan, there occurred a joint advance of Japanese soldiers and Russian insurgents. In addition to such cases of direct support granted by the Japanese authorities to organizations and military detachments that were hostile to the Far Eastern Republic, there were also cases of indirect help. The organization of Russian reactionaries calling itself the Merkulov Government still goes on with the selling out of state and private property of the Far Eastern Republic which they criminally seized in Vladivostok and the surrounding district, and the transactions involved in the sales of these properties, which are concluded with Japanese firms, are endorsed by the Japanese authorities.

The population of the Maritime Province, aroused by these activities of the counter-revolutionary organizations and detachments, is trying to defend its life and property with its own forces. This self-defense, which takes the form of a partisan warfare, often leads to the destruction of the property of the Far Eastern Republic in the Maritime Province, and to armed clashes in this region. In the course of the last month the brutal outrages of the Russian counter-revolutionary organizations acting in the region where the Japanese troops are stationed, have reached their height. In Vladivostok and in the surroundings arrests are proceeding of peaceful inhabitants who are not guilty of any crime. The persons arrested are subjected to torments and tortures and are shot by the score without any investigation or legal proceedings. In the month of October occurred the brutal murder of Zeitlin, the representative of the Far Eastern Republic, who was ordered by the Government to go to Vladivostok in order to put a stop to the acts of lawlessness and destruction which were prevalent there. The responsibility for all these lawless acts and atrocities lies not only with the counter-revolutionary organizations of the Vladivostok region, which in their endeavors to put obstacles in the way of

the lawful authorities of the Far Eastern Republic do not stop at the most unheard of acts of brutality and atrocity. Indirectly the responsibility for them rests with the Japanese Military Command, and also with the Japanese Government, which, by continuing to keep its troops in this territory, by giving help and support to the counter-revolutionary organizations and detachments on this territory, enables them to commit with impunity all manner of offenses against the Russian Population.

In calling attention to the aforesaid facts, the Government of the Far Eastern Republic again protests against the acts of violence perpetrated upon the citizens of the Maritime Province and emphasizes that only then will it be possible to put a stop to these acts of violence, and to restore order in the southern part of the Maritime Province, when the Japanese Military Command will cease, directly or indirectly, to support the activities of the Russian counter-revolutionary detachments and organizations, and when the Japanese troops will be withdrawn from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

The Government of the Far Eastern Republic believes that the negotiations which are going on in Dairen between the Far Eastern Republic and Japan may be brought to a successful conclusion, and that both negotiating parties may conclude an agreement on peaceful economic relations, if only the Japanese troops are withdrawn from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, which would be a proof of the sincere intentions of the Japanese Government towards the Far Eastern Republic.  
November 17, 1921.

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#### PROTEST OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AGAINST THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JAPANESE

The National Assembly addressed the following appeal to all nations, protesting against the Japanese support of Merkulov, Semenov and Kappel, in their recent offensive in the Maritime Province:

The National Assembly, which was selected by the entire population of the Russian Far East, and which is vested with full power, is compelled once more to lodge a decisive protest against Japanese aggression in the Far East. The aggression

has aroused the extreme indignation of the National Assembly.

It is now the fourth year that foreign troops have invaded the Russian Far East. The Japanese sword is suppressing the will of the Russian people. We, the elected representatives of the Russian Far East, from the Maritime, Sakhalin, Priamur, Amur, Transbaikali and Pribaikali Provinces remember very well all stages of the Japanese intervention; all the atrocities committed by the Japanese against the Russian people in the Far East. All the members of the National Assembly are ready to testify to the Japanese endeavors to strengthen and continue their intervention by falsehoods, deceits and atrocities. The Japanese are aiming to seize our territory and turn it into a Japanese colony. We also have in our possession a great number of documents regarding the Japanese schemes to seize our territory.

Japanese troops continue to pour into Vladivostok. Japan controls the entire Russian-Pacific coast. The attack against the Japanese troops in Nikolayevsk in 1920 was the result of Japanese provocation. The Japanese are building fortifications, are digging trenches and putting up barbed wire on Russian territory. Russian rivers have been mined by the Japanese. The mouth of the Amur River has been closed to Russian ships and made a base for attacks upon us. In order to extend their occupation, the Japanese have seized Sakhalin and are exercising all the civil and military authority there. They are disposing of forestry, fishing and mining resources. Russians are prohibited from entering Sakhalin without Japanese permission. Russians are arrested on suspicion of having relations with the legal Russian government.

By prolonging civil war the Japanese create conditions warranting the continuation of intervention; by ruining the economic life of the Russian Far East they aim to spread their own influence.

The Maritime Provincial Assembly, which was elected by the entire population of the province, was endeavoring to establish a democratic rule through a Constituent Assembly, devising means for the unification and pacification of the country, but the Japanese continue their attempts by assisting reactionaries in the coup d'etat in Vladivostok and along the Ussuri Railroad.

Contrary to the agreement of April 29, which provided that

no armed forces be permitted in the Japanese zone, the Japanese have been allowing and aiding in organizing and maintaining anti-government forces. This paralyzed the efforts of the government to restore normal life, and frustrated all attempts to eliminate the marauding bands.


On May 29, the Russian militia which was despatched to Nikolsk-Ussurisk was disarmed by the Japanese, who allowed the town to be captured by the Semenovists. The Japanese prevented the search for arms in the house of a Japanese subject on Komarovsky Street, and arrested all our armed detachments and the commanding staff. During the coup d'etat of May 26, the Japanese disarmed and arrested the government troops who were resisting the Merkulov rebels.

The seizure of the Maritime Province and the introduction of the rule of Semenov proved that Japan's aggression in the Russian Far East is not objected to by other powers.


At the Dairen Conference between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic, the Japanese tried to obtain the consent of the Far Eastern Republic that Japanese troops should remain in Siberia, that fortifications of Russian cities be destroyed, and that the Japanese should obtain all concessions in the territory along the Tartar Straights—all of which means loss of Russian sovereignty and dependence on Japan economically and politically. Failing in this, the Japanese rendered assistance to Merkulov, in launching an attack for which the Japanese supplied munitions; and the entire responsibility for this attack rests with the Japanese.

The Russian people of the Far East repeatedly protested to the whole world against the Japanese atrocities. We protest against discussion by the Washington Conference of questions in which we are vitally interested, without our participation. We strongly protest against the continued presence of Japanese troops on Russian territory, which is an encroachment upon our sovereignty and independence.


(Signed) SUCHOVY, Chairman; BORODOVKIN, DUMKIN, SAYAPIN, FEDOROV, MER, LOBODA, YAKIMOV, ANZIFEROV, SHERTGOV, NIKIFOROV, LUKYANCHIKOV, DOMBINO, Members.  
Chita, December 9, 1921.












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


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